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Summary 
This dissertation investigates three areas of constitutional property law doctrine, 
namely the concept of property for constitutional purposes, the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation and the application of the proportionality principle as a 
means of determining the legitimacy of interferences with property. More specifically, 
it is determined how these three doctrinal areas are approached in the established 
constitutional democracies of Germany, the United States of America, the principles 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights, as well as relatively young 
constitutional democracies in Central Eastern Europe and South Africa.  
The respective German and US law approaches to the three doctrinal areas 
differ in certain aspects. Interestingly, while their points of departure differ, they 
reach similar conclusions in some instances. These two jurisdictions are presented 
as two points on a continuum of approaches to the three doctrinal areas, with the 
aim of determining whether the constitutional democracies in Central Eastern Europe 
and in South Africa resemble an approach closer to German or US law. The 
principles of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the three doctrinal 
areas are also investigated because they represent an alternative framework that 
influences the development of constitutional property law in the younger 
constitutional democracies, particularly in Central Eastern Europe because of their 
links to the European Union. 
Generally speaking, in relation to the three doctrinal areas, the dissertation 
concludes that on the continuum between German and US law, the constitutional 
democracies in Central Eastern Europe and South Africa seem to follow an 
approach that resembles German law rather than US law, although no explicit 
reference is made in this regard. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 iii 
Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek drie gebiede van grondwetlike eiendomsreg-leerstelling, 
naamlik die konsep van eiendom vir grondwetlike doeleindes, die onderskeid tussen 
ontneming en onteiening en die toepassing van die proporsionaliteitsbeginsel as 
meganisme om die legitimiteit van inmenging met eiendom te bepaal. Die ondersoek 
is verder gerig op hoe hierdie drie leerstellingsgebiede in die meer gevestigde 
grondwetlike demokrasieë van Duitsland en die Verenigde State van Amerika en die 
beginsels ontwikkel deur die Europese Hof van Menseregte benader word, 
vergeleke relatief jong grondwetlike demokrasieë in Sentraal-Oos-Europa en in Suid 
Afrika. 
Die onderskeie Duitse en Amerikaanse benaderings verskil met betrekking tot 
sekere aspekte. Interessant genoeg, verskil hul uitgangspunte in bepaalde opsigte 
en tog word soortgelykte gevolgtrekkings getref. Wat die drie leerstellingsgebiede 
betref, verteenwoordig hierdie twee jurisdiksies dus twee punte op ŉ kontinuum. 
Onderliggend aan hierdie ondersoek is die vraag of demokrasieë van Sentraal-Oos-
Europa en Suid-Afrika se benaderings vergelykbaar is met die Duitse of eerder die 
Amerikaanse reg. Die beginsels van die Europese Hof van Menseregte word ook in 
hierdie verband ondersoek omdat hulle ŉ alternatiewe raamwerk daarstel, veral wat 
die ontwikkeling van grondwetlike eiendomsreg in die jonger grondwetlike 
demokrasieë betref. Hier ter sprake is veral Sentraal-Oos-Europa, as gevolg van hul 
bande met die Europese Unie.  
Met betrekking tot die drie leerstellingsgebiede kom die proefskrif oor die 
algemeen tot die gevolgtrekking dat op die kontinuum tussen Duitse en Amerikaanse 
reg, die grondwetlike demokrasieë in Sentraal-Oos-Europa en in Suid Afrika 
benaderings volg wat vergelykbaar is met die Duitse reg eerder as die Amerikaanse 
reg, al word daar in hierdie verband nie eksplisiet daarna verwys nie. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 1 Introduction 
The development of constitutional property law can be said to be contextual in 
nature. The direction one jurisdiction chooses to go in developing or choosing not to 
develop their constitutional property law will not necessarily be the same as another. 
The Central Eastern European jurisdictions faced this problem of having to develop 
their constitutional property law following the fall of Communism in this region. Many 
of the countries in this region have set out on a course of constitutional 
transformation, beginning with the creation of new constitutions. 
With the process of creating a new constitution comes the question of how to 
approach the development of a new constitutional law for the region. South Africa 
was faced with this question after the end of apartheid. The Central Eastern 
European jurisdictions, like South Africa, looked abroad for guidance regarding how 
to go about constructing a new constitution and a new constitutional law. An 
advantage of looking beyond their own borders is that the dissemination of 
constitutional experience makes it possible for well-established and tested 
constitutional principles to be adopted quickly. 1  The Central Eastern European 
jurisdictions found themselves in a unique position: they could choose to forge ahead 
and create their own constitutional property law, or employ the approaches of other 
                                            
1 Ludwikowski R “Searching for a new constitutional model for East-Central Europe” (1991) 17 
Syracuse J Int’l L & Comm 92-170 at 92. See further Lach K & Sadurski W “Constitutional courts of 
Central and Eastern Europe: Between adolescence and maturity” (2008) 3 J Comp L 212-233 at 213-
216; Schwartz H “The bill of rights in America and Central East Europe” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub 
Pol’y 93-98 at 93-94; Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and 
Eastern Europe” (1998) 24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 294. 
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European jurisdictions as a starting point for developing their own constitutional 
property law. They could also adopt the constitutional principles regarding the 
protection of property developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
Some Central Eastern European jurisdictions have decided to apply the principles of 
the ECHR to provide content to the rights listed in their respective constitutions. In 
some jurisdictions the principles are applied in a secondary manner to confirm the 
results of the particular jurisdiction’s own existing constitutional principle. Others 
apply their own constitutional principles and do not use the principles of the ECHR at 
all. Generally speaking, the constitutional principles of the ECHR seem to be an 
important factor that may influence the development of constitutional law, particularly 
constitutional property law, in Central Eastern Europe. Regarding those Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions that apply their own constitutional principles, the 
question arises whether the approach of these jurisdictions to the constitutional 
definition of property, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of 
property and the application of the principle of proportionality perhaps resembles the 
approach to other, more established constitutional democracies, like for instance 
Germany and the United States.  
 Just like the Central Eastern European jurisdictions, South Africa can also be 
characterised as a relatively young constitutional democracy that is still in the 
process of refining its constitutional property law. In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v 
Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism, Eastern Cape,2 Froneman J stated that the question of property is 
fiercely contested in South African society and that there is, as yet, little common 
                                            
2  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
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ground on how we conceive property under section 25 of the Constitution,3 why we 
should do so, and what purpose the protection of property should serve.4 South 
Africa does not have a broad, regional framework that it can adopt to provide clarity 
to any constitutional property law issues that are unclear. Therefore, it will be 
interesting to see how South Africa approaches the specific constitutional property 
law issues of the constitutional definition of property, the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation of property and the application of the principle of 
proportionality and whether these approaches perhaps resemble those employed by 
more established constitutional democracies, in this case Germany and the United 
States. 
  
1 2 Research question, hypotheses and methodology 
1 2 1 Outline of the research problem 
The research question of this dissertation can be described as follows: assuming 
that German law and US law represent two more or less opposite approaches to 
three doctrinal issues in constitutional property law (specifically the definition of 
constitutional property, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, and the 
role of proportionality in adjudicating the validity of state limitations of property 
rights), can it be said that the emerging constitutional property law doctrine in 
younger constitutional democracies (specifically jurisdictions in Central Eastern 
Europe, and also South Africa) resemble one, rather than the other, of these 
                                            
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
4  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 4. 
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approaches? Secondly, is it possible to establish why developments in any of the 
younger democracies tend to follow a particular approach? 
 
1 2 2 Hypotheses 
The German and US law approaches to the concept of property for constitutional 
purposes, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation and the application 
of the proportionality principle are discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation. My 
hypotheses in this regard are, firstly, that these two older, more established 
constitutional democracies represent different approaches to these three themes; in 
instances where similar outcomes are reached in relation to the three themes, the 
methodology and reasoning differs between the two jurisdictions. Secondly, the 
German and US law approaches to the three main themes can be set up as two 
points on a continuum of approaches against which the approaches of younger 
constitutional democracies such as the Central Eastern European jurisdictions and 
South Africa to the three main themes can be measured. 
 Chapter 3 explores the principles of the ECHR regarding the protection of 
possessions. In this regard, my hypothesis is that the principles relating to the 
protection of possessions in terms of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 5 
represent an alternative framework to the approaches of German and US law to the 
three main themes that influence the development of constitutional property law in 
the Central Eastern European jurisdictions. This is because of the special 
relationship that exists between the ECHR and those Central Eastern European 
                                            
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by 
Protocols Nos 11 and 144 and by supplemented Protocols Nos 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13). 
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jurisdictions that are either signatories to the Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Maastricht Treaty,6 member states of the 
European Union or have a different connection to the ECHR. 
Chapter 4 investigates the development of constitutional property law in the 
selected Central Eastern European jurisdictions relating to the three main themes of 
the concept of property for constitutional purposes, the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation and the application of the proportionality principle. The 
hypotheses in this regard are, firstly, that the selected Central Eastern European 
jurisdictions make use of the principles regarding the protection of possessions 
developed by the ECHR because all of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions 
discussed are signatories to the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Secondly, those Central Eastern European 
jurisdictions that do not follow the approach of the ECHR follow an approach that is 
closer to the general trend of German law rather than US law. 
The South African law approaches to the concept of property for constitutional 
purposes, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation and the application 
of the proportionality principle are discussed in chapter 5. The purpose of this 
discussion is to determine where South African law currently stands regarding the 
three main themes. The hypothesis in this regard is that the South African 
Constitutional Court’s approach to each of the three main themes is closer to the 
general trend of German law rather than US law.   
 
                                            
6 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), 29 July 1992, 1992 OJ C 191/1. 
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1 2 3 Methodology 
The dissertation will attempt to provide a normative assessment of the approach to 
the three problem areas followed in the Central Eastern European jurisdictions and 
South Africa and to determine why they follow the approach that they do, insofar as it 
is possible to determine this. The primary focus remains on the approaches adopted 
by the Central Eastern European jurisdictions but South African constitutional law is 
investigated as well to add to the comparative approach of this dissertation and 
because South Africa is also a relatively young constitutional democracy that could 
perhaps benefit from the doctrine of older and more established constitutional 
democracies. 
In order to answer the research question, German and US law, being much 
older and more established constitutional democracies, are presented as two 
different approaches to constitutional property law, particularly with reference to the 
three problem areas of the definition of property for constitutional purposes, the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property and the role of 
proportionality in adjudicating the validity of state limitations of property. The 
approach of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions and South Africa to each of 
these three doctrinal areas will ultimately be measured against that of German and 
US law to see if these relatively young constitutional democracies follow something 
more like the German or more like the US law approach. The role of the ECHR and 
the Central Eastern European jurisdictions’ international law relationship to it is also 
investigated in a separate chapter to determine how this relationship affects the 
development of their constitutional property law. The discussions of German law and 
the Central Eastern European jurisdictions are based on secondary sources that 
were available in English. Invariably, the availability of English sources regarding the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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constitutional property law of the Central Eastern European affects the level of detail 
in certain areas of the discussion as well the generality of the conclusions regarding 
the research questions investigated in that chapter. 
 
1 3 Outline of chapters 
1 3 1 Established doctrine 
Chapter 2 presents German and US law as examples of established doctrine in core 
doctrinal areas of constitutional property law and as two different approaches to the 
three core doctrinal areas of constitutional property law focused on in this 
dissertation. These two jurisdictions represent opposite approaches in certain core 
areas, while in other areas they reach similar conclusions although their points of 
departure are different. German and US law are also presented as two markers on a 
continuum of approaches to the three doctrinal areas. This chapter briefly describes 
both the German and US law approaches to the constitutional definition of property, 
the distinction between deprivation and expropriation and the role of proportionality 
in adjudicating the validity of state limitations of property rights. The purpose of this is 
to assess the Central Eastern European and South African approaches to the three 
doctrinal issues to determine if they follow an approach that is closer to the German 
or US law.  
  
1 3 2 European Court of Human Rights 
In chapter 3 of the dissertation another framework that might influence the 
development of constitutional property law in the Central Eastern European 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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jurisdictions is analysed. The purpose of this comparative chapter is to investigate 
the special relationship between the ECHR and those Central Eastern European 
countries that are either signatories to the Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signatories to the Maastricht Treaty, member 
states of the European Union or that have some other connection to the ECHR. In 
this regard, this chapter specifically investigates the doctrine of the ECHR regarding 
the definition of possessions, the distinction between deprivation (regulation) and 
expropriation of possessions and the application of the fair balance principle 
developed through the court’s interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.7 An investigation into the ECHR’s doctrine regarding the three core 
doctrinal areas is necessary because the Central Eastern European jurisdictions 
discussed in this dissertation are in principle members of the European Union and 
are therefore bound by the ECHR’s principles. It will be clear in this chapter that 
some of the Central Eastern European constitutional courts apply the ECHR’s 
doctrine when adjudicating constitutional matters involving property, either to provide 
content to their own constitutional right to property or in conjunction with the specific 
constitutional court’s existing principles.  
 
1 3 3 Central Eastern European jurisdictions  
Chapter 4 investigates the development of constitutional property law in Central 
Eastern Europe following the fall of Communism in the region. The aim of this 
investigation is to determine, as far as possible based on the sources available in 
                                            
7 Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS 9. 
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English, whether these developments follow a particular approach generally. It is 
also investigated, based on the sources available in English, whether the 
development of constitutional property law relating to the constitutional definition of 
property, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property and the 
application of the proportionality principle as a means of legitimising interferences 
with property resembles either the German or the US approach to these three 
doctrinal areas. Therefore the focus of this chapter is not on whether the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions directly cite or follow German or US law, but rather to 
establish normatively whether the Central Eastern European jurisdictions follow an 
approach that is closer to the general trend of German or US law. 
 
1 3 4 South African law 
Chapter 5 investigates how the concept of property for constitutional purposes, the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property and the principle of 
proportionality as a requirement for the validity of interferences with property are 
approached in South African constitutional property law. The purpose and approach 
of the chapter is not to determine whether there is anything in the emerging case law 
of Central Eastern European jurisdictions that the South African Constitutional Court 
can use. Rather, the South African Constitutional Court’s reasons for following or not 
following specific foreign law examples and whether these reasons align with those 
of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions for either following or not following 
certain foreign law examples will be investigated. It will also be investigated whether 
the South African constitutional property law approach to the three issues is closer to 
either the German or US law markers established in chapter 2. Consequently, the 
ultimate purpose of this investigation is to the determine where the South African law 
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currently stands regarding these three doctrinal areas and where the approach to 
these three doctrinal areas falls on the continuum between the German and US law 
approaches. 
 
1 4 Qualifications  
This dissertation is limited to the discussion of how the concept of property for 
constitutional purposes, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation and 
the application of the proportionality principle is understood in German law, US law, 
the doctrine of the ECHR, selected Central Eastern European jurisdictions and South 
African law. I do not attempt to discuss all the relevant material pertaining to the 
three main themes from the jurisdictions discussed. I discuss a selection of relevant 
and important case law and examples in order to pick up general trends in the 
respective jurisdictions and to draw conclusions in this regard.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation dealing with German and US law is not intended 
as a detailed analysis of the approach of these two jurisdictions regarding the three 
main themes discussed. The purpose of that chapter is to provide a cursory 
description and a broad outline of the German and US law positions (or doctrine) 
regarding the three main themes. As mentioned already, the discussion of German 
law will be based on secondary sources available in English because I cannot read 
German.  
The investigation of the selected Central Eastern European jurisdictions’ 
approach to the three themes in chapter 4 is based on sources that are available in 
English and therefore I realise that the discussion in that chapter may not be 
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complete and that it is likely that certain areas will perhaps be more detailed than 
others. This will necessarily affect the generality of the conclusions reached in that 
chapter. However, my argument is that it is possible, given what is available in 
English, to draw specific conclusions about whether the trend in the respective 
jurisdictions pertaining to the three issues tends more towards one end of the 
continuum than another.   
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Chapter 2  
German and US law: Established doctrine 
2 1 Introduction 
German law1 and US law represent two examples of established doctrine in certain 
core doctrinal constitutional property law issues, specifically the definition of 
constitutional property, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, and the 
role of proportionality in adjudicating the validity of state limitations of property rights. 
In some of the core areas, they represent opposite approaches, while in others they 
reach a similar conclusion although their points of departure are very different. This 
chapter presents German and US law as two examples of different approaches to 
three doctrinal issues relating to constitutional property law and as two markers on a 
continuum. The purpose of the chapter is to ultimately assess the Central Eastern 
European and South African approaches to the three doctrinal issues to determine if 
they follow an approach that tends more towards German or US law.2  
Both German and US law protect property from arbitrary interference by the 
state.3 However, their respective constitutional provisions concerning property look 
                                            
1 I cannot read German and therefore the discussion of German law will be based on secondary 
sources that are available in English. 
2 See chapters 4 and 5 below. 
3 Blaauw-Wolf L & Wolf J “A comparison between German and South African limitation provisions” 
(1996) SALJ 267-296 at 267; Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison 
between the German and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 427-427; Blaauw-Wolf 
L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the doctrine of 
Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 180-201; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 158-163, 451-458; Dana DA & 
Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 121-168; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation 
of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 258-314; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 
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very different. Article 14 of the German Basic Law4 guarantees property as a right 
and states that the law determines the substance and limits of property. 
Furthermore, Article 14 states that property entails obligations and the use of 
property should serve the public interest and also provides for expropriation of 
property if certain requirements are met. The property clause of the United States 
Constitution 5  appears in the Fifth Amendment, 6  read with the Fourteenth 
Amendment7 to the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment proscribes the 
deprivation of property without due process of law (the Due Process Clause) and 
states that property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (the 
Takings Clause).8  
The German and US property clauses differ substantially in terms of both form 
and content. Article 14 not only guarantees property as a right but also sets out how 
the legislature should determine the content of property for the purposes of Article 
14.9 This allows for the regulation of property and achieves a similar goal to that of 
                                                                                                                                        
722-732; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American 
Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 133-147, 73-95; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 201, 203, 215-217, 225-227, 241-242, 272-273, 454-455, 493-501.    
4 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949 (as amended on and up to 30 December 
1993) (Grundgesetz, GG).  
5 Constitution of the United States of America, 1787. 
6 Fifth Amendment, 1791. 
7 Fourteenth Amendment, 1868. 
8 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 398-399; Dana DA 
& Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 3-4; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 678-692; 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 64.   
9 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 413; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: 
A Comparative Analysis (1999) 124-132, 132-146; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 80-85, 224; Alexander GS The Global Debate 
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the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment,10 even though Article 14 and the 
Due Process Clause are very different. Article 14 distinguishes between the 
regulation of property in Article 14.1 and the expropriation of property in Article 
14.3,11 whereas the Fifth Amendment only refers to “deprivation” of property in the 
sense of regulation of property.12 Regarding expropriation, Article 14.3 sets strict 
requirements for a valid expropriation. Expropriation may only take place in the 
public interest and pursuant to a law, which must also determine the nature and 
extent of compensation. The Fifth Amendment requires a public use and just 
compensation for property to be “taken” or expropriated.  
In US constitutional property law the courts developed the doctrine of 
regulatory takings. A regulatory taking occurs when a regulation of property in terms 
of the state’s police power goes too far and is treated as a taking of property, thus 
                                                                                                                                        
over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 114-115, 124-131; 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 172-174. 
10 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 398-408, 441-
450; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 68-85; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 2-6; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American 
Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 69-70; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 121-
123, 174-175. 
11 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 424-427; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 132-150; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 278-289; Alexander GS The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 116-124; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 365-367. 
12 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 410-423, 423-
440; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 86-118; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd 
ed (2005) 675-752; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for 
American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 64-95; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 201. 
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requiring compensation to the affected owner.13 This concept results in a grey area 
between a regulation and expropriation of property. This grey area does not exist in 
German constitutional property law where an interference with property can only be 
characterised as a regulation (determination of the scope and content of property) or 
an expropriation of property. This is due to the strict requirements that must be 
adhered to in order for either a regulation or expropriation of property to be 
constitutionally valid. If the specific requirements are not met, the regulation or 
expropriation is unconstitutional. Therefore, the concept of a regulatory taking cannot 
exist in German constitutional property law.  
On a methodological note, the purpose of this chapter is not to analyse German 
and US law in any detail relating to the constitutional concept of property, the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation and the role of proportionality in 
adjudicating the validity of state limitations of property rights. The purpose of this 
chapter is to superficially describe and broadly outline the German14 and US law 
positions regarding these core doctrinal areas for the ultimate purpose of comparing 
them with the other jurisdictions discussed in subsequent chapters. As was indicated 
earlier in this introduction, German and US law overlap in some of these core areas, 
at least to some extent, but diverge so widely in others that they can be seen as 
opposite ends on a continuum of possible positions regarding the specific point at 
hand. The relative positions adopted in these two legal systems are therefore useful 
                                            
13 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 415. See further Dana DA & Merrill TW 
Property: Takings (2002) 4-6; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 670, 680-692; 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 70-77; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 355-359; 
Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 62-80.   
14 Therefore, it will be unnecessary to expand the citations for the German law aspects of the chapter 
beyond those required for the superficial description and broad outline.  
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markers for a broader comparison of developments in other, less developed 
systems. 
 
2 2 Property 
2 2 1 Introduction  
The German Basic Law and the US Constitution both provide for the protection of 
property from state interference, except in certain circumscribed instances. However, 
these two jurisdictions follow different approaches regarding how property is viewed 
from a constitutional perspective. German private law views property as a 
relationship between persons and things in which they have a concrete and vested 
right. A much wider range of interests is recognised as property for the purposes of 
Article 14 than under the German private law definition of property.15 Article 14 
protects the property of a person and not their wealth in general.16 Therefore, Article 
14 must be relied on in relation to a specific item of property that is recognised as 
such under Article 14.  
                                            
15 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 124-131. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 226-227; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd 
ed (2011) 117-119.   
16 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 119. The US Supreme Court also 
follows this approach, in that it protects only identifiable assets and not general financial interests. 
See further Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German 
and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 414; Mostert H The Constitutional 
Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and 
Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 227-229; Alexander GS 
The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 
127-128. 
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US law views property as a relationship between people with regard to things 
and not between people and things, even in private law.17 The question of whether a 
particular interest or object constitutes property plays a relatively minor role in the 
adjudication of property disputes under this view, which allows for a wide range of 
interests to fall under the property protection provided for in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, without much concern for any differences between private and 
constitutional law. What is at issue in property disputes under US law are the rights 
and duties pertaining to the legal relationship between the parties in so far as these 
rights and duties pertain to property interests. 
 
2 2 2 German law 
Article 14 of the German Basic Law regulates the constitutional protection of 
property. 18  Article 14.1 provides that property and the right of inheritance are 
guaranteed and that the law determines the substance of property and the right of 
inheritance and their limits. Article 14.2 provides that property entails obligations and 
that its use should also serve the public interest. Article 14 does not guarantee the 
right of “ownership” alone, but rather “property”, as is clear from the official English 
translation of Eigentum as property and the fact that a much wider range of 
                                            
17 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 2. See further Alexander GS The Global Debate 
over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 4; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 103-104.  
18 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 413; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: 
A Comparative Analysis (1999) 124-132, 132-146; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 80-85, 224; Alexander GS The Global Debate 
over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 114-115, 124-131; 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 172-174. 
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proprietary interests than ownership in the private law sense is protected under 
Article 14.19  Article 14.1 is phrased in general terms and does not provide a 
constitutional definition of property. This means that the property guarantee in Article 
14.1 could, in theory, encompass all conceivable forms of property but it is the 
legislature that determines which forms of property qualify for protection and what 
their contents are.20  
Regarding the constitutional concept of property, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (BVerfG) held in the 
Naβauskiesung21 case that 
“[t]he legal view that the right to property conferred by § 903 of the Civil Code takes 
precedence over public-law norms […] contradicts the Basic Law. The concept of 
property as guaranteed by the constitution must be derived from the constitution itself. 
This concept of property in the constitutional sense cannot be derived from legal norms 
                                            
19 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 413; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: 
A Comparative Analysis (1999) 151; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 224-225; Alexander GS The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 124-131; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 172-174.  
20 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 413; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 224; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 172. 
21 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung). Case translation in Kommers DP & Miller RA The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 642. See further Van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 117-118; Mostert H The Constitutional 
Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and 
Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 247-250. 
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[ordinary statutes] lower in rank than the constitution, nor can the scope of the concrete 
property guarantee be determined on the basis of private-law regulations.” 22 
Kommers and Miller explain that, in this case, the BVerfG departed from the liberal 
orientation whereby its concept of property deferred to the historical, private law 
notion of the right to property (also Eigentum) codified in the German Civil Code.23 In 
German private law, property is limited to corporeal things (Sachen).24 The approach 
of the BVerfG begins with the private law concept of property but then expands it to 
establish the constitutional concept of property for the purposes of Article 14. The 
private law notion of property is consequently narrower than the constitutional 
concept of property under Article 14. 
The BVerfG has indicated which sources it does and does not use to determine 
what is regarded as property for constitutional purposes.25 One source that the 
BVerfG regards as carrying less weight is the text of the Basic Law itself. Instead of 
relying on a direct textual interpretation of the Basic Law or on private law doctrine, 
the BVerfG relies on the fundamental purpose of property as a constitutional right, 
namely the securing of a sphere of personal liberty necessary for individuals to take 
responsibility for their own life and to participate in the development and functioning 
                                            
22 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung). Case translation in Kommers DP & Miller RA The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 642. 
23 Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd 
ed (2012) 640.  
24 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) SAPL 402-445 at 419; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 151; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property 
and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 215; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 125-127; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 117. 
25 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 124. 
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of the social order. In deciding whether a particular interest is included or excluded 
from constitutional property, the question is whether the constitutional protection of 
an interest would serve this fundamental purpose.  
The BVerfG embraces a wide concept of property, subject to the requirements 
that recognised rights must be both concrete in nature and vested.26 Only specific 
assets are regarded as property for the purposes of the Basic Law and not a 
person’s general wealth or financial status.27 The wider notion of property that the 
Federal Constitutional Court developed on the basis of a general constitutional 
principle allows for future extrapolation of the concept of property.28 In line with this 
principle, the BVerfG has held that it is for the courts to bring the range of objects to 
be protected under Article 14 in line with developments in private law as well as with 
                                            
26 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 163. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 421-422; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 156-157; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 229; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 128-131.  
27 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 119. The US Supreme Court also 
follows this approach, in that it protects only identifiable assets and not general financial interests. 
See further Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German 
and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 414; Mostert H The Constitutional 
Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and 
Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 227-229; Alexander GS 
The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 
127-128.  
28 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 117. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 419; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property 
and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 224-225; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 125. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 21 
social needs in general, thereby extending the concept of property to new objects 
continuously as the need arises.29 
Regarding the interpretation of Eigentum by the BVerfG, Van der Walt states 
that: 
“The German Federal Constitutional Court established a typically constitutional 
interpretation of the term Eigentum that is different from the traditional private-
law meaning of this term, both in referring to the objects of property rights 
(property as opposed to things) and in referring to the range of property rights or 
entitlements (property as opposed to ownership). The constitutional meaning of 
Eigentum as property was developed by interpreting it according to the 
constitutional question whether the inclusion of a specific object or right of 
property under the protection of article 14 GG would serve the constitutional 
purpose of creating and protecting a sphere of personal freedom where the 
individual is enabled (and expected to take responsibility for the effort) to realise 
and promote the development of her own life and personality, within the social 
context.”30    
                                            
29 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 419. See further Mostert H The Constitutional 
Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and 
Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 225; Alexander GS The 
Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 125; 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 119, where Van der Walt states that a 
purposive or functional approach, which relies on the constitutional purpose of the property clause, 
ensures a generous understanding of the objects of property rights in German-language jurisdictions, 
where such an approach might seem counterintuitive in view of the narrow definition of property as 
tangible things in private law.    
30 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 104-105. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 414; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 151-153; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 226; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 124. 
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The result of this approach is that the term Eigentum, as referring to the objects of 
property rights, is interpreted as “things” for the purposes of private law and as 
“property” for the purposes of constitutional law.31 Tangible things are obviously 
protected under Article 14, but a number of intangible objects are also regarded as 
property for the purposes of Article 14. Examples of these intangible objects are 
intellectual property rights such as copyright 32  and trademarks. 33  Commercial 
property interests such as contractual34 and delictual claims35 are also recognised as 
                                            
31 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 118. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 413; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 151; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 215, 224; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 124-125.  
32 BVerfGE 31, 229 (1971) (Urheberrecht), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 
3rd ed (2011) 147 and translation in Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 651-654. See further Mostert H The Constitutional 
Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and 
Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 233-234.  
33 BVerfGE 51, 193 (1979) (Warenzeichen), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 118. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 152; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 233-234. 
34 BVerfGE 83, 201 (1991) (Vorkaufsrecht), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 
3rd ed (2011) 118. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 152; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 230. 
35 BVerfGE 42, 263 (1976) (Contergan), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd 
ed (2011) 118. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 
(1999) 152-153; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence 
on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative 
Analysis (2002) 230.  
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property, as well as workers’ rights36 and certain public-law participation rights.37 
Despite this wide constitutional view of property adopted by the BVerfG, it has 
nevertheless held that intangible interests are only recognised as property once they 
have vested in the beneficiary of the interest in accordance with the law on the basis 
of own investment or performance and not merely on the basis of contingent 
interests or expectations.38  
The BVerfG has stated that: 
“The contents and functions of property are capable and in need of adaptation to 
social and economic conditions. It is the task of the legislature to undertake such 
                                            
36 BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979) (Mitbestimmung), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 118. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 140-142; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 100, 114. 
37 BVerfGE 69, 272 (1985) (Eigenleistung), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 
3rd ed (2011) 118. See further Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison 
between the German and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 421; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 156-157; Mostert H The 
Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law 
and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS 
The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 
128-131. 
38  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 119; BVerfGE 69, 272 (1985) 
(Eigenleistung), discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 118. See 
further Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and 
South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 421; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 156-157; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 128-131. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 24 
adaptation while taking into account the fundamental constitutional guideline 
concerning ethical values.”39 
Based on this point of departure, Mostert concludes that the legislature and the 
BVerfG must allow changes in common perceptions to be channelled into law, while 
maintaining the Basic Law as a guideline to measure such changes. Therefore, the 
constitutional property guarantee anticipates a differentiation between the various 
kinds of property according to the kind of protection they deserve.40   
The BVerfG has held that certain public law entitlements are included under the 
protection of the property guarantee in Article 14, while others are not.41 In order for 
a public law entitlement to be included under the protection of Article 14, it must 
meet the three requirements set out in the Eigenleistung case.42 Firstly, the right 
                                            
39 BVerfGE 12, 112 (1969) (Niedersächsisches Deichgesetz) 117. Translation in Mostert H The 
Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law 
and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 225.  
40 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform 
of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 225. 
See further Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German 
and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 419; Alexander GS The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 130-131; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 117-119.  
41 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 163. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 421; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 156-157; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 128-131.  
42 BVerfGE 69, 272 (1985) (Eigenleistung), discussed in Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of 
property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 
at 421. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
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must resemble private property in that it takes the form of an exclusionary right that 
the holder has been awarded by the state; secondly, it must be based on substantial 
contributions (efforts or inputs) of the holder of the right; and thirdly, the right must 
serve to ensure the holder’s existence (survival). The second requirement excludes 
from protection mere welfare handouts by the state to which the individual did not 
substantially and directly contribute, for example expectations of social benefit 
grants, claims to educational grants, and business and state housing subsidies. The 
protected public law rights depend on a relationship of exchange between the 
individual and the state; as counter-performance for the individual’s contribution, the 
state allocates the right to the individual for private use in accordance with the first 
and third requirements.43 
Van der Walt explains: 
“These requirements are based on the fundamental guideline which ensures that 
an equitable balance can be struck between the interests of the individual and 
the public interest. On the one hand, recognition of a public-law participatory 
right as property means that it is protected just like any other property, although 
the usual principles of constitutional property apply: only concrete rights are 
protected and not wealth in general; and only vested rights or acquired rights are 
recognised. […] On the other hand the public interest is also taken into account: 
the German Federal Constitutional Court has decided that the public-law rights, 
funded as they are from public money, are not absolute entitlements but relative 
to the state of the economy in the sense that their monetary value can be 
                                                                                                                                        
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 128-131; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 163.  
43 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 421. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 156-157; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection 
and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in 
South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS The Global Debate 
over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 128-131; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 163. 
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amended to suit the state’s financial situation, without the amendment amounting 
to an unlawful deprivation or expropriation.”44  
Therefore, the BVerfG embraces a wide concept of constitutional property that is 
capable of further extrapolation should the need arise. The basic principle is that only 
concrete, vested or acquired rights are protected under Article 14.  
 
2 2 3 US law 
The Fifth45 and Fourteenth46 Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of 
America47 (the Constitution), read together, provide protection for property.48 These 
two clauses are usually referred to as the “Takings Clause”49 and the “Due Process 
                                            
44 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 163-164. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 421; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 156-157; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 238; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 128-131; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 163.  
45 Fifth Amendment 1791. Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 1: The Fifth Amendment, 
as part of the original Bill of Rights, directly constrains the federal Government.     
46 Fourteenth Amendment 1868. Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 1-2: The protection 
afforded by the Fifth Amendment is applied to the individual states through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
47 Constitution of the United States of America, 1787.  
48 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 398-408 and 441-
450; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 68-85; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 2-6; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American 
Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 69-70; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 121-
123 and 174-175. 
49 The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall be […] deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.” 
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Clause”50 respectively.51 The Due Process Clause provides that nobody shall be 
deprived of property without due process of law and the Takings Clause provides 
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In 
case law and literature, concerns about the objects of property play a very minor 
role. 52 A wide range of intangible interests tend to be recognised as property for the 
purposes of constitutional law because there were few concerns with this issue in 
private law and therefore it was unnecessary to set off constitutional law against a 
narrow private law tradition as in German law. The result is that a range of objects 
are regarded as property in US constitutional law, including some personal or 
creditor’s rights, the mainstream intellectual property interests, intangible commercial 
interests, certain social or welfare interests and the right to pursue certain legal 
remedies.53   
Similar to German law, not just any intangible interest of value is recognised as 
property. 54  Certain categories of intangible interests are not regarded as 
constitutional property, such as general financial interests falling short of being 
identifiable assets,55 contingent future interests such as prospective clients for a 
                                            
50 The Fourteenth Amendment states that “… nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the law.”  
51 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 398-399. See 
further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 1-2. 
52 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 121. See further, for example, Goldberg 
v Kelly 397 US 254 (1970) and Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1972). 
53 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 122, 135-137, 147-148.  
54 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 135. See further Alexander GS The 
Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 69. 
55 Eastern Enterprises v Apfel 524 US 498 (1998). See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: 
Takings (2002) 70-71; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 135. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 28 
business56 and benefits that derive directly from the government, such as future 
social security payments.57 This indicates that in US law a wide range of intangibles 
is recognised as property for constitutional purposes, but the mere fact that an 
intangible interest is valuable does not necessarily qualify it as property. This is 
similar to the position in German law, where interests amounting to mere 
expectancies or contingent interests and general financial interests or wealth do not 
qualify as property either.58  
The requirement that an interest must be property has not been a problem for 
purposes of the Takings Clause.59 Alexander states that: 
“[t]he overwhelming majority of governmental actions that are likely to implicate 
the takings clause, including both overt exercises of the eminent domain power 
and regulatory measures, involve interests that clearly satisfy the ‘property’ 
requirement, usually standard estates or lesser interests in land. Certainly all 
interests that are classified as property under the private law rules of property, 
real and personal, satisfy the constitutional requirement.”60  
                                            
56 College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Secondary Educational Expense Board 527 US 666 
(1999). See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 74-75; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 135. 
57 Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603 (1960); Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1972); Town of 
Castle Rock, Colorado v Gonzales 545 US 748 (2005). See further Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254 
(1970). In this case the Supreme Court was willing to accept that social security payments are worthy 
of protection as far as the Due Process Clause of the property guarantee was concerned, but not for 
purposes of the Takings Clause: Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 442; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 135. 
58 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 123. See further 2 2 2 above. 
59 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 69. 
60 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 69.  
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Therefore, easements,61 leases,62 mineral rights63 and security interests64 have all 
been considered to be property for the purposes of the Takings Clause.65 However, 
not all interests are protected under the Takings Clause. The United States Supreme 
Court (the Supreme Court) has expressly held that no compensation is required for 
governmental actions that affect interests that are not private property.66 
In Board of Regents v Roth67 the Supreme Court held that:  
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they 
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law – rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of 
entitlement to those benefits.”68  
This is the positivist approach to the issue of property and under this approach, 
constitutional property relies on independent sources such as, but not limited to, 
state law.69 An important ambiguity exists in this statement. Dana and Merrill argue 
                                            
61 United States v Virginia Electric & Power Co 365 US 624 (1961) (flowage easement). 
62 United States v General Motors Corp 323 US 373 (1945) (leasehold). 
63 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) (mining interest). 
64 United States v Security Industrial Bank 459 US 70 (1982) (security interest). 
65 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 69. 
66 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 69. For example in United States v Willow River Power Co 324 US 499 (1945) 
the Supreme Court held that the Willow River Power Company’s interest or advantage in the high-
water level of the St Croix River in order to maintain its power output was not a right protected by law 
and thus did not constitute private property for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 
67 Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1972). See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 443-444; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 122.  
68 Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1972) at 577. 
69 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 85. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 174-
175. 
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that this statement could mean that state law both provides the definition of property 
and determines whether property has been created in a given case. Alternatively, 
this statement could mean that federal constitutional law defines property and that 
state law is the source to which courts should look to determine whether property 
has been created, applying the constitutional definition.70 Subsequent case law has 
done little to clarify which of the above meanings is correct. Alexander refers to 
Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation71 and Palazollo v Rhode Island72 to suggest 
that the Supreme Court rejects the pure positivistic approach of the first meaning, but 
the implications of these decisions remains unclear.73  
As stated above, the United States Supreme Court has rarely dealt with the 
issue of what constitutes “private property” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 
An explanation for this lack of attention to what could be considered a threshold 
inquiry is that most of the cases that implicate the Takings Clause deal with interests 
that obviously satisfy the “private property” requirement. The Supreme Court will only 
venture into an analysis of what it considers to be “private property” for the purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment when it encounters an interest that is not an obvious 
example of “private property.” Another explanation is that property in US law tends to 
be viewed in terms of rights as relationships between legal subjects and not in terms 
of specific objects. This tendency results in the objects of property playing a minor 
role in a property dispute, while property rights are given prominence. 
                                            
70 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 62-63. See further Alexander GS The Global 
Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 70. 
71 Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation 524 US 156 (1998).  
72 Palazollo v Rhode Island 533 US 606 (2001).  
73 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 85-86. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 
174-175. 
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2 2 4 Conclusion 
From the above, certain similarities and differences emerge from the comparison 
between the German and US law approaches to the constitutional concept of 
property. Both German and US law have a wide constitutional notion of property that 
begins with the private law concept but then, in the case of German law, goes 
beyond it. The constitutional notion of property in these two jurisdictions includes 
most well-known and recognised rights and interests in property, both real and 
personal, regarding both tangible things and intangibles, and that includes things like 
intellectual property and some public law rights as well.  
US law appears to end up in the same place as German law to the extent that a 
wide definition of property is recognised for constitutional protection, with roughly 
similar categories of non-property interests excluded in both systems, such as a 
person’s general wealth or mere expectations. This similarity is only partial since 
there are categories, such as public participation rights, where US law recognises 
the interest as property but only for the purposes of due process, in other words the 
interest cannot be the object of a taking that requires compensation. 
Another difference is that the German Basic Law explicitly allows the legislature 
to determine the content and limits of property, meaning that property is not a pre-
constitutional right. In US law, the source of property is state law, which can imply 
that at least some property rights are pre-constitutional. The importance of this 
difference is that any limitation of pre-constitutional rights will require compensation 
and in German law there are no such rights.  
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2 3 Distinction between deprivation and expropriation  
2 3 1 Introduction  
The distinction between deprivation and expropriation is not always clear and easy to 
make. There are a number of different approaches or ways of viewing this 
distinction. Van der Walt explains that there are four approaches to the distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation: 74 as two discrete categories that do not 
overlap at all; as two partially overlapping categories; as two extremes on a 
continuum; or as two overlapping categories of which the smaller is wholly included 
in the larger. Confusion is worst when the two categories are seen as overlapping in 
part or as the two extremes on a continuum, because both of these approaches 
create the possibility to distinguish a grey area where deprivation shades into 
expropriation. Where it is accepted that such a grey area exists, courts appear to 
struggle to distinguish deprivation cases from expropriation cases clearly and 
consistently. However, where deprivation and expropriation are viewed either as two 
discrete, non-overlapping categories or as a smaller category wholly incorporated 
into a larger one, the potential for confusion is reduced, though the initial distinction 
is not necessarily easier to make.75 Besides these four approaches, there are a 
variety of other ways of distinguishing cases of deprivation from cases of 
expropriation. Different approaches could for instance compare the characteristics of 
each, the public use or public purpose requirement for an expropriation to be 
constitutional and the fact that an expropriation must be accompanied by 
compensation.  
   
                                            
74 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 192. 
75 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 192.  
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2 3 2 Terminology 
Differences in terminology may cause confusion when attempting to compare how 
different jurisdictions approach the distinction between deprivation and expropriation. 
For example, some jurisdictions refer to “deprivations” of property in the sense of 
regulation of property, whereas others use the term “deprivation” when what is really 
meant is an expropriation of property. Another example is US law, which uses 
neither the term “deprivation” nor “expropriation” but expropriation is included in its 
notion of taking.76 
Article 14 of the German Basic Law 77  does not expressly refer to the 
deprivation of property. Instead, Article 14.1.2 provides for the statutory 
determination of the substance (content) and limits of property rights. Article 14.2 
stipulates, firstly, that property entails obligations and secondly, that its use should 
also serve the public interest. Read together, Article 14.2 and 14.1.2 constitute the 
property regulation clause of the Basic Law.78 The statutory regulation of property is 
subject to a prohibition on the excessive regulation of property (Übermaβverbot), in 
other words, the proportionality principle. 79  Article 14 expressly refers to the 
                                            
76 It is important to note that US law uses the term “deprivation” to refer to the regulation of property in 
terms of the state’s police power. South African law also uses the term “deprivation” to refer to the 
regulation of property. 
77 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949 (as amended on and up to 30 December 
1993) (Grundgesetz, GG).  
78 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 424-427; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 132-150; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 278-289; Alexander GS The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 116-124; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 365-367. 
79 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 132.  
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expropriation80 of property and the requirements for a valid expropriation are found in 
Article 14.3. Firstly, expropriation is only permissible if it serves the public interest; 
secondly, it may only be ordered pursuant to a law that determines the nature and 
extent of the compensation to be paid; and finally, the amount of compensation must 
reflect a fair balance81 between the public interest and the interests of those affected 
by the expropriation. Regulation of property rights and expropriations operate as 
limitations on constitutionally guaranteed property positions and thus they must be 
justified according to the requirements set out in Article 14. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
provide that no person shall be deprived of, among other things, property without 
due process of law and that private property shall not be taken for public use without 
just compensation.82 Deprivation in US law is most often referred to as “regulation” of 
property in terms of the state’s police power. Secondly, the Fifth Amendment refers 
                                            
80 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 147. There are 
two categories of expropriation allowed under Article 14.3, namely statutory expropriations 
(Legalenteignungen) and administrative expropriations (Administrativenteignungen). Statutory 
expropriations are considered an exceptional category subject to stricter scrutiny and they are 
legitimate only if they are justified by extraordinary circumstances. See further Slade BV The 
Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2012) 95; Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and 
South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 435-436. 
81 In other words, the calculation of the amount of compensation for an expropriation is subject to the 
proportionality principle.  
82 Constitution of the United States of America, 1787. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 410-423, 423-440; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: 
Takings (2002) 86-118; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 675-752; Alexander GS The 
Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 64-
95; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 201; Nginase XH The Meaning of 
‘Public Purpose’ and ‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch 
University 2009) 67; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 69. 
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to property being “taken” against the payment of just compensation. The feature that 
sets US takings law apart from the position in other jurisdictions is the distinction 
between a taking of property and an expropriation of property. “Taking” is a wide 
term that includes the narrower category of formal expropriations or compulsory 
acquisitions in terms of the power of eminent domain, but it also extends to a further 
category of state actions that have the form of police-power regulation of property 
but in effect amount to takings because they “go too far” (a regulatory taking).83 
Takings, both formal and regulatory, are subject to two requirements, namely public 
use and just compensation.  
 
2 3 3 Characteristics   
Article 14 of the German Basic Law explicitly states that property is not absolute and 
its use should serve the public interest. Justified state interference with property 
takes the form of either a limitation, which does not require compensation, or an 
expropriation, which does require compensation. 84  Therefore, property can be 
regulated, provided the regulation is based upon general legislative authority; 
                                            
83 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 423. See further 
Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 5-6, 86-87; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 675-692; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for 
American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 70-77; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 355-359; Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State 
Action (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 62-80. 
84 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 424. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 132-145, 146-151; Mostert H The Constitutional 
Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and 
Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 279-281; Alexander GS 
The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 
116-124; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 365-367. 
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establishes a fair balance between the public interest and the private interest; and is 
not disproportionate in its effects. This regulation is performed in terms of the state’s 
regulatory power. The state may interfere with the use and enjoyment of property in 
terms of the police power principle, and the state will not have an obligation to pay 
compensation if the limitation is within the bounds of the law. This principle lies at the 
heart of the notion of uncompensated regulatory deprivation of property. The police-
power principle is established in German case law. In the Contergan case,85 the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (BVerfG) 
confirmed that the legislature, when making laws to establish the necessary balance 
between the public interest and private interests, is acting within clear limits but is 
nevertheless not precluded from affecting and even changing private property rights, 
even with detrimental effects. This principle was refined further in cases where it was 
held that the extent to which a regulatory deprivation may affect private property 
negatively is partly determined by the nature of the property and its relation to the 
autonomy and privacy of the person or persons affected. The stronger the social 
relation and function of the property, the wider the regulatory powers of the 
legislature in determining the content and limits of that property; the stronger the 
personal and individual character and function of the property, the more limited the 
state’s power to restrict its use through regulation.86   
In the context of regulation and expropriation of property, there is a strong 
emphasis in German law on the formal source of power to perform either of these 
                                            
85 BVerfGE 42, 263 (1976) (Contergan) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd 
ed (2011) 216-217.  
86 BVerfGE 42, 263 (1976) (Contergan) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd 
ed (2011) 217. See further BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979) (Mitbestimmung) discussed in Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 140-142.  
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actions. According to Article 14.3, the laws authorising expropriation must specifically 
provide for compensation. This distinguishes them from the regulatory laws that 
determine the content and limits of property rights according to Article 14.1.2. The 
BVerfG has held that regulatory restrictions on the use of property (statutory 
determination of the content and limits of property rights) could be unconstitutional 
for being excessive and unfair. Excessive restrictions cannot be transformed into 
expropriations simply because they require an extraordinary or inequitable sacrifice 
from the property holder. This is so because these two kinds of actions derive from 
different sources of authority and each must be judged according to its own authority 
and requirements.87 Compensation is required for expropriations only and never for 
statutory determinations of the content and limits of property rights. If the effects of 
the latter are excessive and unfair the regulatory action may be invalid.88 Therefore, 
a law that authorises either a regulation of property rights or an expropriation of 
                                            
87 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 366. Van der Walt explains that the most 
obvious requirement not met by regulatory measures is the linking clause in Article 14.3.2, which 
requires that an expropriation should be authorised by a law that also provides for the form and extent 
of compensation. Regulatory laws contain no such clause and therefore do not satisfy this 
requirement because they do not foresee the payment of compensation, which means that 
expropriatory compensation cannot be awarded for actions under their authority. This was confirmed 
in BVerfGE 100, 226 (1999) (Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz), discussed in 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 119-120. The BVerG stated in the Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-
Pflegegesetz case that it is the regulatory intention, and not the regulatory effect, that determines 
whether a restriction is a regulation or an expropriation. Alexander explains that the advantage of this 
approach is the creation of a strict dichotomy between regulation and expropriation of property, which 
eliminates any middle ground between them. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 140-145. 
88 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 203. See further Mostert H The 
Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law 
and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 279-281; 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 116-117. 
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property must strictly comply with the relevant and necessary requirements set out in 
Article 14 in order for the particular kind of action to be valid. Furthermore, due to the 
fact that the requirements for a valid regulation of property rights are different from 
those of a valid expropriation, the authorisation for such regulation is not sufficient to 
constitute authority for expropriation if the regulation is excessive.   
German law appears to follow the first approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation, treating regulation and expropriation as two discrete 
categories of actions that do not overlap at all. This is so because of the strict 
separation of regulation and expropriation of property based on their respective 
sources of authority and discrete requirements. If a regulation of property has an 
excessive effect it will be regarded as unconstitutional and invalid. It cannot be 
transformed into an expropriation of property because expropriation requires a 
different form of authorisation than regulation. Therefore, German law does not 
recognise an overlap between these two kinds of limitations on property.   
The formal source of power is also important for the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation in US law. Van der Walt explains that, simply put, 
expropriation refers to exercises of the state’s power of eminent domain and 
deprivation (regulation) refers to exercises of the police power.89 Furthermore, this 
distinction rests on the different sources of power by which each form of limitation is 
authorised. This suggests a reason for the fact that compensation is usually not 
required for regulatory deprivation: exercises of the police power, even though they 
may cause loss or damage to property, are as a rule not compensated because their 
purpose is to protect public health and safety for everyone’s benefit and their 
restrictive effect is spread more or less equally amongst all citizens or property 
                                            
89 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 201. 
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owners.90 Therefore, it is assumed that expropriation expects one person or a small 
number of people to give up their property in exchange for compensation in the 
public interest, whereas everyone suffers more or less equal limitations and enjoys 
more or less equal benefits through regulatory deprivation. 91  However, this 
distinction is blurred to the extent that US case law recognises a grey area between 
exercises of the police power and formal expropriations, while German law does not. 
It was said that when a regulatory limitation on the use of property “goes too far” it 
becomes a taking that requires compensation.92 These instances are known as 
regulatory takings. Van der Walt points out that this grey area of regulatory takings is 
recognised with reference to the excessive effects of some regulatory deprivations, 
rather than the authorising source of power.93 
In deciding whether challenged government action constitutes a taking, a two-
level approach is followed. Dana and Merrill explain this test as follows: 
“The first level, which we call categorical review, considers whether the action falls within 
some category for which compensation is always required as a matter of constitutional 
law, or some category for which compensation is never required. The idea behind this 
categorical approach is that there are certain government actions that either so clearly 
demand compensation or are so clearly immune from liability for compensation that they 
require no case-specific judgment by courts. The second level of review, which we call 
ad hoc review, occurs only if the categorical tests for compensation or no compensation 
do not apply. This second-level review is explicitly open-ended, entailing a case-by-case 
balancing of rather poorly defined factors.”94  
                                            
90 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 201. See further Dana DA & Merrill TW 
Property: Takings (2002) 52-57. 
91 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 201. 
92 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 413. See further Alexander GS The Global 
Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 71. 
93 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 201. See further Dana DA & Merrill TW 
Property: Takings (2002) 87; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons 
for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 70-73.  
94 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 87-88. 
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The US Supreme Court has recognised situations that are automatically regarded as 
takings, the most important of which is when the government formally exercises the 
power of eminent domain. The Supreme Court has additionally recognised a number 
of so-called categorical rules,95  two of which are those that govern permanent 
physical occupations and complete loss of value.  
 The Supreme Court has held that permanent physical occupation of property 
by the government constitutes a taking and thus requires the payment of 
compensation, no matter how trivial the economic impact of the occupation or how 
reasonable the government rationale for the occupation.96 The rule that permanent 
physical occupations are automatically takings was developed in the case of Loretto 
v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.97 The Supreme Court stated that property 
rights in a physical thing are the rights to possess, use and dispose of the thing and 
to the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it 
effectively destroys each of these rights with respect to the space occupied. This is 
so because the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself and has 
no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. 
Furthermore, the permanent physical occupation of the property forever denies the 
owner any power to control the use of the property, in that he can neither exclude 
others nor make any non-possessory use of the property. Finally, even though the 
owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or 
                                            
95 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 692-722. See further Dana DA & Merrill TW 
Property: Takings (2002) 86-120; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 73-77.  
96 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 94. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 358. 
97  Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 458 US 419 (1982). See further Singer JW 
Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 693-694; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 76. 
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sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the 
right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the 
property.98  
The Supreme Court justified the application of a categorical rule for permanent 
physical occupations on two grounds. Firstly, its application would avoid “otherwise 
difficult line-drawing problems” and would present “relatively few problems of 
proof”.99 Dana and Merrill explain that the rule would reduce information gathering 
and processing costs that would otherwise be incurred in examining this category of 
government action under the open-ended ad hoc test.100  
In Horne v Department of Agriculture 101  the US Supreme Court had to 
determine whether a marketing order requiring raisin growers to set aside a certain 
percentage of their crops for the account of the government, free of charge, 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Court held 
that the government’s “categorical duty” under the Fifth Amendment to pay 
compensation when it physically takes possession of an interest in property applies 
to both real and personal property.102 The Court stated that the classic taking is one 
where the government directly appropriates private property for its own use and in 
the case of real property, such appropriation constitutes a per se taking that requires 
just compensation.103 There was nothing to suggest that the rule is any different 
when it comes to the appropriation of personal property.104 The Court held further 
                                            
98 Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 458 US 419 (1982) at 435-436. 
99 At 436-437. 
100 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 96.  
101 Horne v Department of Agriculture 576 US 275 (2015). 
102 At 4. 
103 At 4. 
104 At 5. 
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that the Fifth Amendment protects private property without any distinction between 
different types.105  
Regarding the reserve requirement imposed by the marketing order, the Court 
held that this was a clear physical taking because the raisins were transferred from 
the growers to the government and thus the raisin growers subject to the reserve 
requirement lost their entire bundle of property rights in the appropriated raisins, 
namely the right to possess, use and dispose of them.106 The government cannot 
avoid its duty to pay compensation for the physical taking of the raisins by reserving 
contingent interest in a portion of the value of the raisins for the raisin growers 
because this reservation of a portion of the value does not mean that there had not 
been a physical taking.107  
The Court then considered whether a governmental mandate to relinquish 
specific, identifiable property as a condition on permission to engage in commerce 
effects a per se taking. In this case, the reserve requirement did effect a per se 
taking. 108  The Court rejected the government’s argument that the reserve 
requirement did not effect a taking because the raisin growers voluntarily chose to 
participate in the raisin market and if they were unhappy with the situation, they 
could simply grow other types of crops.109  The government also relied on the 
                                            
105 At 5. 
106 At 8-9. 
107 At 9-10. 
108 At 12. 
109 At 12. The US Supreme Court referred to its decision in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp 458 US 419 (1982) where it rejected a similar argument, namely that New York law in question 
did not result in a taking because the landlord could avoid the effect of the law by ceasing to be a 
landlord. Rather, the Court held that a landlord’s right to rent out his property could not be conditioned 
on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation. 
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decision of Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co,110 where the Court decided that companies 
manufacturing pesticides, fungicides and rodenticides can be required to disclose 
health, safety and environmental information about their products as a condition to 
receiving a permit to sell these products.111 While this information included trade 
secrets in which the pesticide manufacturers had a property interest, they were not 
subjected to a taking because they received a valuable government benefit in the 
form of a permit to sell the products.112 The Court rejected the argument by saying 
that, firstly, the taking in this case cannot reasonably be characterised as similar to 
the voluntary exchange that took place in Ruckelshaus and, secondly, the Court had 
already rejected the idea that the reasoning in Ruckelshaus can be extended by 
regarding basic and familiar uses of property as a government benefit on the same 
order as a permit to sell hazardous chemicals.113 Therefore, the Court concluded that 
“[s]elling produce in interstate commerce, although certainly subject to reasonable 
government regulation, is […] not a special government benefit that the [g]overnment 
may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection”.114   
The second categorical rule deals with instances of complete loss of 
economically viable use of land.115 This second category is illustrated by the decision 
of Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council.116 Here, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Fifth Amendment is violated when land use regulation does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his 
                                            
110 Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co 467 US 986 (1984). 
111 Horne v Department of Agriculture 576 US 275 (2015) at 13. 
112 At 13. 
113 At 13. 
114 At 13. 
115 For a more comprehensive discussion of this categorical rule, see Singer JW Introduction to 
Property 2nd ed (2005) 707-718. 
116 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992). 
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land.117 The Supreme Court justified this categorical rule by stating that a total 
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the owner’s perspective, equivalent to a 
permanent physical occupation of the property and in these situations it becomes 
less realistic to indulge the usual assumption that the legislature is merely “adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life”118 in a manner that secures an “average 
reciprocity of advantage”119 to everyone concerned.120 Furthermore, “[t]he functional 
basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without 
compensation […] does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the 
government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses”.121 The 
Supreme Court also pointed out that regulations that leave the owner of land without 
economically beneficial or productive options for its use – typically, as in this case, 
by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state – carry with them the 
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public 
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.122 The Supreme Court 
concluded that there are good reasons for the frequently expressed belief that when 
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically 
beneficial use in the name of the common good, in other words to leave his property 
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.123  
                                            
117 At 1016. 
118 With reference to Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978).  
119 With reference to Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922). 
120 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992) at 1017-1018. 
121 At 1018. 
122 At 1018. 
123 At 1019. 
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Justice Scalia carved out an exception to the categorical rule in cases where 
regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land inhere in the title 
itself:  
 “[A]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background 
principles of the [s]tate’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than 
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts – by adjacent 
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the [s]tate’s law of private 
nuisance, or by the [s]tate under its complimentary power to abate nuisances that affect 
the public generally, or otherwise.”124 
In other words, if the regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of land 
is akin to the restrictions placed on the land by the particular state’s common law of 
property and nuisance, no compensation is required. In order for the state to avoid 
its compensation obligation, “it must locate some land-use prohibition existing in the 
historical common law of nuisance and link that prohibition with the use proscribed 
by the challenged regulation”.125    
The recognition of this grey area between ordinary exercises of the police 
power and formal expropriations seems to indicate that US law follows the third 
approach, viewing regulation and expropriation as two extremes on a continuum. 
Viewing these two concepts in this way allows for a grey area of regulatory takings to 
be distinguished in between the extremes.  
 
                                            
124 At 1029. 
125 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 83. 
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2 3 4 Public use/public purpose 
Article 14.3 of the German Basic Law states that expropriation is only permissible if it 
is in the public interest. German courts have interpreted the public interest 
requirement strictly, requiring that expropriation must be the only possible way of 
achieving the required result (which must also be in the public interest) and the 
expropriation must be strictly necessary to satisfy the need in question.126 Therefore, 
both the purpose of the expropriation and expropriation of the property in realisation 
of the purpose must be in the public interest. Van der Walt states that the BVerfG 
treats this public interest requirement as an open-ended but justiciable constitutional 
requirement that cannot be amended by normal legislation or by administrative 
decision.127 Furthermore, any law or administrative action that does not comply with 
this requirement is in conflict with the Basic Law and is therefore unconstitutional. 
Finally, courts have the duty and the jurisdiction to test whether every individual 
expropriation is justified by the public interest it is meant to serve and authorised by 
legislation for that purpose.128 
                                            
126 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the 
Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis 
(2002) 302-404; Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public Purpose’ and ‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of 
the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) 90-93; Slade BV The Justification of 
Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 95-96; Van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 147; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 476. 
127 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 476.  
128 BVerfGE 56, 249 (1981) (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 477-478. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 302-404; Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public 
Purpose’ and ‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch 
University 2009) 90-93; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 96-98.  
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Expropriation is only justifiable if it is the only possible way in which the specific 
public need or purpose can be satisfied, and if the expropriation is strictly necessary 
to fulfil that purpose, in terms of the proportionality requirement.129 Van der Walt 
explains that 
“[T]he public interest that justifies a specific expropriation has to be sufficiently important 
to justify the extraordinary disturbance that expropriation brings about in the 
constitutional balance between the interests of the individual and of society, and it must 
justify subjecting the individual interest to the interests of society in that specific case (the 
justification aspect of the public purpose requirement). Expropriation is not automatically 
validated when it is generally or loosely associated with some public purpose, interest or 
benefit; each case has to be tested individually to establish that the expropriation actually 
serves a specific public purpose and is justified by it in the sense that the public purpose 
is a more important and overriding interest than the private interest that is affected by the 
expropriation.”130   
In other words, not only must a public purpose exist in order for expropriation to take 
place, that public purpose must have sufficient importance to justify this level of 
interference as well as be specific. A broad purpose will be inadequate and may 
result in the expropriation being declared unconstitutional. In the German case of 
Dürkheimer Gondelbahn131 Böhmer J engaged in a detailed investigation of the 
public interest requirement in Article 14 and concluded that the public interest 
requirement means that expropriation has to be strictly necessary for some public 
duty that has to be performed. However, he emphasised that not every public action 
                                            
129 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 476-477. Van der Walt also points out 
that if the public purpose in question could have been served by another measure, the expropriation 
may be in conflict with the proportionality principle and unjustified.  
130 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 477 (footnotes omitted). 
131 BVerfGE 56, 249 (1981) (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 477-478. See further Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public Purpose’ and 
‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) 90-
93; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 96-98. 
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that serves the public interest in general or benefits the public in some general 
manner is in the public interest as intended in Article 14.3. Specifically, “public 
purpose” is a narrower category than “public benefit” and the mere fact that a 
development benefits the public in some broad sense is insufficient to satisfy the 
public purpose requirement in Article 14.3.132  
In addition to the justification of the expropriation, the public purpose relating to 
a specific expropriation must be established in every individual case with regard to 
the relevant authorising legislation. 133  The BVerfG will determine in each case 
whether the objective of the expropriation, as stated in the authorising legislation, 
corresponds with a public purpose and whether that objective is in fact realised.134 
This means that, besides the need for the public purpose to be important enough to 
justify expropriation, the authorising legislation must authorise and enable the state 
explicitly and clearly to make use of its powers of expropriation in order to pursue or 
                                            
132 BVerfGE 56, 249 (1981) (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 477-478. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 147-149; Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public Purpose’ and ‘Public 
Interest’ in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) 90-93; 
Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 2012) 96-98.   
133 BVerfGE 56, 249 (1981) (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn); Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 
3rd ed (2011) 478; Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public Purpose’ and ‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of 
the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) 90-93; Slade BV The Justification of 
Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 96-98. 
134 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 478. See further BVerfGE 56, 249 
(1981) (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 477-478; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 
147-149; Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public Purpose’ and ‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of the Final 
Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) 90-93; Slade BV The Justification of 
Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 95-98. 
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promote the specific public purpose.135 If the authorising legislation does not clearly 
authorise expropriation to serve the particular public purpose identified in the 
legislation, any act of expropriation performed pursuant to the legislation will be 
invalid and therefore unconstitutional, even if the expropriation serves a legitimate 
and clear public purpose generally.136  
An improper purpose can never justify expropriation. For example, 
expropriation for the general purpose of improving or increasing the property or 
wealth of the state cannot be justified because the purpose of the power to 
expropriate is not to enrich the state but to serve specific public purposes that cannot 
be fulfilled by any other means.137 Another example of an unjustifiable expropriation 
would be the expropriation of one person’s property for the purpose of benefitting or 
enriching another private person.138 However, the German courts will not necessarily 
invalidate an expropriation merely because a private person benefits from it. As long 
                                            
135 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 478. See further BVerfGE 56, 249 
(1981) (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 477-478; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 
147-149; Nginase XH The Meaning of ‘Public Purpose’ and ‘Public Interest’ in Section 25 of the Final 
Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2009) 90-93; Slade BV The Justification of 
Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 95-98. 
136 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 478. 
137 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 478. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 436; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 148; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 302.  
138 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 478. See further Kleyn D “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 436; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 148; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 302. 
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as the expropriation is clearly undertaken to achieve a public purpose or is in the 
public interest and not solely for personal gain, the public purpose requirement could 
be satisfied, despite a private person benefitting from it.139  
The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be 
[…] deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation”.140 This means that there 
are two conditions under which the state may expropriate private property: the first is 
that the expropriation must be for public use and the second is expropriation must be 
accompanied by payment of just compensation.141  Therefore, whenever private 
property is taken for a “public use”, just compensation must be paid to the owner of 
the taken private property. The US Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement 
to mean that takings of private property will only be constitutional if both just 
compensation is paid and the taking is for public use.142 It follows that a taking 
                                            
139 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 478-479. See further Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 147-149; Mostert H The 
Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law 
and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 302-303; Slade BV 
The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 2012) 105-106. 
140 Fifth Amendment 1791. 
141 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 64. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 424; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 169, 191; Singer 
JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 743; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 356; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 69.  
142 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 191. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 424; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 743; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American 
Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 64; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 356; 
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performed in accordance with the power of eminent domain for which full 
compensation has been paid may nevertheless be declared unconstitutional if the 
use for which the property was taken was private as opposed to public.143 Both 
requirements must be adhered to in order for a taking of private property to be 
constitutional. The US Supreme Court has held that the public use requirement is 
met if the taking serves a legitimate public use or purpose even if the government 
achieves the purpose by taking property from one owner and giving it to another 
owner.144 
Dana and Merrill argue that the public use limitation on takings of private 
property, despite its potential as a significant barrier to takings of property, is “rather 
toothless”.145 The reason for this assessment is the highly deferential interpretation 
of the public use requirement that the US Supreme Court has adopted.146 As stated 
earlier, both public use and compensation paid are required for a taking to be 
constitutional. A compensated taking of property that is for a private use is 
unconstitutional. However, in Berman v Parker,147 it was accepted that courts would 
defer to the legislature’s wide discretion to determine what public use is. The US 
Supreme Court stated that “[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the 
                                                                                                                                        
Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 2012) 69. 
143 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 191. See further Singer JW Introduction to 
Property 2nd ed (2005) 743; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development 
(LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 69. 
144 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 743 referring to Berman v Parker 348 US 26 
(1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984). See further Slade BV The Justification 
of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 66-67. 
145 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 191, with reference to Hawaii Housing Authority v 
Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984). 
146 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 483. 
147 Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954). 
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legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well nigh 
conclusive”.148 The deferential approach in Berman was developed with reference to 
the state’s regulatory police powers, but in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff149 the 
US Supreme Court stated that the public use requirement in the Takings Clause is 
“coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police power”.150 This established a 
deferential approach towards the public use requirement in terms of the power of 
eminent domain along with the police power. In Midkiff, the US Supreme Court 
stated further that while the courts do have a role in reviewing what the legislature 
judges as falling into public use, this role is the “extremely narrow one of ensuring 
that the legislature’s determination does not involve an impossibility”.151 In Kelo v 
City of New London152 the majority of the US Supreme Court reiterated that the literal 
requirement that property may only be expropriated if it is actually made available to 
or used by the public or the state had been rejected in favour of the broader 
interpretation of public use as public purpose.153  
This requirement of public use appears to be interpreted less strictly than its 
German counterpart, where any proposed public use used to justify expropriation is 
                                            
148 At 32. 
149 Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984). 
150 At 240. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 484; Slade BV The 
Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2012) 66-67. 
151 At 241. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 485; Slade BV The 
Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2012) 66-67. 
152 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005). See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 486; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic 
Development University 2012) 76-81. 
153 At 420. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 486; Slade BV The 
Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2012) 66-67. 
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scrutinised to ensure that it complies with Article 14.3 and if it fails to do so, the 
expropriation is unconstitutional. The mere fact that the public use appears in 
authorising legislation does not shield it from scrutiny by the BVerfG. There is no 
deferential approach in favour of the legislature, as there is in the US. The US 
approach to this requirement is one of deference to the legislature’s determination of 
what constitutes a public use. The most extreme form of scrutiny of this 
determination by a court is to decide whether the proposed public use does not 
involve an impossibility, a rather low standard to overcome. 
 
2 3 5 Compensation 
Article 14.3 of the German Basic Law requires, in order for an expropriation 
(Enteignung) of property to be valid, that the legislation authorising the expropriation 
must provide for compensation as well as stipulate the type and extent of 
compensation specifically.154 This is known as the Junktim-Klausel or linking-clause 
provision.155 This provision places an obligation on the state to compensate owners 
who are forced to sacrifice their rights and privileges for the common good.156 
                                            
154 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the 
Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis 
(2002) 300. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 
(1999) 150; Du Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the Constitution (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2009) 160. 
155 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the 
Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis 
(2002) 301. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 
(1999) 147. 
156 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the 
Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis 
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Furthermore, Article 14.3 requires that compensation for expropriation reflect a fair 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected.157 In other 
words, the amount of compensation for expropriation of property is determined in a 
contextual manner, taking into account the relevant public interest and interests of 
those affected by the expropriation. Van der Walt explains: 
“The determination whether compensation as provided for indeed creates a fair balance 
between the public interest and the individual interest, as required by article 14.3, is 
made with reference to the fundamental purpose of the property guarantee, and 
therefore involves a weighing of all relevant factors and circumstances in view of the 
proportionality principle. The market value of the property and the financial loss of the 
owner have to be considered to establish the fair balance, but they have to be weighed 
against other interests (including the public interest) and circumstances, and do not 
determine the nature or measure of payment on their own.”158 
German courts have indicated that the compensation paid in the event of 
expropriation of property need not be equal to the market value of the property.159 
                                            
157 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the 
Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis 
(2002) 300. Mostert explains that this is the so-called “Abwägungsgebot”, which does not allow for the 
payment of nominal compensation for expropriation and also does not require that the compensation 
paid should be equal to full market value of the expropriated property. See further Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 150-151; Alexander GS The Global 
Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 115; Du 
Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the Constitution (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 2009) 160-161.    
158 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 151. See further 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 115. 
159 See BVerfGE 24, 367 (1968) (Deichordnung) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 510. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 301; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 115. 
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While Enteignung refers only to those instances that comply with the 
requirements of Article 14.3, there are also instances (known as enteignungsgleiche 
Eingriffe) where legislation unintentionally infringes on an owner’s property rights 
through regulation.160  In these circumstances, an owner is required to make a 
sacrifice regarding his property, which exceeds the ordinary bounds of what is 
expected from a non-expropriatory a regulation of property.161 The requirement that 
compensation be provided for so that an expropriation is valid means that 
compensation is not payable in these instances. 162  However, it is sometimes 
possible to receive a monetary award in these instances of excessive regulation that 
is not considered compensation for expropriation. Rather, this award is an 
equalisation payment that moderates the impact of the burden which a regulatory 
measure or action places upon an individual property holder, thereby ensuring that 
                                            
160  Du Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the Constitution (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2009) 151. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 281-282; Bezuidenhout K Compensation for 
Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2015) 145-146. Bezuidenhout explains that some enteignungsgleiche Eingriffe are infringements of 
property resulting from regulatory state action that is not property authorised, or where the state failed 
to act in accordance with a legal duty and an infringement occurred as a result of that omission, in 
which case the regulations are unlawful and constitutionally invalid. On the other hand, some 
enteignender Eingriffe are lawful interferences with property rights that require an owner to make a 
special or extraordinary sacrifice. These types of interferences are usually the unintended and 
unexpected results of otherwise legitimate regulatory measures and may give rise to a claim for 
equalisation compensation. 
161  Du Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the Constitution (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2009) 151. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 281; Bezuidenhout K Compensation for 
Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2015) 145. 
162  Du Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the Constitution (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2009) 151. 
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the burden is not invalid for being excessive in terms of the proportionality principle. 
These equalisation payments are not constitutional compensation for expropriation 
and therefore recognition of this procedure is fundamentally different from 
expropriatory compensation for regulatory takings in US law.163  
In the case of Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz164 the 
BVerfG restricted the practice of providing solely monetary equalisation in the case 
where legislation caused an overly burdensome regulation of property.165 This case 
concerned the demolition of a structure that was protected by legislation aimed at 
preserving national monuments. This legislation required that an owner seeking to 
demolish a structure protected by the legislation had to apply for a permit before 
commencing with the demolition. The owner in this case applied for the permit but its 
application was rejected. The BVerfG held that this legislation constituted a 
regulation and not an expropriation of property, and therefore no compensation for 
expropriation was required.166 However, the BVerfG held that this regulation was 
                                            
163 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 367. See further Bezuidenhout K 
Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2015) 132-168.  
164 BVerGE 100, 226 (1999) (Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz) discussed in 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 119-121. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 
203, 210-211; Strydom J A Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A Constitutional Analysis (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 246-255; Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 645-650.  
165 Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd 
ed (2012) 645. For a further discussion of this case, see Alexander GS The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 119-121; Strydom J A 
Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A Constitutional Analysis (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 2012) 246-255. 
166 Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd 
ed (2012) 646. See further Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons 
for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 120. 
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disproportionate because it left the owner with something that could not be 
considered “property”.167 The regulation was unconstitutional because a party could 
not expect compensation as a result of a limitation (regulation) of property in 
accordance with Article 14. Where the regulation of property is excessive or 
disproportionate, the appropriate remedy is the invalidation of the legislation 
imposing the regulation and not compensation.168  
The BVerfG then considered whether the disproportionate impact of the 
regulation could be remedied with some form of equalisation. It held that the 
legislature must anticipate and make provision in the regulatory legislation for the 
possible need for equalisation.169 This means making provision within the regulatory 
statute for the relevant administrative body to provide equalisation in the appropriate 
form.170 The BVerfG held that the compensation clause in the relevant legislation in 
this case did not remedy the disproportionate effect in this case because it was too 
vague.171 Furthermore, the BVerfG stated that equalisation provisions should be 
specifically designed to prevent unreasonable or disproportionate effects through 
administrative, technical and financial means, that the equalisation measures must 
                                            
167 Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd 
ed (2012) 648. See further Strydom J A Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A Constitutional 
Analysis (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 251. 
168 Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd 
ed (2012) 647. 
169 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 120. See further Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional Jurisprudence of 
the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 649. 
170 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 120. 
171 Strydom J A Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A Constitutional Analysis (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 253. See further Kommers DP & Miller RA The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 649. 
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be provided for in the legislation and the circumstances in which the equalisation 
provision would be applied must also be specified in the legislation.172  
Therefore, equalisation measures are possible remedies in a case of excessive 
regulation of property, but these measures are only available in exceptional 
circumstances and they must be appropriate and sufficient in preventing the 
excessive regulatory burden from being disproportionate.173 Equalisation measures 
must be provided for in the authorising legislation and such provision must be clear 
and detailed.174 Finally, where there is no provision for equalisation measures, the 
affected owner will not be able to claim compensation and if the interference is found 
to be excessive, the legislation imposing it will be declared invalid.175  
In US law, the Fifth Amendment states that expropriation of property may only 
take place if “just compensation” is provided. Just compensation does not 
necessarily mean that full compensation will be awarded.176 The basic legal standard 
for determining what constitutes just compensation is the fair market value 
standard.177 According to this standard the owner is entitled to the fair market value 
of the property taken (expropriated) by the condemning authority. Fair market value 
                                            
172 Strydom J A Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A Constitutional Analysis (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 254. 
173 Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 167. See further Kommers DP & Miller RA The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd ed (2012) 649. 
174 Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 167-168. 
175 Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 168.  
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 68. 
177 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 169; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 748. 
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means the amount “a willing buyer would pay a willing seller of the property, taking 
into account all possible uses to which the property might be put other than the use 
contemplated by the taker”.178 Fair market value is determined by a number of 
techniques, the four most common ones being a) examination of recent sales prices 
for the property in question; b) examination of recent sales prices for other properties 
in the area deemed to be comparable to the property in question; c) capitalisation of 
the actual or potential rental value of the property in question; and d) calculation of 
the cost of rebuilding the property minus depreciation to reflect age and wear and 
tear.179 The rules regarding which technique is preferred vary among the states. 
There are other standards available to implement the just compensation 
requirement; such as the “restitution” standard, whereby compensation is set to 
equal the benefit received by the taker, and the “indemnification” standard, where 
compensation is based on the loss to the owner.180 The preferred standard is the 
“indemnification” standard, measuring compensation according to the loss suffered 
by the owner.181   
 
                                            
178 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 169-170; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd 
ed (2005) 748. 
179 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 170-171. 
180 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 172-173. See further United States v Causby 328 
US 256 (1946) at 261; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 
(1999) 440-441. 
181 United States v Causby 328 US 256 (1946) at 261. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 440.  
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2 3 6 Excessive deprivation or regulation 
In German law, constructive expropriation is not recognised. An excessive regulation 
is regarded as invalid and not simply relabelled as an expropriation. 182  An 
expropriation is seen as a partial or complete acquisition of concrete individual 
property holdings for the realisation of specific public duties, provided it complies 
with constitutional and statutory requirements. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfG) has unambiguously stated that excessive regulatory action does not 
satisfy the requirements for valid regulation and is therefore invalid. The provision of 
compensation does not transform an excessive interference into a valid regulation. If 
the legislation does not satisfy the requirements for a valid regulation or 
expropriation of property, the legislation is constitutionally invalid. This means that 
the idea of constructive expropriation does not have a place in German constitutional 
law. Constructive expropriation is usually associated with a claim for compensation 
for excessive regulation. Under the clear distinction between regulation of property 
rights and expropriation in German law, the kind of excessive regulation associated 
with constructive expropriation would be invalid, a fact confirmed by the BVerfG. The 
impugned excessive regulation cannot be repurposed as an expropriation and thus 
cannot found a compensation claim. Therefore, an award of expropriatory 
compensation for constructive expropriation is impossible in German constitutional 
law. When a person is adversely affected by unlawful or excessive regulatory action, 
                                            
182 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 149. See further 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 365-367; BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979) 
(Mitbestimmung) discussed in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 366. 
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the correct course of action would be to challenge the validity of the regulation in the 
administrative courts and not to claim compensation.183  
US law treats the distinction between deprivation (regulation) and expropriation 
(taking) of property as two ends on a continuum, which results in judicial recognition 
of a grey area between the two.184 However, a regulation performed in terms of the 
state’s police power that is deemed to be excessive is known as a regulatory taking 
and not constructive expropriation. This is merely a terminological distinction as the 
effect of the two is the same. Only those regulatory actions that are otherwise lawful 
and legitimate but are excessive in their effect on the owner can qualify as regulatory 
takings.185  An excessive regulatory action that is, for example, for an improper 
purpose or is not properly authorised will be invalid.186 The notion of a regulatory 
taking was first recognised in the decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon,187 
where the US Supreme Court held that regulations performed in terms of the police 
power can sometimes have the equivalent impact of an exercise of the state’s power 
of eminent domain.188 This decision gave rise to the “regulatory takings” doctrine: if 
                                            
183 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 367. See further Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 144. 
184 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 356. See further Pennsylvania Coal Co 
v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922); Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 680-686; Alexander 
GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence 
(2006) 70-71.  
185 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 353. 
186 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 418. See further 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 353-354; Bezuidenhout K Compensation 
for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2015) 60. 
187 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922).  
188 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 71. See further Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise 
Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 64-65.  
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an exercise of the police power “goes too far” in interfering with property rights, it will 
be invalidated unless the government pays just compensation.189 Dana and Merrill 
explain that this doctrine prevents the government from evading the limits that the 
Takings Clause places on the power of eminent domain by trying to accomplish the 
same result through an exercise of the police power.190 Van der Walt explains that, 
initially, the US Supreme Court made use of ad hoc factual inquiries to determine 
whether a regulation had gone too far.191 In later cases the US Supreme Court 
subscribed to either a strict rule-bound approach or restricted the ad hoc inquiry to 
situations where the regulatory action in question could not be categorically identified 
as a regulatory taking.192  
Similar to German law, providing compensation for an otherwise unlawful and 
invalid regulation or taking of property does not retrospectively validate the 
unconstitutional regulation or taking.  
 
2 3 7 Conclusion 
 German and US constitutional property law use different terminology when referring 
to the limitation of property rights. Article 14 of the German Basic Law does not refer 
to deprivation of property; instead it provides the statutory regulation of the contents 
                                            
189 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 415; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: 
Takings (2002) 4-5; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for 
American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 71; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 201.  
190 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 5. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 356. 
191 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 356-358.  
192 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 73-77. See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 121-168; 
Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 687-692. 
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and limits of property. It also refers to expropriation of property and states the 
requirements for a valid expropriation. On the other hand, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the US Constitution refer to the deprivation of property, which is 
understood to mean the regulation of property in terms of the state’s police power. 
Whereas German law refers to expropriation, US law refers to takings of property 
against compensation. The term “taking” is understood as a term that includes the 
narrower category of formal expropriations and compulsory acquisitions in terms of 
the power of eminent domain. 
 In both German law and US law there is a strong emphasis on the formal 
source of power to perform either regulation or expropriation of property. In German 
law, a law that authorises expropriation must specifically provide for compensation, 
which distinguishes them from laws that determine the contents and limits of 
property. In US law, expropriation refers to the exercise of the state’s power of 
eminent domain while deprivation (regulation) refers to exercises of the state’s police 
power. German law does not recognise a grey area between regulation and 
expropriation of property, where deprivation can shade into expropriation if it is 
excessive. If a regulation of property is excessive, it will be unconstitutional for being 
excessive and cannot be transformed into an expropriation because each limitation 
derives from a different source of authority and each must be judged according to its 
own authority and requirements. On the other hand, US law does recognise a grey 
area between the exercise of the police power and formal expropriation. Actions that 
fall into this grey area are known as regulatory takings and are recognised with 
reference to their excessive effect rather than the source of authority. Whereas 
German law requires that expropriation be in the public interest and interprets this 
requirement strictly, US law requires that property must be expropriated for public 
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use and the US Supreme Court has adopted a highly deferential approach to the 
interpretation of the public use requirement.  
Regarding compensation for expropriation, German law requires that the 
legislation authorising the expropriation must provide for compensation, specify the 
type and extent of compensation and such compensation must reflect a fair balance 
between the public interest and the interest of those affected. On the other hand, US 
law requires that just compensation is required in the event of expropriation. This 
does not necessarily mean that full compensation will be paid. Rather, compensation 
is determined according to the fair market value standard. Whereas US law provides 
for expropriatory compensation to be paid in the event of a regulatory taking, 
German law does not. German law allows for equalisation to be paid to an owner 
whose property rights have been unintentionally infringed by legislation, but this is 
not compensation for expropriation.   
German and US law have opposite approaches to the notion of excessive 
regulation of property. Whereas the notion of constructive expropriation is not 
recognised in German law at all, US law recognises the concept of a regulatory 
taking. A regulatory taking occurs when a police power regulation is deemed 
excessive and treated as a taking requiring compensation. The notion of regulatory 
takings exists in a grey area between regulation and expropriation. This grey area 
exists due to US law treating regulation and expropriation as points on a continuum. 
German law treats regulation and expropriation at two distinct categories of limitation 
on property rights and therefore, no grey area can exist between the two categories. 
A regulation of property that is excessive is invalid because it does not satisfy the 
requirements for a constitutional limitation of property rights and it will not be 
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relabelled as an expropriation because it does not satisfy the requirements for a valid 
expropriation of property either.   
   
2 4 Proportionality and judicial balancing   
2 4 1 Introduction 
The proportionality principle is a fundamental and well-developed principle in 
German law,193 despite not being expressly mentioned in the Basic Law.194 The 
proportionality principle is derived from the Rechtsstaat principle.195 The function of 
the proportionality principle “is to ensure that the regulation starts with but also ends 
                                            
193 Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South 
African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 427-427; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 158-163, 451-458; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings 
(2002) 121-168; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence 
on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative 
Analysis (2002) 258-314; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 722-732; Alexander GS 
The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 
133-147, 73-95; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 201, 203, 215-217, 225-
227, 241-242, 272-273, 454-455, 493-501. 
194 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 133.  
195 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 133. This term is often translated as a state subject to “rule of law” but 
Alexander regards this as a misleading translation, a better one being “constitutional state”. See 
further Kleyn D “The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and 
South African approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 424-425; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 158; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South 
Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 287-289.  
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with the public interest, and that it respects and protects both the public interest and 
the individual interests equally”.196  
The proportionality principle is not completely unknown in US law, but its use is 
limited.197 The term “proportionality” is used with reference to regulatory takings and 
specific forms of regulations, of which exactions are a good example. Exactions are 
demands or conditions set by cities that property owners must comply with in order 
to receive a government permit to build on their land.198 However, the Supreme 
Court has held199 that the police power involved in regulating property in this manner 
cannot be used to “’extort’ a sacrifice of property in exchange for some discretionary 
land-use permission and disguise it as a regulatory control over the use of property, 
even if the sacrifice is clearly beneficial for public purposes and loosely connected 
with the benefit derived from the land-use permission”.200  
                                            
196 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 135. See further 
Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 133; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 290-291; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 
365. 
197 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 199.  
198 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 735-740. See further Dana DA & Merrill TW 
Property: Takings (2002) 210-217; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 80-82; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 290. 
199 See Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987) and Dolan v City of Tigard 512 
US 374 (1994). See further Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 735-740; Dana DA & 
Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 210-217; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 80-82; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 290. 
200 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 416. See further 
Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 735-740; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings 
(2002) 210-217; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for 
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The dominant methodology in US law for analysing takings cases is judicial 
balancing, even though the US Supreme Court has developed at least two 
categorical rules to assist in resolving taking cases.201 However, when entering the 
realm of regulatory takings, these categorical rules are of less assistance and the 
analysis takes the form of an essentially ad hoc factual enquiry.202 
 
2 4 2 Proportionality review in German law  
There is no explicit provision relating to proportionality in the Basic Law.203 Other 
than the right to human dignity, all the rights in the Basic Law are relative.204 
Furthermore, some of these rights do not have explicit limitation clauses while others 
can only be limited by law or specify their own specific limitation requirements.205 
The right to property in Article 14 of the Basic Law is an example of a right that may 
                                                                                                                                        
American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 80-82; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 290. 
201 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 73. 
202 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 121. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 358-359. 
203 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949 (as amended on and up to 30 December 
1993) (Grundgesetz, GG). See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 290; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional 
Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 133. 
204 Barak A Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 179. See further Kleyn D 
“The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African 
approach” (1996) 11 SAPL 402-445 at 424; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 127-128; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 258 -260. 
205 Barak A Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 179. See further Mostert 
H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private 
Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 263. 
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only be limited by law. According to Article 19(1) of the Basic Law, a fundamental 
right may be limited as long as three conditions are met: firstly, a right may only be 
restricted by or pursuant to a law; secondly, a right so restricted must be based on a 
law that has general application; finally, the law allowing for the restriction must 
specify the fundamental right concerned and explicitly mention the article 
concerned.206  
 Van der Walt explains that “proportionality review ensures that a state 
limitation (either deprivation or expropriation) of property establishes a proper 
balance between the public purpose it serves, the means employed to promote that 
purpose and the effect that the limitation has on the affected property holder”.207 
Furthermore, in order for a limitation to be valid it must be strictly necessary 
(erforderlich), suitable for the purpose it serves (geeignet) and not impose burdens 
disproportionate to its benefits (unverhältnismäβig or unzumutbar). 208  The 
requirement of necessity means that the legislature must, among the options 
available, adopt the one that least limits the right in question.209 The requirement of 
suitability means that the legislative limitation must have some rational connection to 
                                            
206 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 180. See further 
Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of 
Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 261-
262. 
207 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 242. 
208 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 135. See further 
Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of 
Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 289-
290; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 242. 
209 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 134. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 289. 
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the intended aim of the limitation.210 Alexander explains that the third requirement 
asks whether the harm caused to the rights holder is proportionate to the stated 
objective.211  
It is important to distinguish the principle of proportionality from the theory of 
Güterabwägung or “balancing of interests”. Blaauw-Wolf explains that: 
“Although some of the criteria for interpretation overlap and lead to the same results, the 
main critique against this theory is that all limitations are regarded as ‘conflicts’. More 
importantly, different constitutional norms are weighted and ranked, some being 
considered more important than others, although the Basic Law does not provide for 
such interpretation. To complicate matters, the principle of proportionality in the narrow 
sense is often also referred to as a ‘balancing of interests’, a reference to the stages of 
confining all the possible measures to attain a specific goal to the least far-reaching 
restriction.”212 
According to the Güterabwägung theory, rights and values are “ranked” according to 
their source, for example constitutional rights are ranked higher than rights provided 
                                            
210 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 134. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 289; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 242. 
211 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 134. See further Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 290; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 242. 
212 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 197. See further 
Blaauw-Wolf L & Wolf J “A comparison between German and South African limitation provisions” 
(1996) SALJ 267-296 at 282-283; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative 
Analysis (1999) 162-163; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 293-296. 
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for in other statutes.213 Furthermore, this theory proposes a hierarchal ranking of 
fundamental rights, in that freedom, for example, will rank higher than the right to 
property as well as other rights that protect things due to the fact that freedom is a 
personal right. The importance of a right is dependent upon, among other things, its 
relevance to the community. The degree of relevance to the community is linked to 
the importance of freedom. Finally, the fundamental principle of this theory 
determines that “the more fundamental a right is for the maintenance of values in a 
democratic state, the higher its position in this pyramid of fundamental rights”.214  
There is also a “concrete ranking” of rights that exists over and above the 
“abstract ranking” discussed immediately above.215 This “concrete ranking” can be 
applied in certain situations to determine which right has preference over another, in 
other words which right will have to give way to another should they clash. Whether 
a right must give way to another depends on the number of values or interests at 
                                            
213 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 197. See further 
Blaauw-Wolf L & Wolf J “A comparison between German and South African limitation provisions” 
(1996) SALJ 267-296 at 282-283; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property 
and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 293.  
214 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 197. See further 
Blaauw-Wolf L & Wolf J “A comparison between German and South African limitation provisions” 
(1996) SALJ 267-296 at 282-283; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property 
and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 293-294. 
215 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 197. See further 
Blaauw-Wolf L & Wolf J “A comparison between German and South African limitation provisions” 
(1996) SALJ 267-296 at 282-283; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property 
and its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 293-294. 
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stake, the intensity of the infringement and the degree to which a right deserves 
protection. It is important to note that this Güterabwägung approach remains 
controversial and has not been endorsed by the BVerfG; just a few academics 
support its application in the constitutional context.216 Some of the criticisms leveled 
against Güterabwägung are,217 for example, that the concretisation of fundamental 
rights could potentially be limited to interest balancing, resulting in the negation of 
the formal elements of these rights contained in the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Another view is that Güterabwägung does not enhance legal certainty but 
encourages a subjective assessment of constitutional norms.218    
Alexander explains that a theoretical distinction is drawn between 
proportionality and balancing in German law: balancing is an abstract weighting or 
ranking of fundamental rights while proportionality is viewed as a matter of 
institutional competence.219 The proportionality test is used to determine whether the 
legislature has overstepped its competence to determine the scope and content of 
                                            
216 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 198. See further 
Blaauw-Wolf L & Wolf J “A comparison between German and South African limitation provisions” 
(1996) SALJ 267-296 at 283; Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and 
its Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis (2002) 295.  
217 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 198-199.   
218 Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-215 at 198. See further 
Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of 
Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 295. 
219 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 203; Blaauw-Wolf L “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle 
of proportionality and the doctrine of Güterabwägung – A comparative analysis” (1999) 14 SAPL 178-
215 at 198-201.  
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the property guarantee. Finally, the point of both proportionality review and balancing 
is to determine whether a legislative limitation of the right to property is excessive. 
The processes of each form of review often overlap and often lead to the same 
result. The distinction between proportionality review and balancing is important 
because the fundamental mode in German law is proportionality, based on a notion 
of authority, while balancing accords more with US law.   
   
2 4 3 Judicial balancing in US law 
As mentioned above, proportionality is not completely unknown in US law and finds 
application in the context of regulatory takings and exactions. The leading Supreme 
Court decisions regarding exactions are Nollan v California Coastal Commission220 
and Dolan v City of Tigard.221 In both cases, building permission was conditional 
upon the dedication of certain parts of the landowners’ property for public use. In 
Nollan, the Supreme Court held that the condition would be valid only if there was a 
sufficient nexus 222  between the condition and the reason for the development 
limitation.223 The Supreme Court held that there was no nexus at all between the 
condition and the reason for the development restriction and thus did not elaborate 
                                            
220 Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987). 
221 Dolan v City of Tigard 512 US 374 (1994) 
222 Crump D “Takings by regulation: How should the Court weigh the balancing factors?” (2012) 52 52 
Santa Clara LR 1-45 at 8 explains that a possible reason for the specification of this close nexus 
standard was the prevention of “pretextual takings”. Crump gives the example of a situation where the 
government “regulates” an owner’s property in a manner that is not related to its regulatory goal of, for 
instance, securing land for a public park. If the regulation forces the owner to use his property for a 
public use, such as recreation by the nonpaying public, then the close nexus test would cut through 
this pretext and identify the government’s action as a taking.  
223 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 736, discussing Nollan v California Coastal 
Commission 483 US 825 (1987). 
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on how tight the connection between these two points has to be.224 In Dolan, the 
Supreme Court addressed this question. The Supreme Court held that there must be 
a sufficient nexus between the condition and the projected impact of the 
development and there must also be “rough proportionality” between the condition 
and the projected impact of the proposed development in order to satisfy the Takings 
Clause.225 The principles developed in the Nollan and Dolan decisions are confined 
to exaction cases and do not apply to challenges to direct regulation generally.226     
Despite the occasional reliance on proportionality in this sense, the dominant 
methodology for dealing with takings cases in US law is balancing, combined with 
the application of at least two categorical rules to assist in resolving takings cases. 
Alexander explains that balancing in US law is “basically a form of cost-benefit 
analysis, in which multiple factors are weighed in the abstract rather than in a 
contextualised fashion”.227 When faced with a case of a potential regulatory taking, 
the Supreme Court resorts to an ad hoc factual inquiry.228 The Court’s balancing 
method is usually structured around several requirements, most of which are derived 
                                            
224 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 737, discussing Nollan v California Coastal 
Commission 483 US 825 (1987). 
225 Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 737-738, discussing Nollan v California Coastal 
Commission 483 US 825 (1987). See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 222-
225; Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 81. 
226 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 212-213. See further Alexander GS The Global 
Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 80-81. 
227 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 203. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 451-458. 
228 Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 121. See further Singer JW Introduction to 
Property 2nd ed (2005) 687-692.  
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from the opinion of Holmes J in the decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon.229 
The issue in this case was state legislation that prohibited the mining of coal in a 
manner that caused subsistence of houses on the land under which the coal was 
located.230 The Pennsylvania Coal Company challenged the legislation on the basis 
of an allegation that it causes an uncompensated taking of the pillars of coal that the 
Company cannot mine due to the legislation.231 Holmes J identified several factors 
for determining whether a taking has “gone too far”: firstly, the diminution of value 
caused by the regulation; secondly, whether the regulation served to avoid a harm to 
the general public; thirdly, whether the regulation provided an average reciprocity of 
advantage among all affected property owners; and finally, whether the regulation 
effectively destroyed discrete property and/or contractual rights.232  
In Holmes J’s view, the legislation in question had the effect of destroying 
previously existing property and contractual rights. 233  The legislation sought to 
abolish a recognised, and valuable, estate in land 234  and had the effect of 
appropriating or destroying the right to mine by making it commercially impracticable 
                                            
229 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922). 
230 At 413. See further Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for 
American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 74; Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 123-127; 
Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed (2005) 680-686.  
231 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 74, discussing Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922). See further 
Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 123-127; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 680-686.  
232 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 74, discussing Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922). See further 
Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 123-127; Singer JW Introduction to Property 2nd ed 
(2005) 680-686. 
233 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 413. 
234 At 414. 
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to exercise the right to mine.235 Furthermore, this legislation was aimed at avoiding 
harm to a single private home rather than reducing harm to the public interest.236 The 
legislation in this case did not secure an “average reciprocity of advantage” because 
it gave a benefit to the owners of the surface properties while placing a burden on 
the owners of the subsurface coal.237  
In Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York,238 the Court reaffirmed 
its commitment to a multifactor balancing approach, but at the same time revised the 
factors to be considered.239 The diminution in value factor was retained but two new 
factors, the character of the government action and distinct investment-backed 
expectations, were added. 240  Together, Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central 
indicate that there are at least six factors taken into account in the Court’s balancing 
analysis: diminution in value; reciprocity of advantage; prevention of public harm; 
destruction of an existing and discrete property interest; character of the government 
action (whether invasive or not); and interference with investment-backed 
                                            
235 At 414. 
236 At 414. 
237 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 414 discussed in Alexander GS The Global 
Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 74. See 
further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 127-131; Singer JW Introduction to Property 
2nd ed (2005) 687-692. 
238 Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978). 
239 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 74, discussing Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 US 104 
(1978). See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 127-131; Singer JW Introduction 
to Property 2nd ed (2005) 687-692. 
240 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 74, discussing Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 US 104 
(1978). See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 127-131; Singer JW Introduction 
to Property 2nd ed (2005) 687-692. 
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expectations.241 While all of these factors are potentially relevant in the balancing 
enquiry, it is “impossible to predict how much weight any one of them will carry in a 
given case. The Court has made it clear that it will weigh each factor on the basis of 
the specific facts of each case”.242 
 
2 4 4 Conclusion 
The balancing approach of US law is quite different from proportionality review in 
German law. As stated above, balancing sees the US Supreme Court weigh up 
certain factors in an abstract, non-contextual manner while the proportionality review 
of the BVerfG is highly contextual and therefore the question of whether the 
requirements for proportionality have been met or not will depend on the facts of the 
case. The US balancing methodology places the emphasis on efficiency of resolution 
of property disputes, while German proportionality review places heavy emphasis on 
the authority for the interference with property rights, the means chosen to bring 
about the interference and the outcome of such interference on the persons affected. 
The US balancing methodology appears to be similar to the (non-judicially endorsed) 
German theory of Güterabwägung, which also involves the abstract and non-
contextual ranking of rights and interests. A concrete ranking also exists in order to 
determine which right will prevail in a particular situation. Alexander points out 
                                            
241 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 75, discussing Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 US 104 
(1978). See further Dana DA & Merrill TW Property: Takings (2002) 127-131; Singer JW Introduction 
to Property 2nd ed (2005) 687-692. 
242 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 75. 
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certain distinct differences between balancing and proportionality:243 firstly, balancing 
weighs up the relevant factors in an abstract manner, while a court engaged in 
proportionality review will consider multiple factors and evaluate the relevant weight 
to be given to each factor “in the immediate context of the problem before the 
court”.244 Secondly, proportionality review is more structured than balancing. On the 
one hand, the three pronged German approach to proportionality “explicitly unpacks 
different questions and requires the court to focus on each one separately”.245 On 
the other hand, “balancing involves a more amorphous process of tossing all 
relevant factors into a single calculus”.246 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
German and US Constitutional property law represent two different approaches to 
how property is defined for constitutional purposes, how to distinguish between 
deprivation and expropriation of property and the application of the proportionality 
principle as a means to test the legitimacy of an interference with constitutionally 
protected rights. The German constitutional property law system is regulated by the 
Basic Law and by legislation, which sets out clear requirements that must be 
followed in order for the protection provided by Article 14 to be applicable. These 
                                            
243 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 203-204.  
244 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 203. 
245 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
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requirements are enforced strictly and failure to comply with them will result in 
constitutional invalidity. This strict enforcement of requirements is why the concept of 
constructive expropriation or regulatory takings has no place in German 
constitutional property law. A constructive expropriation of property does not comply 
with the requirements of a regulation or an expropriation and is therefore 
constitutionally invalid. US constitutional property law relies less on legislation and 
more on the wording of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and doctrine 
developed by the courts over time. This approach has led to much confusion 
surrounding US takings law and discrepancies in the judgments of the courts 
adjudicating constitutional property matters. This approach also allowed for the 
creation of the regulatory takings doctrine, which in itself is confusing with at times 
unpredictable results. In some respects, the approaches of these two jurisdictions 
are similar and in other instances their approaches diverge quite significantly.   
Both German and US constitutional law protect property from interference by 
the state and recognise a very wide concept of constitutional property even though 
their points of departure are different. What constitutes property for the purposes of 
this protection is determined differently in each of these jurisdictions. German law 
uses the private law definition of property as being limited to corporeal things as the 
point of departure for developing a much broader constitutional definition of property, 
which encompasses a variety of interests. The list of interests recognised as 
property for the purposes of Article 14 is also subject to expansion should the 
interests of society require it. German law regards property as a relationship 
between people and things, with things being the objects of property rights. US law 
views all property in terms of rights as relationships between legal subjects and not 
in terms of relationships to objects, even if the right in fact relates to some property 
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object. This means that the question of whether a particular object is property plays a 
minor role in the adjudication of property disputes because the focus of the enquiry is 
the relationship between the parties or how their competing rights must be 
reconciled. This approach allows for a large number of interests to be considered 
property because the rights in relation to object, and not necessarily the object itself, 
are what are important.  
Despite the difference in approach, the constitutional notion of property in these 
two jurisdictions ends up including most well-known and recognised rights and 
interests in property. Both German and US law exclude from protection non-property 
interests such as the general wealth of an individual and mere expectations. German 
and US law also treat certain categories of property rights differently, such as public 
participation rights. Under German law, these rights are protected as property for all 
intents and purposes, whereas in US law these rights are only regarded as property 
for the purposes of due process and therefore cannot be the object of a taking 
requiring compensation. A difference between German and US law is that property in 
German law is not a pre-constitutional right because its Article 14 explicitly 
empowers the legislature to determine its content and limits. In US law, it can be 
implied that at least some property rights are pre-constitutional because the source 
of property is state law.  
In terms of deprivation and expropriation, German and US constitutional 
property law diverge significantly. German law views these two forms of interference 
with property as being distinct from each other, as evidenced by the different validity 
requirements for each of them. This approach means that there is no grey area 
between a deprivation and an expropriation of property; an interference with property 
is either a deprivation (regulation) or an expropriation. It is not possible for a 
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regulation of property to be transformed into an expropriation by judicial 
interpretation; any attempted regulation of property that does not satisfy the 
requirements is constitutionally invalid. Thus, constructive expropriation is not 
recognised in German law. US law approaches the deprivation (regulation) and 
expropriation (taking) of property in a manner opposite to the German law approach. 
US law treats these two forms of interference as points on a continuum, with the 
possibility of a grey area existing in between. It is in this grey area that the regulatory 
takings doctrine finds its application. A regulatory taking is a regulation of property 
that exceeds the bounds of a regulation to the extent that it has the effect of a taking 
of property, requiring compensation to be paid for the excessive impact on the 
property rights of the affected party. 
There are similarities between the German and US law approach to deprivation 
and expropriation, particularly with regard to excessive regulation of property. Both 
systems distinguish between the sources of state power employed to regulate or 
expropriate property. The consequences of attempting to interfere with property 
using the incorrect power are quite similar in German and US law. Where the state’s 
regulation of property using the police power is excessive, German law will regard 
the regulation as constitutionally invalid if it does not meet the requirements of a valid 
regulation of property; compensation in the form of equalisation may be payable if it 
has been specifically provided for in the legislation. In US law, excessive regulation 
may be struck down as constitutionally invalid for being an improper use of the police 
power or it may give rise to a claim for expropriatory compensation because it 
amounts to a regulatory taking. In this regard equalisation is not the same as 
expropriatory compensation. Furthermore, in both systems, the provision of some 
form of equalisation or compensation does not legitimise the unconstitutional 
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interference. The interference remains unconstitutional with the equalisation or 
compensation serving to alleviate the excessive burden placed on the property 
holder or holders in question. German and US law differ regarding the interpretation 
of the public interest or public use requirement. Whereas German law interprets this 
requirement strictly, the US Supreme Court has adopted a deferential approach to 
the interpretation of this requirement. Regarding compensation for expropriation, 
German law requires that the authorising legislation provide for compensation, as 
well as specify the type and extent of compensation. The compensation must also 
reflect a fair balance between the public interest and the interest of those affected. 
US law requires that just compensation be paid for expropriation, determined on the 
basis of the fair market value standard. Just compensation does not necessarily 
mean that full compensation will be paid. Whereas US law provides for the payment 
of expropriatory compensation in the event of a regulatory taking, German law does 
not. German law allows for the payment of equalisation to an owner whose property 
rights have been unintentionally infringed by legislation, but this is not compensation 
for expropriation.   
Regarding proportionality, the approach of German and US law diverges. 
Proportionality is a well-established principle of German constitutional law and is the 
primary method of testing the legitimacy of state interference with property. 
Proportionality takes two forms in German law. The first is a general application test, 
asking whether law of general application has infringed the right in question, whether 
the infringement is necessary, whether the infringement is properly authorised and 
asks whether the ends of the regulation justify of the means, generally speaking. The 
second form focuses on the effect of the regulation on the individual property owner. 
Proportionality is not unheard of in US law, but is only applied in certain cases, most 
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notably in cases of regulatory takings and exactions. The primary method of 
determining the constitutionality of takings of property is judicial balancing. Judicial 
balancing involves weighing up a number of factors in an abstract manner within a 
single calculation with the focus on the effect on the individual property owner or 
owners in question. It is not really concerned with a general application test. Judicial 
balancing bears a resemblance to the German theory of Güterabwägung, which 
involves the abstract and non-contextual ranking of rights and interests. 
Güterabwägung is not widely accepted in German law, with proportionality being the 
preferred method of determining the legitimacy of interferences with rights by the 
state.  
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Chapter 3  
European Court of Human Rights: Its special 
role and relationship to new democracies in 
Central Eastern Europe  
3 1 Introduction   
Whereas chapter 2 is intended to show the continuum of approaches to 
constitutional property issues in German and US law that Central Eastern European 
jurisdictions might be expected to adopt in developing their own constitutional 
property law, this chapter indicates another framework that might influence that 
development because of the links of the jurisdictions to the European Union. This 
chapter investigates the doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) through its interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1), specifically 
the meaning of “possessions” in the case law of the ECHR, the adjudication of the 
distinction between deprivations (regulations) and expropriations of property and the 
fair balance principle. It is necessary to investigate the ECHR’s principles regarding 
these three issues because the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in 
chapter 4 are members of the European Union and therefore bound by the ECHR’s 
principles. Consequently, some of the Central Eastern European constitutional 
courts refer to and apply these principles when adjudicating constitutional matters.1 
These constitutional courts apply the principles of the ECHR either to provide 
content to their own constitutional right to property or in conjunction with the 
constitutional court’s existing principles.  
The ECHR has emphasised that  
                                            
1 See chapter 4 below. 
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“[T]he object and purpose underlying the Convention, as set out in Article 1, is that the 
rights and freedoms should be secured by the Contracting State within its jurisdiction. It 
is fundamental to the machinery of protection established by the Convention that the 
national systems themselves provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the Court 
exerting its supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiarity.” 2 
What is clear is that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention)3 places the obligation of securing and 
giving effect to the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention to each member 
or contracting state within their own jurisdictions. Each contracting state must ensure 
that its legal system provides protection of the rights and freedoms that the 
Convention contains.   
The ECHR’s role in the resolution of disputes brought before it is supervisory in 
nature. The matters are first heard in the contracting state’s courts and if litigants are 
dissatisfied with the outcome, the case may be brought before the ECHR. A dispute 
involving a right or freedom in the Convention must first be adjudicated according to 
the law of the contracting state before it may be considered by the ECHR. The 
ECHR is, therefore, not a court of first instance but is an institution that is similar to 
an appeal court for citizens of contracting states to approach if they are dissatisfied 
with the outcome of their case having been adjudicated by the contracting state’s 
courts. 
Article 14 is concerned with both the protection and regulation of “possessions” 
and is divided into three rules.5  
                                            
2 Z and Others v United Kingdom 29392/95 ECHR 2001-V para 103. 
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by 
Protocols Nos 11 and 144 and supplemented by Protocols Nos 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13).  
4 Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS 9. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 85 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.” 
The first rule deals with the interference with enjoyment of possessions, the second 
rule deals with deprivation of possessions (in the sense of expropriation) and the 
third rule deals with controls regulating the use of property.6 These rules are not 
                                                                                                                                        
5 Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 11-18; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 116-118; Carss-Frisk M The 
Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2001) 6, 10-20; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 96-
104; Allen T “The autonomous meaning of ‘possessions’ under the ECHR” in Cooke E (ed) Modern 
Studies in Property Law Volume 2 (2003) 57-77 at 58-59; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 
1998 (2005) 39-94; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 865-872; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A 
The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 6-9; Svetlana 
S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Russian 
National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 9-27; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 120-121, 164-165; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative 
Perspective (2013) 56-58. 
6 Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 22-31; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 105-114; Carss-Frisk M The 
Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2001) 21-25; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 60-69; 
Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 112-124; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & 
Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 878-
893; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention 
on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
its Protocols (2007) 10-12; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 18-27; 
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treated in isolation. The second and third rules are concerned with specific instances 
of interference with the right of peaceful enjoyment of possessions and must be 
construed in light of the principle laid down in the first rule.7 Allen explains that the 
first rule is a residual category in the sense that many types of interferences fall 
under either the second or third rule, but there are some that fall exclusively under 
the first rule.8 
The three-rule structure of Article 1 seems to indicate that the ECHR treats 
deprivation (regulation) and expropriation as two discrete categories that do not 
overlap at all. While both must comply with the principle of lawfulness, be in the 
public or general interest and comply with the principle of proportionality, each 
constitutes a unique interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. 
However, there is uncertainty regarding the relevance of this three-rule structure. 
The ECHR is inconsistent with its classification of interferences under one of the 
three rules.9 It is not clear how this structure affects the judicial analysis in a given 
case.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law 5th ed (2009) para 11.2.22; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 367-370; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative 
Perspective (2013) 62-83; Sluysmans J, Verbist S & Waring E (eds) Expropriation Law in Europe 
(2015) 1-26. 
7 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37. 
8 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 107. 
9 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 120 explains that the ECHR has sometimes 
treated the destruction or confiscation of property as an interference falling under either the first rule 
or the second rule. In Allard v Sweden 35179/97 ECHR 2003-VII, a joint owner of land was ordered to 
destroy a house they had built without the consent of their fellow owners. Clearly, this order was 
made to enforce private law rules on joint ownership and should have fallen under the third rule. 
However, the ECHR instead viewed it as a case falling under the second rule, with no explanation for 
this categorisation. 
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3 2 Possessions   
3 2 1 Introduction 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Article 1) states that: 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.”10  
There is an internal inconsistency that exists in the language of Article 1, namely that 
the nature of the interest protected by Article 1 is described differently from one 
translation to another. 11 The English version of the Protocol refers to “possessions” 
in the first two sentences and “property” in the final sentence whereas the French 
version refers to “biens” (possessions) in the first sentence and to “propriété” 
(ownership) in the second and third sentences.12 In order to reduce the potential 
confusion, the ECHR has decided that the scope of Article 1 should be read broadly 
and thus it has adopted a construction of Article 1 that is closer to the French version 
                                            
10 Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS 9. 
11 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 29. See further Van Rijn A “Right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van 
Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 
at 865-866; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 120-121; Marckx v Belgium 
(1979) 2 EHRR 330.  
12 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 29. See further Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar 
M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 6-9. 
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of Article 1.13 Therefore, the first sentence of Article 1 covers all forms of interference 
with all types of property, while the second sentence covers only the acquisition of 
ownership and the first part of the third sentence covers regulatory controls on rights 
of exclusion and disposition as well as use of property.14 
The property guarantee in Article 1 applies to both movable and immovable 
property. 15  The concept of “possessions” has been broadly interpreted by the 
ECHR, 16  which decided in its Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v The 
Netherlands judgment17 that:  
                                            
13 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 29. See further Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 
EHRR 330; Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403; Inze v 
Austria (1998) 10 EHRR 394.  
14 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 61-62. See further Allen T Property and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 29; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd (2011) 120-121; 
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737.  
15 Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 11-12. See 
further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 117; Carss-
Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 6; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 
97; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 40; Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A 
and Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 
865-866; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Protocols (2007) 6-9; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 
13-17; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 120-121, 164-165; Praduroux S 
The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 56. 
16 Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 11-18; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 116-118; Djajic S “The right 
to property and the Vasilescu v Romania case” (2000) 27 Syracuse J Int’l L & Comm 363-396 at 369-
378; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 6, 10-20; Rook D Property Law and Human 
Rights (2001) 96-104; Allen T “The autonomous meaning of ‘possessions’ under the ECHR” in Cooke 
E (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Volume 2 (2003) 57-77 at 59; Allen T Property and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2005) 39-94; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions 
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“[T]he notion ‘possessions’ […] in Article 1 of Protocol No 1 […] has an autonomous 
meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of physical goods: certain other rights 
and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as ‘property rights’, and thus as 
‘possessions’, for the purposes of this provision […].”18  
The Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands judgment 
establishes that the autonomous meaning doctrine applies to Article 1 and, more 
specifically, to the interpretation of “possessions”. This raises two broad questions,19 
the first of which is how far the autonomous meaning doctrine extends the 
applicability of Article 1. Allen suggests that this judgment indicates that the ECHR 
will apply the doctrine to the classification of rights already recognised under national 
law, and in such cases the autonomous meaning doctrine has a specific and limited 
application. The application of the autonomous meaning doctrine does not purport to 
establish vested rights where none exists under national law; rather it would allow 
the ECHR to find that, for instance, a bundle of rights classified as a non-proprietary 
interest under national law amounts to a possession under Article 1.  
The second question is what function the doctrine serves in relation to Article 
1.20 In the Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v Netherlands judgment21 the 
ECHR reasoned that the autonomous meaning doctrine should be applicable to 
                                                                                                                                        
(Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and 
Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 865-872; Grgić A, Mataga Z, 
Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 
6-9; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 9-27; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 120-121, 164-165; Praduroux S The Protection of Property 
Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 56-58. 
17 Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403.    
18 Para 53. 
19 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 43-44. 
20 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 44. 
21 Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403 para 53. 
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Article 1, but the decision does not indicate why this should be the case. This 
decision could perhaps be explained with reference to cases decided under Article 6 
of the Convention. A concern of the ECHR in cases involving Article 6 is that a state 
might seek to limit its obligations by exploiting the differences in the legal systems of 
member states.22 In König v Germany23 the ECHR acknowledged the problem of 
autonomy of meaning of the expressions used in the Convention when compared to 
its domestic law counterparts.24 The ECHR further acknowledged, as it had done in 
previous cases, that the concept of “civil rights and obligations” was autonomous in 
meaning and a failure to apply the principle of autonomy to this concept would lead 
to results that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.25 One 
of the purposes served by the autonomous meaning doctrine is to prevent member 
states from circumventing their obligations under the Convention by simply re-
labelling existing private property so as to put it beyond the protection of the 
Convention.26   
 
                                            
22 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 44. See further Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar 
M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 17-19. 
23 König v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 170. 
24 Para 88. 
25 Para 88. 
26 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 44. See further Allen T “The autonomous 
meaning of ‘possessions’ under the ECHR” in Cooke E (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Volume 
2 (2003) 57-77 at 61 where Allen refers to Brumărescu v Romania (2001) 33 EHRR 35. In this case, a 
declaration by the Romanian court that reversed earlier judicial declarations that the applicant held 
certain property was treated as an interference with possessions.   
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3 2 2 Meaning of “possessions” for the purposes of Article 1 
Article 1 provides no guidance or direction regarding the meaning of “possessions”, 
leaving the Strassbourg institutions to determine the scope of this concept. 27 
Examples from case law of what constitutes a “possession” for the purposes of 
Article 1 include28 immovable property;29 shares in a company;30 intellectual property 
rights;31 the benefit of restrictive covenants in freehold land when combined with the 
receipt of an annual rent;32 a leasehold estate;33 security rights under a retention of 
title clause;34 the goodwill of a business;35 planning permission36 and rights of user.37   
                                            
27 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 96. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 116-118; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2001) 10-17; Allen T “The autonomous meaning of ‘possessions’ under the ECHR” in Cooke 
E (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Volume 2 (2003) 57-77 at 62-63; Van Rijn A “Right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van 
Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 
at 865-872; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Protocols (2007) 6-9; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 120-
121; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 56-57.  
28 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 97-98. 
29 Wiggins v United Kingdom (1978) 13 DR 40. 
30 Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 249. 
31 See, for example, Smith Kline and French Laboratories v Netherlands (1990) 66 DR 70; British-
American Tobacco Company Ltd v Netherlands (1995) 21 EHRR 409.   
32 S v United Kingdom 10741/84 4 July 1988. 
33 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
34 Gasus Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403. 
35 See, for example, Van Marle and Others v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 491; Fredin v Sweden 
(1991) ECHR Series A vol 192; Iatridis v Greece [GC] 31107/96 ECHR 1999-II. 
36 Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319. 
37 X v Federal Republic of Germany (1959) YB 3 244. 
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The ECHR expanded its definition of “possessions” in Saghinadze and Others 
v Georgia,38 where it stated that the concept of “possessions” is also independent 
from the formal classifications of domestic law.39 The issue that must be examined is 
whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, may be regarded as 
having conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected under 
Article 1. Another way of determining whether a particular right or asset is a 
possession for the purposes of Article 1 is by considering the economic value of the 
right or asset.40 The ECHR stated that “possessions” are not limited to physical 
possessions and that certain rights and interests constituting assets may also be 
regarded as possessions for the purposes of Article 1. 41  The concept of 
“possessions” is furthermore not limited to existing possessions and may also cover 
assets, including claims, in respect of which applicants can argue that they have at 
least a legitimate expectation of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right.42 
An expectation is considered legitimate if it is based on either a legislative provision 
or a legal act bearing on the property interest in question. 43  The ECHR has 
interpreted and applied the concept of possessions under Article 1 in a series of 
cases dealing with interesting property situations. 
                                            
38 Saghinadze and Others v Georgia 18768/05 27 May 2010. 
39 Para 103. 
40 Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in 
Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 866. See further Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 
97; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 56-57. 
41 Iatridis v Greece [GC] 31107/96 ECHR 1999-II para 54; Beyeler v Italy [GC] 33202/96 ECHR 2000-I 
para 100.  
42 Saghinadze and Others v Georgia 18768/05 27 May 2010 para 103. See further Prince Hans-Adam 
II of Liechtenstein v Germany [GC] 42527/98 ECHR 2001-VIII para 83. 
43 Saghinadze and Others v Georgia 18768/05 27 May 2010 para 103. See further Plechanow v 
Poland 22279/05 7 July 2009 para 83; Kopecký v Slovakia [GC] 44912/98 ECHR 2004-IX paras 45-
52. 
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In the Saghinadze case, 44 the first applicant, a former high-ranking official in 
the Abkhazian Ministry of the Interior, was offered the position of Head of the 
Investigative Department of the Georgian Ministry of the Interior. After the first 
applicant accepted the position, he was granted permission to use a cottage owned 
by the Ministry. The applicants were later forcibly removed from the cottage based 
on an oral order by the newly appointed Minister of the Interior and police officers 
remained in control of the cottage as well as the adjacent premises, which had 
become the sixth applicant’s registered property.45 The applicants complained that 
this amounted to a taking of the cottage in terms of Article 1.46   
The Court considered the meaning of “possessions” for the purposes of Article 
1 and observed that the first applicant settled, together with his family, in the cottage. 
He was not squatting, as his employer, the Ministry of the Interior, had offered the 
dwelling to him. 47  Of paramount importance was the authorities’ own manifest 
tolerance of the first applicant’s exclusive, uninterrupted and open use of the cottage 
and the adjacent premises for more than 10 years. During this period, the first 
applicant installed various fixtures and planted fruit trees and vegetables, and started 
keeping poultry and small livestock. He was also able to accommodate eight of his 
displaced relatives without requiring additional permission from the state.  
                                            
44 Saghinadze and Others v Georgia 18768/05 27 May 2010 para 8.  
45 Para 21. 
46 Para 75. 
47 Para 104. The ECHR does not mention what the situation would be had it been found that the first 
applicant and his family had been squatting in the cottage. However, had the first applicant and his 
family been occupying the cottage and the adjacent land unlawfully, Internally Displaced Persons and 
Refugees Act of 28 June 1996 (the IDPs Act) allowed for the eviction of internally displaced persons 
on a number of grounds, including if such occupation was vexatious and without lawful basis. 
Therefore, the state could have lawfully evicted the first applicant and his family in terms of the IDPs 
Act if it proved that their occupation was vexatious and unlawful. 
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The Court further attached importance to the fact that, subsequent to the 
transfer of the cottage by the Ministry to the first applicant for temporary 
accommodation, the state confirmed the rights of internally displaced persons (IDP) 
(like the applicants) in the housing sector and established solid guarantees for their 
protection.48 The most conspicuous and authoritative of these was the Internally 
Displaced Persons and Refugees Act of 28 June 1996. This Act recognised that an 
IDP’s possession of a dwelling in good faith constituted a right of a pecuniary nature, 
meaning that it was not possible to evict an IDP from an occupied dwelling against 
his or her will without offering in exchange either similar accommodation or 
appropriate monetary compensation in exchange.49 In light of these considerations, 
the Court concluded that the first applicant had a right to use the cottage as his 
accommodation and that this right had a clear pecuniary dimension and should thus 
be regarded as a possession for the purposes of Article 1.50  
Another interesting case dealing with rights relating to property is Hamer v 
Belgium.51 The parents of the applicant built a holiday home in the Zutendal area of 
Belgium in 1967, without obtaining the requisite planning permission to do so.52 
Following the death of the applicant’s mother, the applicant and her father drew up a 
deed of partition, as the applicant had become the “remainderman” of half of the 
property through inheritance from her mother. This deed, which specifically 
mentioned the existence of the house in question, was registered with the Mortgage 
Registrar at the Ministry of Finance and a registration fee was paid.53 Upon her 
                                            
48 Para 107. 
49 Para 107.  
50 Para 108.  
51 Hamer v Belgium 21861/03 ECHR 2007-V.  
52 Para 7. 
53 Para 8. 
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father’s death, the applicant became the sole owner of the property. The applicant 
specifically declared in a notarised deed of distribution that the property was a 
holiday home. These deeds were registered with the local authorities and the 
applicant paid the required inheritance tax as well as annual property taxes and 
second-residence taxes on the property. According to the applicant, her father had 
paid the relevant taxes until his death.54  
The applicant later renovated the holiday home and had trees on the adjoining 
property felled. In 1994, a partly government-owned Flemish water-supply company 
carried out works to connect the holiday house to the drainage and water supply 
systems. At that time there was no response from the local authorities to this work.55 
Later in 1994, two separate police reports were drawn up by police officers that 
noted, firstly, that trees on the property had been felled in violation of a Flemish 
forestry decree and, secondly, that the holiday home had been built in 1967 without 
planning permission and that it was located in a forested area in which no such 
permission could be issued.56 Court action ensued and the house was demolished 
pursuant to an enforcement order made by the Court of Cassation (the Belgian 
Supreme Court).57  
One of the issues that the European Court had to determine was whether the 
applicant had a substantive interest protected by Article 1.58 The Court held that the 
impugned building had been in existence for twenty-seven years before the domestic 
authorities recorded the offence. It is undeniably the responsibility of the authorities 
                                            
54 Para 9. 
55 Para 10-11. 
56 Para 12-13.  
57 Para 14-37. 
58 Para 75. See further Zwierzyńsky v Poland 34049/96 ECHR 2001-VI para 63. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 96 
to record breaches of the town and country planning legislation and to allocate the 
necessary resources to do so. The Court held that the authorities could even be 
considered to have been aware of the existence of the building in issue, since the 
applicant had paid taxes on the building, just as her father had. Based on these 
facts, the Court considered that the authorities tolerated the situation for twenty-
seven years and continued to tolerate it for a further ten years after the offence had 
been established.59 The Court held that the applicant’s proprietary interest in the 
enjoyment of her holiday home had been sufficiently established to amount to a 
substantive interest and therefore a possession for the purposes of Article 1. 
Furthermore, the applicant has a legitimate expectation of being able to continue to 
enjoy that possession.60 This decision is not entirely in conflict with Belgian domestic 
law, since the practice of distinguishing between interests in land and interests in 
dwellings or buildings on the land is recognised in Belgian law.61 
A similar case is Öneryildiz v Turkey.62 The applicant in this case was living 
with twelve close relatives in a slum dwelling in an area adjacent to a rubbish tip. The 
dwelling was one of a large number of dwellings built without authorisation.63 A 
methane explosion resulted in a landslide of waste that engulfed ten slum dwellings, 
                                            
59 This reference to time periods was for the purpose of indicating that the applicant’s proprietary 
interest had been established to the level of being a possession for the purposes of Article 1. There 
was no prescription issue of any sort involved in this aspect of the judgment. 
60 Hamer v Belgium 21861/03 ECHR 2007-V para 76. 
61 Distinguishing between interests in land and interests in the buildings on the land is possible in 
Belgian law because of the institution of opstal, provided for in Artikel 1 of the Opstalwet van 10 
Januarie 1824. Opstal is not formally incorporated into the Belgische Burgerlijk Wetboek. See in this 
regard Mijnssen FHJ, Van Velten AA & Bartels SE Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van 
het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten 15th ed (2008) 
306; Sagaert V Goederenrecht: Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 131-135.  
62 Öneryildiz v Turkey 48839/99 ECHR 2004-XII. 
63 Para 10. 
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including the applicant’s.64 It was not disputed that the applicant’s dwelling had been 
erected in breach of Turkish town-planning legislation and had not conformed to the 
relevant technical standards, or that the land the structure had occupied belonged to 
the Treasury.65 However, the parties disagreed on whether the applicant had a 
possession for the purposes of Article 1.66  
In respect of the land on which the dwelling in question had been built, the 
applicant argued that nothing prevented him at any time from taking steps to acquire 
ownership of the land in accordance with the relevant procedure. The Court rejected 
this speculative argument because it was unable, due to the lack of detailed 
information provided by the parties, to ascertain whether the land in question formed 
part of a slum-rehabilitation plan or whether the applicant satisfied the formal 
requirements under the town-planning legislation in force at the material time for 
obtaining transfer of title to the publicly owned land he was occupying. In any event 
the applicant admitted that he did not take any administrative steps to that end. The 
Court concluded that the applicant’s hope of having the land transferred to him one 
day does not constitute a claim of a kind that was sufficiently enforceable in the 
courts and hence is not a distinct possession.67  
In respect of the dwelling itself, the Court held that a different consideration 
applies.68 The Court observed that between the unauthorised construction of the 
dwelling in issue in 1988 and the explosion in 1993, the applicant remained in 
possession of his dwelling despite the fact that his position was subject to rules laid 
                                            
64 Para 11. 
65 Para 125. 
66 Para 125. 
67 Öneryildiz v Turkey 48839/99 ECHR 2004-XII para 126. See further Kopecký v Slovakia [GC] 
44912/98 ECHR 2004-IX paras 25-26.  
68 Para 127. 
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down in legislation that permitted the authorities to destroy the dwelling at any time. 
There was no evidence that the relevant authorities had even envisaged taking such 
measures against the applicant. Furthermore, the authorities let the applicant and his 
close relatives live undisturbed in their house, in the social and family environment 
that they had created.69 This led the Court to conclude that the authorities tolerated 
the applicant’s actions. The Court held that these facts also supported the conclusion 
that the authorities acknowledged that the applicant and his close relatives had a 
proprietary interest in their dwelling and movable goods.70 The Court concluded that 
the applicant’s proprietary interest in his dwelling constitutes a substantive interest 
and that he has a possession within the meaning of Article 1.71  
The Hamer and Öneryildiz cases are interesting in that both dealt with 
unlawfully constructed dwellings built on state owned land. In determining whether 
the applicants had interests amounting to possessions, the ECHR distinguished 
between the applicants’ potential interest in the land upon which the dwellings were 
built and the applicants’ potential interest in the dwellings themselves. In both cases 
the ECHR held that the applicants had no protected interest in the land upon which 
the dwellings were built because, in Hamer, the dwelling had been built without 
obtaining planning permission on state owned land in respect of which no such 
permission could have been obtained and, in Öneryildiz, the land in question was 
simply state owned land which the applicant had no right to inhabit.   
The ECHR then determined whether the respective applicants had any 
protectable interest in the dwellings. In both cases the ECHR held that the respective 
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applicants had substantive interests in these dwellings that could be considered 
possessions for the purposes of Article 1, despite the fact that the dwellings had 
been built unlawfully. The substantive interest in the respective properties appears to 
stem from the fact that the authorities involved in these cases allowed the existence 
of these dwellings to continue for a significant period of time without taking any 
action against the inhabitants. While this reasoning is understandable in light of the 
facts of Hamer, where the structure had existed for decades and the applicant and 
her predecessors even paid property taxes on it, it is strange that the Court would 
treat the dwelling in Öneryildiz in a similar manner, considering that the dwelling had 
existed for only five years, during which time the applicant had not paid council taxes 
on it. 
These cases illustrate how property law under Article 1 operates differently 
from private law. They show that the concept of possessions under Article 1 is not 
necessarily the same as the concept of property under the private law of a member 
state. This allows the ECHR to decide a particular matter unrestricted by domestic 
private law rules of property. The ECHR distinguished between the applicants’ 
potential interest in the land and the applicants’ potential interest in the dwellings 
they had built on the land. In both cases the ECHR found that the applicants had no 
protectable interest in the land upon which they had built their respective dwellings. 
However, the ECHR did find that the respective applicants had certain protectable 
interests in the dwellings they had built. In Hamer, the ECHR held that the applicant 
had a proprietary interest in the enjoyment of her holiday home that had risen to the 
level of a possession, despite the fact that the very existence of that holiday home 
was unlawful under Belgian private law. In Öneryildiz, the ECHR held that the 
applicant’s proprietary interest in his dwelling constituted a substantive interest and 
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thus a possession. This methodology of separating interests in land and interests in 
dwellings or buildings on the land is possibly due to the nuanced concept of 
possessions created by the ECHR that is broader than the private law concept of 
property of the member states.  
Aside from traditional instances of property such as land and dwellings, private 
law claims such as claims for delictual damages and public law claims such as social 
welfare benefits are also recognised as possessions under Article 1.72 The question 
of whether a pecuniary claim in private law could constitute a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1 was considered in the judgment of Stran Greek Refineries and 
Stratis Andreadis v Greece.73 In this case, a contract was concluded between the 
Greek state, which was controlled by a military dictatorship, and Andreadis for the 
construction of a crude oil refinery in the Megara region of Greece, near Athens.74 
Once democracy was restored, the government regarded the contract as prejudicial 
to the national economy and relied on legislation to terminate it.75 The ECHR stated 
that, in order to determine if the applicants had a possession for the purposes of 
Article 1, the ECHR had to ascertain whether the judgment of the Athens Court of 
                                            
72 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 101. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 117; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide 
to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2001) 13; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 46-57; Van Rijn A “Right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van 
Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 
at 867; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
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First Instance dealing with this matter and an arbitration award granted in favour of 
the applicants gave rise to a debt in the applicants’ favour that is “sufficiently 
established to be enforceable”.76  
The ECHR held that the effect of the judgment of the Athens Court of First 
Instance “was merely to furnish the applicants with the hope that they would secure 
recognition of the claim put forward [and] [w]hether the resulting debt was 
enforceable would depend on any review by two superior courts”.77 Regarding the 
arbitration award, the ECHR held that, according to its wording, it was final and 
binding.78 Furthermore, this award granted the applicants a right under domestic law 
to the amount awarded and therefore this right constitutes a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1.79 
The judgment of Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium 80  concerned 
collisions involving the applicants’ ships which they attributed to the negligence of 
the Belgian pilots. 81  The ECHR held that, in order to determine whether the 
applicants had a possession for the purposes of Article 1, it may have regard to the 
domestic law in place at the time of the alleged interference. The law in question in 
this case was the Belgian law of tort, under which claims for compensation come into 
existence as soon as the damage occurs. The ECHR held that a claim of this nature 
constitutes a possession for the purposes of Article 1.82 The ECHR concluded that, 
on the basis of previous judgments of the Belgian Court of Cassation, the applicants 
                                            
76 Para 59. 
77 Para 60. 
78 Para 61. 
79 Para 62. 
80 Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium (1995) 21 EHRR 301. 
81 Para 6. 
82 See in this regard Van Marle and Others v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 491 para 41. 
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could argue that they had a legitimate expectation that their claims deriving from the 
accidents would be determined in accordance with the general law of tort.83  
The two judgments discussed above confirm that a right to pecuniary 
compensation arising out of a private claim does constitute a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1, provided that it is sufficiently established so as to be 
enforceable. They also confirm that a mere hope of an enforceable claim will not be 
regarded as a possession for the purposes of Article 1. Conversely, the legitimate 
expectation that an applicant’s claim will become enforceable according to the 
application of the generally applicable domestic law in place will be regarded as a 
possession because the right to compensation will be established as enforceable in 
terms of the domestic law.   
The case law of the ECHR distinguishes between two types of public law 
claims; those based on the provision of consideration by the claimant and those 
based purely on state grants and concessions in relation to social or economic 
policy.84 The first is a property-creating system and claims to benefits from the 
scheme constitute possessions for the purposes of Article 1.85 The second is based 
                                            
83 Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium (1995) 21 EHRR 301 para 31. See further Pine Valley 
Developments Ltd and Others v Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319. 
84 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 99 –101. See further Sermet L The European 
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European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 867. 
85 Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in 
Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 867. See further Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 
99-101; Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 12-13; 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 103 
on social solidarity and does not create any claim to an identifiable share for the 
participant, but only an expectation, and the amount depends on the conditions 
prevailing at the time the pension is being paid. 86  The ECHR has held that 
compulsory contributions to a state pension scheme may, in certain circumstances, 
found a right to payment of pension benefits, which amounts to a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1.87 Furthermore, the ECHR has held that Article 1 does not 
guarantee entitlement to a pension of a particular amount.88 The ECHR also held in 
Gaygusuz v Austria89 that the right to an advance on a person’s pension in the form 
of emergency assistance was a pecuniary right and therefore a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1.90   
Article 1 only guarantees existing property; therefore it will not apply in cases 
where social welfare benefits have not been provided.91 In FPJM Kleine Staarman v 
                                                                                                                                        
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 117-118; Carss-
Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the 
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86 Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in 
Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of 
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87 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 101. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
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88 Müller v Austria (1976) 3 DR 25. 
89 Gaygusuz v Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 365. 
90 Gaygusuz v Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 365 para 41.  
91 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 71. See further Sermet L The European 
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Netherlands,92 the European Commission did not treat a non-contributory scheme of 
disability benefits as possessions and held that there was no direct link between the 
contributions made and the benefits awarded, and therefore a person “does not 
have, at any given moment, an identifiable and claimable share in the fund”.93 
Therefore, Article 1 does not protect the mere expectation of benefits, only those 
benefits that have actually been provided. Allen explains that Article 1 “does not 
guarantee a minimum level of subsistence or other social benefits; nor does it apply 
to general promises to provide or enhance benefits”.94 
Furthermore, according to Allen, if an existing benefit qualifies as a possession 
for the purposes of Article 1, the withdrawal or modification of the benefit should also 
qualify as an interference with that possession. 95  The Kjartan Asmundsson v 
Iceland96 decision is an example of and instance where the modification of a social 
welfare benefit can result in an interference with a possession, the possession being 
                                                                                                                                        
Protocols (2007) 7; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 14; Van der 
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94 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 71-72. See further Sermet L The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 12-13; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 117-118; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
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Rights (2001) 101; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 868. 
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a right to derive a benefit from a social welfare scheme, such as a pension. This 
case dealt with the loss of pension fund entitlements. In 1969, the applicant 
completed his training as a navigation officer at the Icelandic College of Navigation 
and started work as a seaman. However, an accident sustained aboard a trawler in 
1978 left him unable to continue working as a seaman. His disability was assessed 
at 100%, which made him eligible for a disability pension from the Seamen’s Pension 
Fund (the Pension Fund). The assessment was made according to criteria that 
applied under section 13(1) and (4) of the Seamen’s Pension Fund Act,97 notably 
that the claimant was unable to carry out the work he had performed before his 
disability, that his participation in the Seamen’s Pension Fund had been intended to 
insure against this contingency, and that he had sustained a loss of fitness for work 
of 35% or more. The applicant underwent regular disability assessments by a 
physician accredited by the Seamen’s Pension Fund and was each time assessed 
as 100% disabled in relation to his previous job. After the accident, the applicant 
joined a transport company as an office assistant and later became the head of its 
claims department.98  
In 1992, an amendment to the Seamen’s Pension Fund Act considerably 
altered the basis for the assessment of disability in that the assessment was not to 
be based on the Pension Fund beneficiaries’ inability to perform the same work but 
work in general. The Pension Fund applied the new provisions not only to persons 
who had claimed a disability pension after the date of their coming into force but also 
to persons who were already in receipt of a disability pension before that date. Under 
the new rules, a fresh assessment of the applicant’s disability was carried out and it 
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concluded that the applicant’s loss of capacity for work in general was 25% and thus 
did not reach the minimum of 35%. As a result, from 1 July 1997 onwards, the 
Pension Fund stopped paying the applicant the disability pension and the related 
child benefits he had been receiving for nearly twenty years since the accident in 
1978.99 
The Court held that, according to case law decided in terms of the Convention, 
making contributions to a pension fund might, in certain circumstances, create a 
property right and such a right may be affected by the manner in which the Pension 
Fund is distributed. The rights stemming from payment of contributions to social 
insurance systems are pecuniary rights for the purposes of Article 1. However, even 
assuming that Article 1 guarantees benefits to persons who have contributed to a 
social insurance system, it cannot be interpreted as entitling that person to a pension 
of a specific amount. An important consideration in the assessment under this 
provision is whether the applicant’s right to derive benefits from the social insurance 
scheme in question has been infringed in a manner resulting in the impairment of the 
essence of his pension rights.100 The applicant’s right to derive benefits from the 
Seaman’s Pension Fund was regarded as a possession, and thus as property, for 
the purposes of Article 1.101 This approach is similar to that of Germany and US as 
both jurisdictions require that a person make contributions to the pension fund in 
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question before they obtain a constitutionally protected property right to derive a 
benefit from the pension fund.102 
Allen explains that since the ratification of the Convention and its Protocols by 
former communist countries, the ECHR has had to deal with cases concerning 
claims to property taken under old regimes.103 Furthermore, some countries enacted 
legislation that provided for the restoration of property or, in the alternative, for 
compensation in the form of money or substitute property. Allen further explains that: 
“[S]ome of the [Article 1] cases concern individuals who still have a legal title to property 
but cannot obtain its return; others concern individuals who are excluded from 
compensation schemes or otherwise treated unfairly. There are therefore two distinct 
issues concerning the applicability of [Article 1]. The first is whether the formal title to 
property is a[n] [Article 1] possession, even where the property was taken many years 
ago and has since changed hands many times. The second arises when the original title 
is lost or not recognised as a[n] [Article 1] possession. Here, the issues concern statutory 
schemes of compensation or restoration of property where applicants fail to satisfy 
conditions on entitlement.”104  
The ECHR has stated, regarding the survival of property rights, that: 
“’[P]ossessions’ can be ‘existing possessions’ or assets, including claims, in respect of 
which the applicant can argue that he has at least a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining 
effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of the 
survival of an old property right which it has long been impossible to exercise effectively 
cannot be regarded as a ‘possession’”.105  
In the Malhous decision, the only “hope of recognition” that the applicant had had 
been crystallised in 1991 legislation which allowed for persons in the applicant’s 
position to claim restitution. However, the applicant had failed to satisfy the 
                                            
102 See 2 2 2 and 2 2 3 above. 
103 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 57. See further Djajic S “The right to 
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requirements for the restitution of the land itself. This meant that any claim for 
restitution of the land itself was remote before the 1991 legislation came into effect 
and remained remote after its promulgation. Therefore, according to the ECHR, the 
applicant did not have a claim to a possession protected under Article 1. 
The decision of Broniowski v Poland106 dealt with a situation comparable to that 
of Malhous. In Broniowski the rights relied upon by the applicant still existed and 
were recognised in domestic law. The applicant alleged that Article 1 had been 
breached in that his entitlement to compensation for property abandoned in the 
territories beyond the Bug River, referred to by the Polish Constitutional Court as his 
“right to credit”, had not been satisfied.107 The crux of the applicant’s claim under the 
Convention lay in the state’s failure to satisfy his entitlement to compensatory 
property, which had vested in him under Polish law.108 The applicant maintained that 
his entitlement constitutes a property right, which Poland has originally recognised in 
taking it upon itself the obligation to compensate repatriated persons for land 
abandoned in the territories beyond the Bug River. The obligation had later been 
incorporated into domestic law, which vested in the applicant, as the heir of his 
repatriated grandmother, a specific right to offset the value of the property 
abandoned by his family beyond the Bug River against the price, or the fee for 
perpetual use, of immovable property purchased from the state. The applicant added 
that the right is explicitly recognised as a property right by the Polish courts and that 
the Polish Constitutional Court had defined it as the “right to credit”. As such, it 
undeniably falls within the concept of possessions for the purposes of Article 1.109  
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The European Court found that the applicant has a proprietary interest eligible 
for protection under Article 1. The Court further noted that the applicant’s entitlement 
had continuously had a legal basis in domestic legislation and the Polish Supreme 
Court defined it as a “debt chargeable to the state” which had “a pecuniary and 
inheritable character.” 110  When the matter was taken up in Poland, the Polish 
Constitutional Court described the applicant’s entitlement as the right to credit, which 
has the special nature of an independent property right that should be recognised as 
a constitutionally protected property right under the Polish Constitution, and which is 
a special property right of a public law nature.111 The Polish Constitutional Court 
accepted that the materialisation of this right depended on action by an entitled 
person, but it rejected the idea that the right did not exist until its realisation through 
a successful bid at an auction for the sale of state property. Consequently, the Polish 
Constitutional Court held that the right to credit is subject to protection under Article 
1.112  
Following the above judgment, the Polish Supreme Court considered that the 
right to credit was a particular proprietary right of a pecuniary value, which is 
inheritable and transferrable in a specific manner and whose substance consisted in 
the possibility of having a certain pecuniary obligation satisfied through the use of 
specific funds known as the “Bug River money”.113 
The European Court subscribed to the analysis and conclusions reached by the 
Polish Constitutional and Supreme Courts and concluded that the applicant’s right to 
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credit constitutes a possession for the purposes of Article 1.114 The Court added that 
the applicant’s possessions comprised the entitlement to obtain compensatory 
property of the kind listed in the relevant ordinance.115 While the right was created in 
a somewhat inchoate form, its materialisation was to be effected by an administrative 
decision allocating state property to the applicant, thus section 81 of the Land 
Administration Act 1982, which laid down the applicant’s right to credit, served as the 
legal basis for the state’s obligation to comply with the right.116 
This decision is a good example of how the definition of possessions in Article 
1 operates with regard to a claim. In this case, the applicant’s right to be 
compensated with property was regarded as a claim and thus as an asset potentially 
falling under the definition of a possession for the purposes of Article 1. In order for 
an asset, such as a claim, to be considered a possession, the applicant must be able 
to argue that he has at least a legitimate expectation of obtaining effective enjoyment 
of a property right. An expectation is considered “legitimate” if it is based on either a 
legislative provision or a legal act bearing on the property interest in question. In 
Broniowski, the applicant had such an expectation on the basis that his right to 
credit, in other words his right to claim compensation from the state, was recognised 
in domestic legislation binding the state to uphold his claim provided he brings 
proceedings to enforce it. The expectation was regarded as legitimate because the 
right to claim compensation is provided for in legislation that has a direct legal 
bearing on the right to claim the compensation in question that the legislation itself 
created.  
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3 2 3 Conclusion 
Regarding Article 1, Allen reaches the following conclusion:  
“The case law on the scope of [Article 1] possessions is characterised by 
reasoning that is formal, and ostensibly neutral, in the sense that it relies almost 
exclusively on national law to determine the content of [Article 1] possessions. 
As such, the cases reveal that [Article 1] is essentially conservative in its 
function. To the extent that there is an ethical theory underpinning the 
jurisprudence, it is only that property must be protected because it is property. 
The ethical basis for entitlement is determined at the national level, and [Article 
1] simply provides further support for that determination.”117 
The cases discussed above support Allen’s conclusion regarding the nature of 
property for the purposes of Article 1. The ECHR in the above cases first assessed 
whether a property right exists under the national law of the member state in 
question and if it finds that such a right does exist, it more easily accepts that the 
interest falls to be protected in terms of Article 1.118 This is especially true with regard 
to claims, where the ECHR has specifically stated that the claim must have a basis 
in domestic law in order for it to be considered a possession for the purposes of 
Article 1.119 However, the ECHR’s interpretation is not dependent on any domestic 
law definitions of property. It will look at domestic law to determine if the interest in 
question is property in the domestic law of the state in question and if so, it will 
regard the interest as a possession for the purpose of Article 1. However, if the 
interest is not recognised as property in the domestic law of the state in question, the 
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autonomous meaning doctrine allows the ECHR to determine if the interest in 
question is a possession for the purposes of Article 1 or not.   
 
3 3 Distinction between deprivation and expropriation  
3 3 1 Terminology  
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Article 1) provides that “[e]very natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions; [n]o one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law” and that this “shall not in 
any way impair the right of the state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 120  The use of the term 
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Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS 9. See further Sermet L The European Convention on 
Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 22-31; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 105-114; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the 
Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 21-
25; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 60-69; Allen T Property and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (2005) 112-124; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 
of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 878-893; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A 
The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 10-12; 
Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 18; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of 
Land Law 5th ed (2009) para 11.2.22; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 367-
370; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 62-83; 
Sluysmans J, Verbist S & Waring E (eds) Expropriation Law in Europe (2015) 1-26. 
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“deprive” in Article 1 refers to the actual taking away or dispossession of property in 
the sense usually understood in most jurisdictions as expropriation and not of the 
regulation of property.121 The ECHR clarified the relationship between the different 
elements of Article 1 by stating that: 
“The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment 
of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the paragraph. The second rule covers 
deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second 
sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the [s]tates are entitled, 
amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained 
in the second paragraph.”122  
The ECHR has said that these three rules are not distinct in that “[t]he second and 
third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right of 
peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in light of the 
                                            
121 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 191, 368. See further Sermet L The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 23; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 105; Carss-Frisk M The Right to 
Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2001) 21; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 63; Allen T Property and 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 112; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s 
possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) 
Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 872-878; Grgić A, 
Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocols (2007) 10-11; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 19; Praduroux 
S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 73.  
122 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 61. See further Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 100; Carss-Frisk M The Right to 
Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2001) 21-22; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 61-62; Allen T Property 
and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 102-104; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right 
to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 10; Praduroux S The Protection of 
Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 62-63. 
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general principle enunciated in the first rule”.123 Regarding this “general principle”, 
the ECHR stated that rule 1 reflects the principle that there must be a “fair balance” 
between “the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”.124 The second 
rule governs deprivation (expropriation) of possessions and sets out the conditions 
for a valid expropriation and the third rule governs controls on the use of property, in 
other words it deals with the member state’s power to regulate the use of property 
within its borders. Allen explains that since the first rule is general in nature and the 
                                            
123 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 102; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide 
to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2001) 25; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 61-62; Allen T Property and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2005) 102; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 
1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 875; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A 
The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 10; Praduroux 
S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 63.   
124 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 69. See further Sermet L The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 34-35; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 118; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide 
to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2001) 31; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 69; Allen T Property and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2005) 103; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 
1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 881; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A 
The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14; Svetlana 
S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Russian 
National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 32; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 369. 
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second an third rules are merely specific types of interferences with possessions, it 
follows that the fair balance principle applies to them as well.125  
  
3 3 2 Characteristics 
As stated above, Article 1 is divided into three rules. The first rule deals with the 
interference with enjoyment of possessions, the second rule deals with deprivation of 
possessions (in the sense of expropriation) and the third rule deals with controls 
regulating the use of property. The second and third rules are concerned with 
specific instances of interference with the right of peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
and must be construed in light of the principle laid down in the first rule. The first rule 
is a residual category in the sense that many types of interferences fall under either 
the second or third rule.126 Furthermore, the first rule as a category is described 
negatively as being those cases that do not fall under the second or third rules. 
There is currently no single conception of what constitutes a first rule case, but an 
                                            
125 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 103. See further Sermet L The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 34-36; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 119; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide 
to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2001) 31; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 62; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & 
Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 881; 
Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on 
Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocols (2007) 14; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 33; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 242; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights 
in Comparative Perspective (2013) 63.    
126 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 107. See further Carss-Frisk M The Right 
to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (2001) 24; Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35; Stran Greek 
Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (1994) 19 EHRR 293 
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arguably definable category of a first rule cases includes, among others, 
interferences relating to the expropriation of property.127 These types of preliminary 
actions fall under the first rule, but once expropriation has taken place the second 
rule applies.  
The second rule deals with deprivation of possessions. As mentioned above, 
the term “deprivation” in Article 1 is used in the sense of expropriation and not 
regulation. While the second rule does not explicitly require compensation, the 
ECHR has stated that a deprivation of possessions usually requires compensation in 
order to maintain a fair balance, in other words in accordance with proportionality.128 
Where it is found that a deprivation of property within the meaning of the second rule 
has taken place, it means that there has been an interference with the right of 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions. In order for an interference to be compatible 
with Article 1, it must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, it must be carried out subject to 
the conditions provided for by law, which excludes any arbitrary action on the part of 
the national authorities; secondly, it must be in the public interest; and thirdly, it must 
strike a fair balance between the owner’s rights and the interests of the community, 
                                            
127 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 107-110. 
128 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 112. See further Sermet L The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 39-40; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 115-116; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2001) 37-40; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 66; Van Rijn A “Right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van 
Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 
at 881; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Protocols (2007) 5-6; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 
34; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 511; Praduroux S The Protection of 
Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 74. 
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in line with the proportionality principle.129 Regarding the first condition of lawfulness, 
the existence of a legal basis for the interference is not, in itself, sufficient to satisfy 
the principle of lawfulness. Rather it is the quality of the applicable provisions that 
matters: they must be compatible with the rule of law and provide safeguards against 
arbitrariness. The legal norms upon which the deprivation of property is based must 
be in accordance with the domestic law of the relevant member state, including the 
provisions of its Constitution. The provisions of the domestic law must be sufficiently 
accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application. A particular rule is 
foreseeable when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences 
by the public authorities. However, the ECHR has limited power to review 
compliance with domestic law, especially when there is nothing from which it can 
conclude the authorities have applied the relevant legal provisions in a manifestly 
erroneous manner or so as to reach arbitrary conclusions.130  
The ECHR has reiterated that, regarding the second condition of “public 
interest”; the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international 
                                            
129 Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in 
Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 878-879. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 113; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the 
Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 26 
and 40; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 65-74; Allen T Property and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2005) 94 and 114; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property 
under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 12; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 455; Vistiņś and Perepjolkins v Latvia [GC] 71243/01 25 October 2012 para 94; 
Maksymenko and Gerasymenko v Ukraine 49317/07 16 May 2013 para 51.  
130 Maksymenko and Gerasymenko v Ukraine 49317/07 16 May 2013 para 52-54; Vistiņś and 
Perepjolkins v Latvia [GC] 71243/01 25 October 2012 para 95-98. 
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judge to appreciate what is in the public interest because of their direct knowledge of 
their society and its needs. Furthermore, the ECHR has stated that: 
“Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of public 
concern warranting measures of deprivation of property. Here, as in other fields to which 
the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a 
certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the notion of ‘public interest’ is necessarily 
extensive. In particular, the decision to enact laws expropriating property will commonly 
involve consideration of political, economic and social issues. The Court, finding it natural 
that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and 
economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature’s judgment as to 
what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable 
foundation.”131 
Therefore, while national authorities are given wide discretion to determine what is in 
the public interest, the ECHR will intervene and consider this issue when it has found 
that the national authorities’ judgment as to what falls into the public interest is 
“manifestly without reasonable foundation”.  
Regarding the third condition of a “fair balance”, the ECHR has stated that even 
if a measure of interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
is lawful and carried out in the public interest, it must still strike a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements 
of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. In particular, there must be 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by 
any measure depriving a person of his possessions.132 Furthermore, the ECHR has 
stated that: 
                                            
131 Vistiņś and Perepjolkins v Latvia [GC] 71243/01 25 October 2012 para 106. 
132 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 69. See further Sermet L The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 34-35; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 118; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide 
to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
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“In determining whether this requirement is met, the Court recognises that the State 
enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of 
enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified 
in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question. 
Nevertheless, the Court cannot abdicate its power of review and must determine whether 
the requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicants’ right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, within the meaning of the first sentence of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”133 
The concepts of a “fair balance” and “proportionality” are considered in more detail in 
a separate section of this chapter below.134  
The third rule is concerned with regulatory controls over the use of property. 
This rule recognises that the member states are entitled, amongst other things, to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest by enforcing such 
laws as they deem necessary for this purpose. However, this rule, like the other two, 
is subject to the principle of proportionality. A fair balance must be struck between 
the public interest served by the laws controlling the use of property and the private 
interest affected. Furthermore, it is important to note the distinction between controls 
over the use of property and other controls over property. Allen argues that, by 
referring only to the use of property, the third rule excludes controls over the rights of 
                                                                                                                                        
(2001) 31; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 69; Allen T Property and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2005) 103; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 
1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 881; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A 
The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14; Svetlana 
S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Russian 
National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 32; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 369. 
133 Maksymenko and Gerasymenko v Ukraine 49317/07 16 May 2013 para 61. 
134 See 3 4 below. 
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possession or disposition from its application.135 However the ECHR has not applied 
the third rule in this way. The third rule has been applied to restrictions on the right of 
possession136 as well as restrictions on rights of disposition.137 Examples of controls 
judged under the third rule include legislation that imposes tenancy agreements on 
landlords and which set allegedly inadequate levels of rent.138 The ECHR has held 
that interferences under this rule must comply with the principle of lawfulness, have a 
legitimate aim that is in the general interest, and strike a fair balance. 139 
Furthermore, it has also held that a significant degree of deference to the national 
authorities will be allowed with regard to determining what is in the public or general 
interest, unless this determination is manifestly without reasonable foundation.140 
The three-rule structure of Article 1 seems to indicate that the ECHR’s 
approach to the distinction between deprivation (regulation) and expropriation treats 
these two forms of interference with property as two discrete categories that do not 
overlap at all. While both must comply with the principle of lawfulness, they must be 
in the public or general interest and comply with the principle of proportionality, each 
constitutes a unique interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property.141 
                                            
135 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 119. 
136 See, for example, Chassagnou and Others v France (2000) 29 EHRR 615. 
137 See, for example, Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 
391.  
138 See, for example, Hutten-Czapska v Poland [GC] 35014/97 ECHR 2006-VIII; Edwards v Malta 
17647/04 24 October 2006; Bittó and Others v Slovakia 30255/09 28 January 2014. 
139 Bittó and Others v Slovakia 30255/09 28 January 2014 para 95; Hutten-Czapska v Poland [GC] 
35014/97 ECHR 2006-VIII para 160-168; Edwards v Malta 17647/04 24 October 2006 para 52-78; 
Nobel and Others v Netherlands 27126/11 2 July 2013 para 31. 
140 Para 96.  
141 Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 23. See further 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 105; Carss-Frisk M 
The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2001) 25; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 61-62; Allen 
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However, there is uncertainty regarding the relevance of this three-rule structure. 
The ECHR is inconsistent with its classification of interferences under one of the 
three rules.142 It is not clear how this structure affects the judicial analysis in a given 
case. Allen explains that, considering the three-rule structure, there are three distinct 
steps that should be followed in determining whether there has been a violation of 
Article 1.143 The first step is to ask whether Article 1 is applicable, the second step is 
to identify the applicable rule and the third step is to ask whether the interference is 
justifiable. The purpose of the second step is to narrow the fairly broad inquiry under 
the third step by indicating which facts can be eliminated from the analysis of legality 
and proportionality as well as the weight and significance to be attached to facts that 
must be considered. Allen concludes that if the second step does not in any way 
perform this function, it has no useful purpose in the analysis of cases.144   
   
3 3 3 Public interest 
The second rule of Article 1 states that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest […]”. The approach of the ECHR regarding the question 
of public interest is a sympathetic or deferential approach. The ECHR interprets 
public interest sympathetically towards the states, leaving them as wide a “margin of 
                                                                                                                                        
T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 103; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L 
(eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 887; Grgić A, 
Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocols (2007) 10-11; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective 
(2013) 79-80.  
142 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 120. 
143 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 121. 
144 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 121. 
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appreciation” as possible, but the ECHR will investigate whether a legitimate public 
purpose was involved and whether the expropriation was properly authorised.145  
The decision of James v United Kingdom146 confirmed the deferent approach of 
the ECHR with regard to the public interest requirement. The ECHR held that “a 
deprivation of property effected for no reason other than to confer a private benefit 
on a private party cannot be ‘in the public interest’. Nonetheless, the compulsory 
transfer of property from one individual to another may, depending on the 
circumstances, constitute a legitimate means for promoting the public interest.”147 
Furthermore, the public interest cannot be said to require the transferred property to 
be put into use for the general public or specific community, nor that the general 
public or the specific community in question benefit directly from the taking.148 The 
EHCR concluded in this case that “a taking of property effected in pursuance of 
legitimate social, economic or other policies may be ‘in the public interest’, even if 
the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment of the property taken”.149 
                                            
145 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 113. See further 
Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 33-34; Carss-Frisk 
M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2001) 27; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 35-37; Allen 
T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 125-130; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & 
Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 879-
881; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention 
on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
its Protocols (2007) 14; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 30-32; Van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 488; Praduroux S The Protection of Property 
Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 5-8.   
146 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
147 Para 40. 
148 Para 41. 
149 Para 45. 
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Regarding the margin of appreciation afforded to the national authorities, the ECHR 
stated the following: 
“Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities 
are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is ‘in the 
public interest’. Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus 
for the national authorities to make the initial assessment both of the existence of a 
problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of property and of the 
remedial action to be taken [...]. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the 
Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation. Furthermore, the notion of ‘public interest’ is necessarily extensive. In 
particular, as the Commission noted, the decision to enact laws expropriating property 
will commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social issues on which 
opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court, finding it 
natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social 
and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature’s judgment as to 
what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that judgment be manifestly without reasonable 
foundation. In other words, although the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for 
that of the national authorities, it is bound to review the contested measures under Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and, in so doing, to make an inquiry into the facts with 
reference to which the national authorities acted.”150 
The ECHR’s deferent approach to the public purpose requirement is also seen in its 
judgment in Holy Monasteries v Greece.151 This case involved legislation, which 
transferred all the property held by the monasteries to the state unless the 
                                            
150 Para 46. See further Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights 
(1998) 33-34; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 106, 
113; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 27; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights 
(2001) 35-37, 65; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 125-130; Van Rijn A “Right 
to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof 
F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 
863-893 at 879; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 
30-32; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 488-490. 
151 Holy Monasteries v Greece (1995) ECHR Series A No 301A. 
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monasteries could establish that they held title to the property, by way of either a 
duly registered deed, a statutory provision or a final court decision against the 
state.152 The reasons given by the state for this legislation were to end the illegal 
sale of the land in question, encroachments on it and the abandonment or the 
uncontrolled development thereof.153 While the Court expressed some doubt as to 
the reasons for these measures, it held that these doubts were insufficient to deprive 
the legislation of its legitimacy as being in the public interest.154  
The above analysis confirms the ECHR’s deferent approach to the national 
authorities’ determination of what would be in the public interest. However, the 
Court’s deference to this determination is not complete because the ECHR will not 
defer to the national authority’s determination if it finds that the determination is 
without any reasonable foundation. The ECHR’s approach to the public interest 
requirement appears to be similar to the US approach to this requirement, in that the 
US Supreme Court also follows a deferent approach,155 but the deference of the US 
courts is towards determinations of public interest identified by the legislature, while 
the ECHR defers to the member states. However, neither court is entirely deferent to 
the respective determinants of public interest. The courts will still, where necessary, 
assess the determinations to ensure that the proposed public use or public interests 
                                            
152 Para 24. 
153 Para 69. 
154 Para 69. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 
(1999) 106; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 65; Allen T Property and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2005) 125-130; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions 
(Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and 
Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 879-881; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 488-490.  
155 See 3 4 above. 
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is indeed legitimate. The German156 approach is stricter in the sense that there is 
less deference to a statutory determination of public interest. A public interest relied 
on to justify an expropriation will always be scrutinised in order to ensure its 
legitimacy.  
 
3 3 4 Compensation 
Article 1 does not specifically mention the payment of compensation as a 
requirement for deprivation (in the sense of expropriation) of property. However, the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR indicates that compensation for expropriation of property 
is usually required on the basis of the proportionality principle.157 The notion of 
payment of compensation was mentioned in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden158 
where the ECHR held that the issuing of expropriation permits that authorised 
expropriation for an unlimited period of time interfered with the applicants’ 
possession in such a way that only a reduction in the time period or compensation 
                                            
156 See 3 4 above. 
157 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35; James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 
123. See further Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 
39-40; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 115-116; 
Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 37-40; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights 
(2001) 66; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 112; Van Rijn A “Right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van 
Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 
at 881; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Protocols (2007) 5-6; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 
34; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 511; Praduroux S The Protection of 
Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 74. 
158 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35. 
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would render the interference legitimate.159 This reference to compensation was 
picked up in James, 160  where the ECHR laid down principles regarding 
compensation: Article 1 impliedly requires the payment of compensation as a 
necessary condition for the expropriation of property; expropriation without 
compensation is only permissible in certain exceptional circumstances; 
compensation terms are material to the assessment of whether the burden placed on 
a person is disproportionate and therefore in conflict with Article 1; Article 1 does not 
guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances because circumstances 
and the public interest may call for reimbursement that is less than full market value; 
and the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its 
value would normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be 
considered justifiable under Article 1.161  
                                            
159 Para 73. See further Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 150.  
160 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
161 Para 54. See further Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights 
(1998) 39-40; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 115-
116; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 38-39; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights 
(2001) 70-73; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 171-180; Van Rijn A “Right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, 
Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-
893 at 881-882; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Protocols (2007) 7-8; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 
34; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 505; Praduroux S The Protection of 
Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 73-74; Sluysmans J, Verbist S & Waring E (eds) 
Expropriation Law in Europe (2015) 15-23. 
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The standard for compensation required in Rule 2 cases is that compensation 
should be “reasonably related to its value”.162 Allen explains that this is not a strict 
standard because while it suggests that national authorities must take the value of 
the property into account when determining the amount of compensation in a given 
case, it does not suggest that full value must be paid in every case.163 The EHCR 
requires an equitable or fair balance to be struck when determining compensation, 
similar to the German164 method of determining compensation for expropriation.165  
 
3 3 5 Excessive deprivation or regulation 
3 3 5 1 Constructive expropriation 
The ECHR’s position on constructive expropriation is, at this point, uncertain.166 
There was initially a reasonably clear distinction made between expropriation, 
                                            
162 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. See further Sermet L The European Convention on 
Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 39-40; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 115; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the 
Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 38-
39; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 71; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 
1998 (2005) 154; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 881; Praduroux S The Protection of Property 
Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 75. 
163 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 154.  
164 See 3 5 above. 
165 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 511. 
166 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 367. See further Sermet L The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 24; Van der Walt AJ 
“Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice 
relating to regulatory takings” (1999) 14 SAPL 273-331 at 299-302; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 111-112; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2001) 22-23; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 63-64; Allen T Property and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 112-118; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s 
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governed by the second rule, and controls on the use of property (regulation), 
governed by the third rule. A small number of subsequent decisions of the ECHR 
appear to have created space for recognition of a notion of something like 
constructive expropriation, but the authority for doing so is not clear.   
In Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden,167 the ECHR held that in the absence of a 
formal expropriation, it must “look behind the appearances and investigate the 
realities of the situation complained of”.168 This statement appears to create the 
possibility for the recognition of constructive expropriation under Article 1.169  In 
Papamichalopoulos v Greece, 170  the ECHR held that the interference with the 
applicants’ land did not constitute a control on the use of property in terms of the 
second paragraph of Article 1, nor were the applicants formally expropriated.171 
Following the reasoning in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, the ECHR stated that 
it had to determine whether the situation complained of amounted to a de facto 
                                                                                                                                        
possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) 
Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 874; Grgić A, Mataga 
Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 
10-11; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 26; Gray K & Gray SF 
Elements of Land Law 5th ed (2009) para 11.2.22; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in 
Comparative Perspective (2013) 76-79.  
167 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35. 
168 Para 63. 
169 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 63. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 111-112; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2001) 22-23; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 368; Praduroux S 
The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 76.  
170 Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) ECHR Series A vol 260B. 
171 Para 41. 
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expropriation.172 The ECHR held that the loss of the ability to dispose of the land in 
question, combined with the failure of the attempts made to remedy the situation, 
entailed sufficiently serious consequences “for the applicants de facto to have been 
expropriated in a manner incompatible with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
their possessions”.173  The ECHR also found that a de facto expropriation was 
present in the case of Vasilescu v Romania.174 In this case, the police searched the 
applicant’s house without a warrant, in connection with a police investigation into her 
husband’s activities. The police seized 327 gold coins. The police discontinued the 
investigation but kept the coins.175 The ECHR held that, due the lack of any basis in 
law, as was recognised by both the domestic courts and the government, retention of 
the coins could not be interpreted as a deprivation of possessions or as a control on 
the use of property allowed by the first and second paragraphs of Article 1.176 
Following Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden and Papamichalopoulos v Greece, the 
ECHR held that it had to be ascertained whether the situation complained of 
amounted to a de facto confiscation that was incompatible with the applicant’s right 
to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.177 The ECHR concluded that the applicant 
had been the victim of a de facto confiscation because the loss of all ability to 
dispose of the property in question, combined with the failure of attempts to remedy 
the situation through the national authorities and the courts entailed sufficiently 
                                            
172 Para 42. 
173 Para 45. 
174 Vasilescu v Romania (1998) 28 EHRR 241. 
175 Para 8-10.  
176 Para 50.  
177 Para 51. 
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serious consequences for it to be held that a de facto confiscation had taken 
place.178  
The judgment of Fredin v Sweden179 appears to provide some support to the 
argument that the ECHR does recognise de facto or constructive expropriation. This 
case concerned the regulation of permits for the excavation of gravel. The ECHR 
held that the applicants had not been formally expropriated by this regulation, but 
then held that the term “deprivation” in Article 1 covered not only formal 
expropriations but also measures that amount to de facto expropriations.180 The 
ECHR noted that the legislation in question was designed to control the use of the 
applicants’ property, which left untouched their ability to make formal decisions 
regarding the fate of their property, though it remained to be seen whether the 
consequences of the revocation of their permit to excavate gravel were so serious as 
to result in a de facto expropriation of property.181 Therefore, the regulation did not 
take away all meaningful use of the applicant’s property and was considered by the 
ECHR to be a control of the use of property in terms of the third rule and not a 
deprivation of property under the second rule of Article 1.182 Van der Walt points out 
that the implication of this decision is that a control of the use of possessions which 
does take away all meaningful use of an applicant’s property might be regarded as 
deprivation of property and judged under the second rule, which would bring the 
                                            
178 Para 53. 
179 Fredin v Sweden (1991) ECHR Series A vol 192. 
180 Para 42 referring to Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 63.  
181 Para 43. 
182 Para 47. 
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ECHR’s case law regarding constructive expropriation closer to the US case law on 
regulatory takings.183   
Conflicting decisions have suggested that excessive regulatory controls of the 
use of property should be treated as deprivations that require compensation,184 while 
others have expressed doubt regarding this possibility.185 Adding to the uncertainty 
are decisions where the ECHR has found a violation of the third rule on the basis 
that the regulatory authority failed to establish the required fair balance between 
state and individual interests, and awarded compensation under Article 41 of the 
Convention.186 Van der Walt explains that 
“[t]his kind of award is arguably constitutional compensation that should be distinguished 
from compensation for expropriation and it should not be seen as an indication that the 
court has adopted the idea that compensation should be paid for constructive 
expropriation. In a sense it resembles the equalisation payment that is possible in 
German […] law, albeit on a different basis. Constitutional compensation for regulatory 
action that has unfair results does not equal compensation for constructive 
expropriation.”187  
Van der Walt concludes that the authority for the recognition of constructive 
expropriation in European Convention law is ambiguous at best.188  
 
                                            
183 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 112. See further 
Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative Perspective (2013) 76. 
184 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 368. See further Erkner and Hofauer v 
Austria (1987) ECHR Series A vol 117; Poiss v Austria (1987) ECHR Series A vol 117; Inze v Austria 
(1998) 10 EHRR 394; Banér v Sweden (1989) 60 DR 128; Fredin v Sweden (1991) ECHR Series A 
vol 192; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (1994) 19 EHRR 293. 
185 See Tre Traktörer AB v Sweden (1989) ECHR Series A vol 159; Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 
EHRR 391; Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319. 
186 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 370. 
187 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 370.  
188 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 370. 
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3 3 5 2 A third category  
If the interference with an applicant’s possessions does not constitute an 
expropriation or a control of the use of property but nevertheless interferes with the 
applicant’s possessions, the interference will be examined under the first rule. These 
cases appear to constitute a third category of interference with possessions, simply 
known as interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.189  
In Banér v Sweden,190 it was held that the introduction of legislation that gave 
the public the right to fish in the applicant’s waters, where he previously enjoyed the 
exclusive right to do so, without compensation, amounted to a violation of Article 
1.191 The Commission held that it had to be determined whether this interference had 
to be regarded as a deprivation in terms of the second rule, a control of the use of 
property in terms of the third rule, or a “third form of interference to be considered 
under the first rule”.192 The Commission held that deprivation of possessions in terms 
of Article 1 is not limited to cases where formal expropriation has taken place; it may 
also take place when the measure affects the “substance of the property to such a 
degree that there has been a [de facto] expropriation or where the measure 
                                            
189 Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 88. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 99-105; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2001) 24-25; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 872-878; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A 
The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 11-12; Gray K 
& Gray SF Elements of Land Law 5th ed (2009) para 11.2.22; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 388. 
190 Banér v Sweden (1989) 60 DR 128. 
191 At 133. 
192 At 136. 
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complained of ‘can be assimilated to a deprivation of possessions’”. 193  The 
Commission concluded that the interference in this case had to be determined under 
the third rule regarding controls of the use of property because the applicant had not 
been deprived of his title or his right to fish and that the restrictions placed on his 
rights to his property could not be assimilated into expropriation, nor were they 
serious enough to affect the substance of the property right.194 In Katte Klitsche de la 
Grange v Italy,195 the applicant complained that a prohibition against building placed 
on his property, for which he had not received compensation, violated Article 1.196 
The ECHR held that this dispute fell to be decided under the first rule dealing with 
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions because it did not involve a deprivation of 
possessions (the second rule) or a control of the use of property (the third rule).197  
In Matos e Silva, LDA and Others v Portugal,198 the applicants’ land was 
subject to a number of restrictions including a ban on building and a restriction on the 
development of the land.199 The ECHR held that the applicants had suffered an 
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions because, 
although the measures in question left intact the applicants’ right to deal with and 
use their possessions, they greatly reduced the applicants’ ability to do so in practice 
and they affected the very substance of ownership.200 
                                            
193 At 137. 
194 At 137-138. 
195 Katte Klitsche de la Grange v Italy (1994) Series A vol 293B. 
196 Para 35. 
197 Para 40. 
198 Matos e Silva, LDA and Others v Portugal (1997) 24 EHRR 573.  
199 Para 76. 
200 Para 79. 
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When determining whether this interference was justified under Article 1, the 
ECHR held that this case was to be decided in terms of the first rule of Article 1 due 
to the fact that there was no formal expropriation, nor was there a de facto 
expropriation, because the effect of the measures could not be equated with 
deprivation of possessions.201 Therefore, the ECHR had to determine whether a fair 
balance had been struck between the general interest of the community and the 
requirements for the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.202 The ECHR 
accepted that the measures were in the general interest but concluded that they had 
serious and harmful effects that hindered the applicants’ ordinary enjoyment of their 
right for more than thirteen years and as a result, the applicants had to bear an 
individual and excessive burden that upset the fair balance.203 Having found a lack of 
a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the requirements 
of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, the ECHR saw fit to award to 
the applicants a monetary amount as just satisfaction in terms of Article 50 of the 
Convention. 204  Importantly, this award was not one of compensation for 
expropriation, nor can it be viewed as recognition of constructive or de facto 
expropriation, as neither of these forms of expropriation were present in this case. 
This award was made in terms of Article 50, which gives the ECHR the discretion to 
order the payment of just satisfaction to an injured party where such injury is the 
result of a member state’s decision or where the measure is in conflict with its 
obligations under the Convention and the internal law of the member state only 
allows for partial reparation for the effects of the decision or measure. The 
                                            
201 Para 85.  
202 Para 86, referring to Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 69. 
203 Para 92. 
204 Para 97-101. 
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compensation award in terms of Article 50 therefore resembles either a general 
award of constitutional damages or compensation in terms of the equalisation 
awards that are allowed in German law.    
 
3 3 6 Conclusion 
Article 1 is divided into three rules. The first rule deals with interferences with the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the second rules deals with deprivation 
of possessions and the third rule deals with controls on the use of property. The term 
“deprived” in Article 1 is understood to mean the actual taking away or dispossession 
of property in the sense of expropriation. Article 1 also refers to controlling the use of 
property by the member states in their respective jurisdictions, which is understood 
as meaning the regulation of property by the member states. This three-rule 
structure appears to indicate that the ECHR treats deprivation (expropriation) and 
regulation of property as two discrete categories that do not overlap. While both must 
comply with the principle of lawfulness, be in the public or general interest and 
comply with the principle of proportionality, each constitutes a unique interference 
with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. To comply with the principle 
of lawfulness the legal basis for the interference must based on the rule of law, 
provide safeguards against arbitrariness and be in accordance with the law of the 
relevant member state, including the provisions of its Constitution. The ECHR 
employs a deferential approach to the public interest requirement, deferring to the 
national authorities’ determination of what is in the public interest. The ECHR will 
intervene when it is found that the determination made by the national authorities is 
manifestly without reasonable foundation. Regarding proportionality, the interference 
must strike a fair balance between the general interests of the community and the 
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requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. There must also 
be proportionality between the means employed and the aim sough to be achieved 
by the measure.  
 Article 1 does not specifically mention compensation as a requirement for 
deprivation (expropriation) of possessions. However, the jurisprudence of the ECHR 
indicates that compensation for expropriation is usually required on the basis of the 
proportionality principle. Article 1 does not guarantee a right to full compensation 
because the circumstances of the case and the public interest may call for 
reimbursement at less than market value. The standard is that the compensation 
paid should be reasonably related to the value of the expropriated property.   
The ECHR is inconsistent with its classification of interferences under one of 
the three rules. This inconsistency has resulted in decisions that appear to constitute 
a third category of interference with possessions that are judged under the first rule 
of Article 1. If the ECHR awards compensation for interferences that fall into this third 
category, such compensation is not compensation for expropriation. It will most likely 
be an award as just satisfaction in terms of Article 50 of the Convention, which 
resembles a general award of constitutional damages or compensation in terms of 
the equalisation awards that are allowed in German law.   
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137 
3 4 Fair balance 
3 4 1 Introduction 
The doctrine of proportionality plays a very important role in the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR.205 The ECHR incorporated the proportionality test into its analysis of Article 1 
in its Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden 206  and James v United Kingdom 207 
decisions. In Sporrong, the ECHR held that: 
                                            
205 Sermet L The European Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 32-37; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 118-120; Greer S The 
Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2000) 5; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 26-43; Rook D Property Law and 
Human Rights (2001) 69-74 and 80-86; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 101-
166; De la Rasilla del Moral I “The increasingly marginal appreciation of the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine” (2006) 7 German LJ 611-623 at 613-619; Letsas G “Two concepts of the margin of 
appreciation” (2006) 26 Oxford J Legal Stud 705-732 at 706; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & 
Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 878-
891; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention 
on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
its Protocols (2007) 12-15; Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 32-35; 
Greer S “The interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights: Universal principle or 
margin of appreciation?” (2010) 3 UCL Hum Rts Rev 1-14 at 6; Mowbray A “A study of the principle of 
fair balance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2010) 10 Hum Rts LR 289-
317 at 289-290; Kratochvíl J “The inflation of the margin of appreciation by the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2011) 29 Neth Q Hum Rts 324-357 at 326; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Law 3rd ed (2011) 242, 368-370; Praduroux S The Protection of Property Rights in Comparative 
Perspective (2013) 73-80. It should be noted that the ECHR does not always employ a proportionality 
standard when determining if there is a fair balance between the general interests of the community 
and the requirements of the protections of the individual’s fundamental rights, for example JA Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45 (GC) para 75-85.  
206 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35.  
207 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 
(2005) 123.  
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“For the purposes of [the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1], the Court must 
determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights […]. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the 
Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1 – 1).”208 
Therefore, the ECHR held that the first sentence of Article 1 not only sets out the 
right to property, but also implicitly incorporates a fair balance (proportionality) 
test.209 This incorporation of a fair balance test was taken further in the James 
decision, where the ECHR held that: 
“The three rules are not, however, ‘distinct’ in the sense of being unconnected. The 
second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of 
the general principle enunciated in the first rule.”210  
Allen explains that, from this statement in James, it follows that the fair balance test 
applies to all interferences with possessions.211  
                                            
208 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 69. 
209 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 123. See further Sermet L The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 34-35; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 118-120; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A 
Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2001) 69; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 881; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The 
Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14-15; Svetlana S Protection 
of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National 
Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 32-33; Mowbray A “A study of the principle of fair 
balance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2010) 10 Hum Rts LR 289-317 
at 291-292; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 242. 
210 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 para 37. 
211 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 124. See further Carss-Frisk M The Right 
to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (2001) 30; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 139 
The ECHR has held that an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest 
of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights.212  In particular, there must be a “reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by 
any measure depriving a person of his possessions”.213 In determining whether 
these requirements are met, the ECHR recognises that the member states enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation regarding both choosing the means of enforcement and 
ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general 
interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question.214 However, 
the ECHR cannot abdicate its power of review and must determine for itself whether 
the requisite balance has been established and maintained in a manner consonant 
with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.215  
 
3 4 2 Functions of the fair balance principle 
The fair balance principle performs at least two discrete functions.216 The first is that 
this principle allows the ECHR to assess the proportionality of a respondent state’s 
conduct.217 An example of the ECHR analysing the proportionality of an interference 
                                                                                                                                        
European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14.  
212 Jahn and Others v Germany 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01 ECHR 2005-VI para 93.  
213 Para 93. 
214 Para 93. 
215 Para 93. 
216 Mowbray A “A study of the principle of fair balance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2010) 10 Hum Rts LR 289-317 at 308. 
217 Mowbray A “A study of the principle of fair balance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2010) 10 Hum Rts LR 289-317 at 308. See further Sermet L The European 
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with an applicant’s Convention rights in order to determine if a fair balance had been 
struck is Hutten-Czapska v Poland.218 In this case, Polish legislation limited the 
applicant’s right to increase the rent payable by her tenants and her right to 
terminate tenancies. The government argued that these measures were necessary 
to deal with the housing shortage that occurred during the transition from a 
Communist system to a free market system. The ECHR held that  
“[n]ot only must an interference with the right of property pursue, on the facts as well as 
in principle, a ‘legitimate aim’ in the ‘general interest’, but there must also be a 
reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realised by any measures applied by the [s]tate, including measures designed to 
control the use of the individual’s property. That requirement is expressed by the notion 
of a ‘fair balance’ that must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. 
The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 as a whole. In each case involving an alleged violation of that Article the Court 
must therefore ascertain whether by reason of the State’s interference the person 
concerned had to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden.”219 
Regarding whether the legislation in question had a legitimate aim, the ECHR held 
that, as a result of the social and economic circumstances of the case, the legislation 
did have a legitimate aim that was in the general interest.220  
                                                                                                                                        
Convention on Human Rights and Property Rights (1998) 35; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 118; Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the 
Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 31-
33; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 69; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L 
(eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 881; Grgić A, 
Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocols (2007) 14.  
218 Hutten-Czapska v Poland [GC] 35014/97 ECHR 2006-VIII. 
219 Para 167. 
220 Para 178. 
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 While the legislation in question did have a legitimate aim in the general 
interest, the ECHR further held that 
“It is true that, as stated in the Chamber judgment, the Polish State, which inherited from 
the communist regime the acute shortage of flats available for lease at an affordable 
level of rent, had to balance the exceptionally difficult and socially sensitive issues 
involved in reconciling the conflicting interests of landlords and tenants. It had, on the 
one hand, to secure the protection of the property rights of the former and, on the other, 
to respect the social rights of the latter, often vulnerable individuals. Nevertheless, the 
legitimate interests of the community in such situations call for a fair distribution of the 
social and financial burden involved in the transformation and reform of the country’s 
housing supply. This burden cannot, as in the present case, be placed on one particular 
social group, however important the interests of the other group or the community as a 
whole. 
In the light of the foregoing, and having regard to the effects of the operation of the rent-
control legislation during the whole period under consideration on the rights of the 
applicant and other persons in a similar situation, the Court considers that the Polish 
State has failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the 
community and the protection of the right of property. 
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”221 
While the aim of the legislation in question was legitimate and in the general interest, 
the ECHR found that the legislation placed a disproportionate burden on one 
particular social group, in this case landlords. 
The second function performed by the fair balance principle is that it provides a 
mechanism that enables the ECHR to determine if the respondent state is subject to 
an implied positive obligation arising under the Convention.222 In these instances, the 
ECHR must reconcile the interests of the applicant with the interests of the 
community as submitted by the respondent state to determine if the fair balance 
                                            
221 Para 225. 
222 Mowbray A “A study of the principle of fair balance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2010) 10 Hum Rts LR 289-317 at 310.  
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principle requires the respondent state to act positively to fulfill the relevant 
Convention right of the applicant.223 
 
3 4 3 The margin of appreciation 
In deciding cases of violations of rights in the Convention, the ECHR has developed 
the notion of a margin of appreciation. This practice takes the form of deference to 
the member states regarding the policies they choose to implement and the manner 
in which they implement them.224 This notion was first developed in the judgment of 
Handyside v United Kingdom,225 where it was held that state authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to give an exact opinion on 
the prevalent “moral” requirements as well as on the necessity of a restriction or 
penalty intended to meet them.226 This statement was subsequently confirmed in 
                                            
223 Mowbray A “A study of the principle of fair balance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2010) 10 Hum Rts LR 289-317 at 311.  
224 Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 125. See further Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 106; Carss-Frisk M The Right to 
Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2001) 27; Rook D Property Law and Human Rights (2001) 32-33; De la Rasilla del 
Moral I “The increasingly marginal appreciation of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine” (2006) 7 
German LJ 611-623 at 613-619; Van Rijn A “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions 
(Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and 
Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 863-893 at 865; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M 
& Vilfan A The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14; Svetlana 
S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Russian 
National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 30-32; Greer S “The interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Universal principle or margin of appreciation?” (2010) 3 UCL 
Hum Rts Rev 1-14 at 2-5; Kratochvíl J “The inflation of the margin of appreciation by the European 
Court of Human Rights” (2011) 29 Neth Q Hum Rts 324-357 at 327.  
225 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
226 Para 48. 
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Ireland v United Kingdom,227 where the ECHR stated that “by reason of their direct 
and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national 
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide 
both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
derogations necessary to avert it”. 228  The margin of appreciation was again 
confirmed and applied in James v United Kingdom,229 where it was held that the 
national authorities were better placed than the international judge to appreciate 
what is in the public interest and that it is for the national authorities to make the 
initial assessment both of a problem of public concern warranting measures of 
deprivation of property and the remedial action to be taken.230 Therefore, when 
dealing with deprivations of possessions in terms of the second rule, the ECHR will 
defer to the national authorities and allow them to make the initial assessment as to 
what is in the public interest and whether the measure that causes the deprivation of 
possessions is in line with that public interest. The ECHR will respect the 
determination made by the national authorities, unless it finds the determination to 
be manifestly without reasonable foundation.231 This means that the ECHR will not 
substitute its own determination of what is in the general interest for that of the 
national authorities, but it will review the contested measures in question to make 
                                            
227 Ireland v United Kingdom 5310/71 18 January 1978.  
228 Para 201. See further Kratochvíl J “The inflation of the margin of appreciation by the European 
Court of Human Rights” (2011) 29 Neth Q Hum Rts 324-357 at 326.  
229 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
230 Para 46. 
231 Para 46. 
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sure that they are lawful, in the general interest and strike a fair balance of 
proportionality between the public interest and the private interest involved.232 
The notion of a margin of appreciation to the member states’ designation of 
what is in the public interest is also applied in cases concerning the third rule of 
Article 1, namely controls of the use of property, in the same manner as it applies to 
the requirement of the general or public interest requirement set in the second rule of 
Article 1.233 As in cases under the second rule, the member states make the initial 
determination of what is in the general interest, but the ECHR will inquire whether 
the limitation or interference is lawful, in the general interest and whether a fair 
balance of proportionality is struck between the public interest served and the private 
interest affected.234    
According to commentators, the margin of appreciation doctrine has two 
primary uses: firstly, it is used as a doctrine of deference that ensures that the ECHR 
will not usurp the power of the member states to decide on how to apply the rights in 
                                            
232 Para 46. See further Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35; Holy Monasteries v 
Greece (1995) ECHR Series A No 301A; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 113; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 488-
489.  
233 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 106-107. See 
further Carss-Frisk M The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No 
1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 26-31; Rook D Property Law and Human 
Rights (2001) 32-33; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 125; Van Rijn A “Right 
to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van Hoof 
F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 
863-893 at 887-888; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 226-227. 
234 See X v Austria (1979) 17 DR 27; Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35; James v 
United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123; Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 391; Tre Traktörer AB v 
Sweden (1989) ECHR Series A vol 159; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 106-107; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 
226-227.  
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the Convention to concrete factual circumstances; and secondly, it can be used to 
affect the definitions of the rights themselves and thereby affect the extent of the 
obligations placed on member states by the Convention.235  
Allen explains that the degree of deference depends on a number of factors. 
The first question is whether the decision is one made by the parliament of a 
member state or one made by administrative authorities. Greater deference will be 
shown to the decisions of parliament than to those made by administrative 
authorities. Secondly, greater deference is required when the Convention requires a 
balance to be struck, as it does with Article 1. The fact that Article 1 is so heavily 
qualified means that greater deference should be shown in property disputes than 
when dealing with complaints grounded in other, less qualified articles. Thirdly, the 
nature of the subject matter of the dispute is an important factor in deciding which 
degree of deference is appropriate. In International Transport Roth GmbH v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,236 it was held that “greater or lesser 
deference will be due according to whether the subject matter lies more readily 
within the actual or potential expertise of the democratic powers of the courts”.237 
 Other factors that have been considered by the ECHR when determining the 
degree of deference include the legitimate aims pursued by the restriction on the 
right or rights in question or non-compliance with a positive object to secure a right or 
rights; whether an emergency situation is present; the seriousness of the 
interference as a consideration for narrowing the deference allowed and the 
                                            
235 Kratochvíl J “The inflation of the margin of appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights” 
(2011) 29 Neth Q Hum Rts 324-357 at 328; Letsas G “Two concepts of the margin of appreciation” 
(2006) 26 Oxford J Legal Stud 705-732 at 706; Greer S The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation 
and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights (2000) 5.  
236 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728. 
237 Para 87. 
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“European consensus” standard. 238  The “European consensus” standard is a 
“generic label used to describe the Court’s inquiry into the existence or non-
existence of a common ground, mostly in the law and practice of the member States 
of the Council of Europe […].”239 
 
3 4 4 Conclusion  
The ECHR has held that the first sentence of Article 1 not only sets out the right to 
property but also implicitly incorporates a fair balance (proportionality) test and that 
this fair balance test applies to all interferences with possessions. Any interference 
with possessions must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved by 
the interference. The ECHR has developed a notion of a margin of appreciation, 
which takes the form of deference to the member states regarding the policies they 
choose to implement and the manner in which they are implemented. When dealing 
with deprivations of possessions in terms of the second rule, the ECHR will defer to 
the national authorities and allow them to make the initial assessment as to what is 
                                            
238 De la Rasilla del Moral I “The increasingly marginal appreciation of the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine” (2006) 7 German LJ 611-623 at 615-619. See further Rook D Property Law and Human 
Rights (2001) 35-36; Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 128-130; Van Rijn A 
“Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in Van Dijk P, Van 
Hoof F, Van Rijn A & Zwaak L (eds) Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights 
(2006) 863-893 at 888-889; Grgić A, Mataga Z, Longar M & Vilfan A The Right to Property under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and its Protocols (2007) 14-15.   
239 De la Rasilla del Moral I “The increasingly marginal appreciation of the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine” (2006) 7 German LJ 611-623 at 617.  
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in the public interest and whether the measure that causes the deprivation of 
possessions is in line with that public interest. The ECHR will respect the 
determination made by the national authorities, unless it finds the determination to 
be manifestly without reasonable foundation. The margin of appreciation operates in 
the same way regarding controls on the use of property under the third rule.  
 
3 5 Conclusion 
The ECHR has a special relationship with the member states of the European Union, 
especially the Central Eastern European members. It acts as a court of appeal 
regarding matters concerning the rights provided for in the Convention. Countries 
who want to become members of the European Union must ratify the Convention 
and recognise the ECHR’s authority as protector of these rights. The Convention 
was not intended to supplant the existing law of countries that seek membership in 
the European Union. Therefore, the legislature of a country must amend or add to 
the existing law to safeguard these rights by providing mechanisms for the protection 
of these rights. The existing law of Central Eastern European countries that seek to 
become members of the European Union in the aftermath of the fall of Communism 
may be influenced by the principles and case law of the ECHR.  
 In order to deal with potentially conflicting existing law of the member states of 
the European Union, particularly in the case of property disputes, the ECHR has 
developed the autonomous meaning doctrine regarding the definition of 
“possessions” for the purposes of Article 1. This doctrine was initially developed with 
a focus on Article 6 but was later used in property disputes. This doctrine allows the 
ECHR to determine for itself whether a particular interest constitutes a possession 
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for the purposes of Article 1 without being restricted to the relevant domestic law. 
This prevents the member states from legislating that a particular interest is not 
property so as to frustrate or prevent potential applicants’ claims from being brought 
before the ECHR. If the interest is regarded as property in the relevant domestic law, 
it will be regarded as a possession for the purpose of Article 1. If the interest is not 
recognised as property in the relevant domestic law, the ECHR will apply the 
autonomous meaning doctrine to determine if the interest in question is a possession 
for the purposes of Article 1 or not.  
The ECHR has also developed a distinction between deprivation (regulation) 
and expropriation of property. In this regard, the ECHR has interpreted the term 
“deprived” in Article 1 to mean expropriation of property. This expropriation must be 
in line with some public interest and subject to any conditions on expropriation in the 
domestic law of the member state as well as the principles of international law. In the 
third paragraph of Article 1, provision is made for the individual member states to 
control the use of property within their own jurisdictions. This provision allows the 
member states to control the use of property through any regulations that they deem 
necessary. A wide degree of deference is provided to the member states regarding 
the measures that they may implement for this purpose. However, this degree of 
deference is not unlimited. The ECHR will intervene when a measure implemented 
by a member state to control the use of property is manifestly unreasonable in the 
circumstances. The three-rule structure of Article 1 appears to indicate that the 
ECHR treats deprivation (expropriation) and regulation of property as two discrete 
categories that do not overlap. While both must comply with the principle of 
lawfulness, be in the public or general interest and comply with the principle of 
proportionality, each constitutes a unique interference with the right to the peaceful 
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enjoyment of possessions. In the context of deprivation (expropriation), the first rule 
of Article 1 does not explicitly state that compensation is required for deprivations to 
be valid, though the ECHR has stated that compensation is required for deprivations 
in order to maintain a fair balance. 
As mentioned above, it is uncertain whether the ECHR recognises something 
like a notion of constructive expropriation. A small number of decisions appear to 
have created the space for something like constructive expropriation but the 
authority for doing so is not clear. The ECHR’s inconsistency in classifying 
interferences under the three rules in Article 1 has led to decisions that appear to 
constitute a third category of interference with possessions. The interferences in this 
category are judged under the first rule of Article 1. If the ECHR awards 
compensation for interferences judged under the first rule, for example a monetary 
amount as just satisfaction under Article 50, then that compensation will not be 
compensation for expropriation. Rather, this compensation would resemble either a 
general award of constitutional damages or compensation in terms of the 
equalisation awards that are allowed in German law.    
When there is an interference with a right in the Convention, the ECHR must 
determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights. Proportionality analysis has been incorporated into 
the fair balance inquiry and is described as playing a central role in the jurisprudence 
of the ECHR. An important aspect of the fair balance inquiry is the margin of 
appreciation afforded to member states. The ECHR will defer to the member states 
regarding the implementation of legislation and policy within their jurisdictions. The 
rationale for this level of deference is that the legislatures of the member states are 
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in the best position to legislate on matters in the jurisdiction than the international 
judge. This margin of appreciation further enforces the ECHR’s supervisory role in 
that the ECHR cannot dictate to the legislatures of the member states how to protect 
property rights or other rights in their respective jurisdictions.  
The ECHR is a supervisory body aimed at enforcing the protection of the rights 
in the Convention and to ensure that member states provide for this protection. While 
it cannot directly dictate to the member states what principles they should adopt and 
how they should do so, the ECHR can influence the existing law of the member 
states to bring it in line with the principles developed by the ECHR. This influence is 
most notable in member states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose use of 
ECHR principles and case law is incredibly prolific and used to provide content to 
their right to property. Other Central Eastern European member states, such as the 
Russian Federation, make use of ECHR principles and case law to a more limited 
extent, while others, such as Hungary, do not use them at all. Nonetheless, the 
ECHR’s doctrine could potentially influence the developmental direction that an 
emerging democracy’s laws and policies take if it wishes to be a member of the 
European Union and to have access to the ECHR.  
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Chapter 4  
Central Eastern European jurisdictions: 
Analysis of constitutional texts and case law 
4 1 Introduction 
“Constitutional law grows out of a nation’s history. It reflects the nation’s culture and its 
aspirations, its tragedies and its miseries.”1  
The above quote rings true for most constitutional democracies, both old and new. It 
is especially significant in the context of the developing constitutional democracies of 
Central Eastern Europe. In the years since the fall of Communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe, many of the countries in this region have set out on a course of 
constitutional transformation, beginning with the creation of new constitutions.2 The 
                                            
1 Schwartz H “The bill of rights in America and Central East Europe” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 
93-98 at 93. For further reading in this regard, see generally Ludwikowski R “Searching for a new 
constitutional model for East-Central Europe” (1991) 17 Syracuse J Int’l L & Comm 92-170; Preuss 
UK “The politics of constitution making: Transforming politics into constitutions” (1991) 13 Law & Pol’y 
107-123; Klingsberg E “Judicial review and Hungary’s transition from communism to democracy: The 
Constitutional Court, the continuity of law and the redefinition of property rights” (1992) 41 BYU LR 
41-144; Visegrády A “Transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Experiences of a model 
country – Hungary” (1992-1993) 1 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 245-265; Yee S “The new constitution of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina” (1996) 7 Eur J Int’l L 176-192; Sajó A “Constitution without the constitutional 
moment: A view from the new member states” (2005) 3 Int’l J Const L 243-261; Lach K & Sadurski W 
“Constitutional courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between adolescence and maturity” (2008) 3 J 
Comp L 212-233. 
2 Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998) 
24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 290. See further Ludwikowski R “Searching for a new 
constitutional model for East-Central Europe” (1991) 17 Syracuse J Int’l L & Comm 92-170 at 92; 
Klingsberg E “Judicial review and Hungary’s transition from communism to democracy: The 
Constitutional Court, the continuity of law and the redefinition of property rights” (1992) 41 BYU LR 
41-144 at 43-47; Schwartz H “The bill of rights in America and Central East Europe” (1992) 15 Harv J 
L & Pub Pol’y 93-98 at 95-96; Schwartz H The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist 
Europe (2002) 1-6; Karadjova M “Property restitution in Eastern Europe: Domestic and international 
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process of reconstructing constitutions yielded the advantages of allowing the people 
and politicians of the Central Eastern European countries to get accustomed to 
pluralistic structures and the time needed to construct new constitutions without 
being forced to continue living under the old socialist constitution or to live in a 
constitutional vacuum.3 However, the negative effect of the short time that was 
available to construct new constitutions were revisions that were halfhearted and 
which led to inconsistencies and even contradictions in some cases.4 Instead of 
revising the existing socialist constitution, some countries simply stopped applying 
the old constitutions.5 For example, Romania and Lithuania replaced their socialist 
constitutions with interim constitutional laws and an interim basic law respectively, 
until these interim measures were replaced by full-fledged constitutions.6  
In drafting their new constitutions, most Central Eastern European countries 
looked to examples and models both within the region and abroad. An advantage of 
looking beyond a country’s own border is that the dissemination of constitutional 
experience makes it possible for well-established and tested constitutional principles 
                                                                                                                                        
human rights law responses” (2004) 29 Rev Cent & E Eur L 325-363 at 326; Sajó A “Constitution 
without a constitutional moment: A view from the new member states” (2005) 3 Int’l J Const L 243-261 
at 243-244; Lach K & Sadurski W “Constitutional courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between 
adolescence and maturity” (2008) 3 J Comp L 212-233 at 213.   
3 Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998) 
24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 290.  
4 Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998) 
24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 291. Schweisfurth and Alleweldt use Russia as an example, 
specifically where the new separation of powers principle collided with the principle that powers are 
consolidated in the hands of parliament. See further Sajó A “Constitution without a constitutional 
moment: A view from the new member states” (2005) 3 Int’l J Const L 243-261 at 247. 
5 Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998) 
24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 292.  
6 Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998) 
24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 292. 
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to be adopted quickly.7 The drafting of the sections dealing with human rights was 
heavily influenced by the conditions and negotiations regarding the Council of 
Europe’s procedure for admission.8 Membership of the European Union, specifically 
the influence that such membership has on the development of constitutional law in 
Central Eastern European countries, is an important aspect to consider. Sajó argues 
that membership of the European Union increases constitutional pre-commitment at 
the national level, since many constitutional elements that exist in the domestic 
constitution are now beyond the reach of national majorities and European 
institutions that are independent of national politics protect many constitutional 
elements as well.9 Most of the constitutions that have emerged from the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions contain bills of rights, either in the constitution itself10 
or in a separate document.11 A number of these constitutions also contain provisions 
that entrench which type of economy the country will have. For example, Article 11 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Albania12 states that Albania’s economic system 
                                            
7 Ludwikowski R “Searching for a new constitutional model for East-Central Europe” (1991) 17 
Syracuse J Int’l L & Comm 92-170 at 92. See further Lach K & Sadurski W “Constitutional courts of 
Central and Eastern Europe: Between adolescence and maturity” (2008) 3 J Comp L 212-233 at 213-
216; Schwartz H “The bill of rights in America and Central East Europe” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub 
Pol’y 93-98 at 93-94; Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and 
Eastern Europe” (1998) 24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 294. 
8 Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998) 
24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 294. See further Lach K & Sadurski W “Constitutional courts of 
Central and Eastern Europe: Between adolescence and maturity” (2008) 3 J Comp L 212-233 at 215. 
9 Sajó A “Constitution without a constitutional moment: A view from the new member states” (2005) 3 
Int’l J Const L 243-261 at 251-252. 
10 For example, Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Moldova, Poland and the Russian Federation. 
11 For example, the Czech Republic.  
12 Constitution of the Republic of Albania, 1998 (text approved by referendum on 22 November 1998 
and promulgated on 28 November 1998; changes to articles 109/1 and 154/1, /2 made by law no 
9675 of 13 January 2007; changes to articles 64, 65, 67, 68, 87, 88, 104, 105 and 149 and the repeal 
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is based on public and private ownership, a market economy as well as freedom of 
economic activity (Article 11(1)); Article 19(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Bulgaria13 states that the economy of Bulgaria shall be based on free economic 
initiative; Article M(1) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary14 states that the economy 
of Hungary is based on “work that creates value and freedom of enterprise”; Article 9 
of the Constitution of Moldova15 states that “the market, free economic initiative and 
fair competition shall represent the main elements of the economy”. These 
provisions indicate a shift away from the socialist economic structure that these 
countries endured in favour of promoting economic growth. Another reason for 
entrenching free market economies, or economies with elements thereof, is that 
such changes are required by the European Union for a country to be considered for 
membership and the advantages that such membership entails.     
After the fall of Communism in Central Eastern Europe, the need for 
constitutional review was obvious and apparent. As a result, constitutional courts 
soon became a permanent and uncontroversial element of the legal and political 
landscape of Central Eastern Europe.16 These constitutional courts have been both 
                                                                                                                                        
of Part Twelve made by law no 9904 of 21 April 2008; changes to articles 73, 126 and 137 made by 
law no 88/2012 of 18 September 2012). 
13 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991 (amended SG 85/26 Sep 2003, SG 18/25 Feb 2005, 
SG 27/31 Mar 2006, SG 78/26 Sep 2006 - Constitutional Court Judgment No 7/2006, SG 12/6 Feb 
2007). 
14 Fundamental Law of Hungary (effective as of 1 April 2013). 
15 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (adopted on 29 July 1994, amended and supplemented on 
5 July 2000). 
16 Lach K & Sadurski W “Constitutional courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between adolescence 
and maturity” (2008) 3 J Comp L 212-233 at 213. See further Ludwikowski R “Searching for a new 
constitutional model for East-Central Europe” (1991) 17 Syracuse J Int’l L & Comm 92-170 at 169-
170; Schweisfurth T & Alleweldt A “New constitutional structures in Central and Eastern Europe” 
(1998) 24 Rev Cent & E Eur L 289-328 at 313-314.  
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present and effective in their interventions in the decisions of the executive and the 
legislature, deciding on the constitutionality of statutes concerning economic and 
social policy, past injustices, communist political crimes and public morality. 17 
Schwartz explains that the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe 
had the same civil law tradition as Western Europe and were very unfamiliar with the 
American system of judicial review, and therefore it was natural for these new 
democracies to opt for the European model practiced by the Western European 
constitutional courts.18  
The focus of this chapter is the development of constitutional property law in 
Central Eastern Europe following the fall of Communism in the region. The aim of the 
investigation is to determine, as far as possible based on the sources available in 
English, whether the developments in Central Eastern European constitutional 
property law follow a particular approach generally and whether the development of 
constitutional property law in this region relating to the constitutional definition of 
property, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property and the 
application of the proportionality principle as a means of legitimising interferences 
with property resembles either the German or the US approach to these three 
issues.19 It must be noted that this investigation is based on sources that are 
available in English, therefore it is likely that certain areas will perhaps be more 
                                            
17 Lach K & Sadurski W “Constitutional courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between adolescence 
and maturity” (2008) 3 J Comp L 212-233 at 213. 
18 Schwartz H The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2002) 23. 
19 See chapter 2 above. 
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detailed than others and this will necessarily affect the generality of conclusions 
regarding the research questions investigated in this chapter.20 
    
4 2 Property 
4 2 1 Introduction 
Given the recent history of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions regarding 
property rights violations, it is unsurprising that many new constitutions in this region 
protect property rights in some form or another. The constitutions of Albania,21 
Belarus,22 Bosnia and Herzegovina,23 Bulgaria,24 Croatia,25 the Czech Republic,26 
Estonia, 27  Hungary, 28  Moldova, 29  Poland 30  and the Russian Federation 31  have 
                                            
20 Certain Central Eastern European jurisdictions, for example Estonia and the Czech Republic, are 
not discussed in relation to all of the themes investigated in this chapter. This is due to the 
inaccessibility of sources relating to these themes and this affects the detail of the discussions of the 
Central Eastern European jurisdictions and whether they can be discussed regarding a particular 
theme at all. 
21 Article 41(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, 1998 (text approved by referendum on 
22 November 1998 and promulgated on 28 November 1998; changes to articles 109/1 and 154/1, /2 
made by law no 9675 of 13 January 2007; changes to articles 64, 65, 67, 68, 87, 88, 104, 105 and 
149 and the repeal of Part Twelve made by law no 9904 of 21 April 2008; changes to articles 73, 126 
and 137 made by law no 88/2012 of 18 September 2012). 
22 Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus of 1994 (with alterations and amendments 
adopted at the republican referendums of November 24, 1996 and October 17, 2004). 
23 Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995 (as amended in 2009). 
24 Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991 (amended SG 85/26 Sep 2003, SG 
18/25 Feb 2005, SG 27/31 Mar 2006, SG 78/26 Sep 2006 - Constitutional Court Judgment No 
7/2006, SG 12/6 Feb 2007). 
25 Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 6 July 2010. 
26 Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms of 16 December 1992 
(forming part of the Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992). 
27 §32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 3 July 1992. 
28 Article XIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (effective as of 1 April 2013). 
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clauses directed at protecting property rights, although the wording of these clauses 
varies. Some of the clauses state that the right to property is protected,32 while 
others protect the right of possession or ownership of property.33 While not much 
really turns on this difference in wording, what is important is that each of these 
constitutions makes a deliberate effort to promote and protect the private ownership 
of property. Furthermore, these clauses mostly take the form of positive guarantees 
of the right to property. Most place an obligation on the state to guarantee the right of 
private property. A further similarity between these property clauses is that none of 
them attempts to define property for the purposes of their respective constitutions or 
specify what the content of ownership is. This is perhaps the better route to take 
because formulating a strict definition of property or ownership may end up limiting 
the protection provided by the property clause in the future and may limit the 
development of the constitutional property law in the region. In what follows a brief 
overview is provided of the property provision in some of the Central Eastern 
European constitutions and the indications in their case law regarding the content 
and scope of constitutional property.     
 
                                                                                                                                        
29 Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (adopted on 29 July 1994, amended and 
supplemented on 5 July 2000). 
30 Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997. 
31 Article 35 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (with the Amendments and Additions of 30 
December 2008). 
32 For example, Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Russian 
Federation.   
33 For example, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Moldova and Poland.  
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a) Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina34 states that “[a]ll 
persons within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms […] including the right to property.” The Constitution says 
nothing about the substance or the limitations of the right to property and therefore 
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina had to find guidelines for the 
interpretation of the provision elsewhere. The Constitutional Court refers to Article 1 
of Protocol No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) to provide the necessary substance to the right to 
property provided by Article II (3)(k) and also to set out the limits of the protection 
that the right to property in Article II (3)(k) provides. The Constitutional Court has 
held that both Article II (3)(k) and Article 1 ECHR protect the right to property, but the 
protection of the right to property by Article II (3)(k) does not extend beyond the 
protection granted under Article 1 ECHR, thereby implying that the ambit of 
protection of property is limited by the interpretation of what constitutes property in 
terms of Article 1 ECHR.35  
The Constitutional Court has stated that the right to property applies only to 
assets, either corporeal or incorporeal, to which a person is entitled and does not 
protect the right to assets to which the person is not already entitled. 36  The 
Constitutional Court has also held that the term “property” includes a wide range of 
property interests that represent an economic value37 and shall be taken to include 
various acquired rights such as monetary claims and other rights of economic 
                                            
34 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995 (as amended in 2009). 
35 Case No U12/01 para 34. 
36 Case No AP – 292/06 para 45.  
37 Case No AP – 298/07 para 28; Case No AP – 2157/08 para 42; Case No AP – 1908/06 para 30. 
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value.38 According to the Constitutional Court, the notion of “property” should not be 
interpreted too restrictively but ought to be seen as having an autonomous meaning, 
so that it may be sufficient to show that the established economic interest exists in 
order to ascertain that it establishes the protected right to property.39  
A recent decision of the Constitutional Court40 shows how the right to property 
protected by Article II (3)(k) and Article 1 ECHR is only applicable in respect of 
property to which the party claiming to enforce the right is already entitled. This case 
turned on whether the contract purporting to transfer ownership in the disputed real 
property had been entered into voluntarily as an expression of the free will of the 
plaintiff in the initial court action. The lower courts concluded that, based on the 
circumstances, the plaintiff had indeed acted voluntarily and of his own free will in 
entering into the contract with the appellant and that the contract was not the product 
of coercion, threat or duress within the meaning of Article 21(a) of the Law Amending 
the Law on the Transfer of Real Estate. 41  Article 21(a) states that unilateral 
expressions of will or other legal transactions entered into under duress, deceit or 
force by which the right of ownership is transferred to another person or persons by 
the owner of the real property or those having the right to dispose of the real property 
shall be null and void and shall not represent the basis for the acquisition of the right 
of ownership of the real estate in question. Furthermore, any registration of 
ownership in real property registers on the basis of a unilateral expression of will or 
other legal transaction referred to above shall be null and void and have no legal 
effect. 
                                            
38 Case No U12/01 para 28. 
39 Case No AP – 1908/06 para 30. 
40 Case No AP – 292/06. 
41 Official Gazette of SRBiH Nos 21/92, 3/93 and 18/94. 
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The Supreme Court found that, under the facts established by the lower courts, 
at the time the contract was entered into a state of war was prevailing in the region 
where the real property was situated and that the plaintiff’s decision to sell the real 
property and leave the region was influenced by war circumstances, the presence of 
armed forces and anonymous threatening phone calls the plaintiff had received. 
Therefore, the court held that the lower courts were incorrect in finding that the 
plaintiff had entered into the contract as an expression of his own free will and not as 
a result of coercion, threat or duress within the meaning of Article 21(a).42 The 
Supreme Court further held that the lower courts had failed to take into account the 
fact that the will expressed at the time of the conclusion of the contract may have 
been brought into question if it occurred in an urgent situation or while the plaintiff 
was under substantial pressure or in serious danger. Consequently, the Supreme 
Court found that such circumstances must be taken into account when determining 
whether the plaintiff might be deemed to have voluntarily concluded the contract and 
in determining whether or not the plaintiff validly transferred his right to the other 
person. 43  The Supreme Court concluded that based on the prevailing war 
circumstances, the presence of armed forces and the threatening anonymous phone 
calls and the incredibly low price paid for the real property in question, it was 
necessary to apply Article 21(a) and declare that the contract for the sale of the 
property was null and void.44 
The result was that the appellant was no longer entitled to the real property, 
because the transfer of the right of ownership and the registration of the appellant as 
co-owner of the real property in question were invalid for being in conflict with Article 
                                            
42 Case No AP – 292/06 para 11. 
43 Case No AP – 292/06 para 11. 
44 Para 12. 
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21(a). In determining whether the appellant’s right to property had been infringed by 
the Supreme Court’s ordering of the appellant to return the real property to the 
plaintiff, the Constitutional Court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
regarding the status of the appellant’s right to the real property in question, namely 
that the appellant had no such right as a matter of law. The Constitutional Court 
reiterated that the right to property protected by Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution 
and Article 1 ECHR only applies in respect to property to which the party claiming 
infringement of the right is entitled. The Constitutional Court concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s order required the appellant to return the property to the plaintiff 
and consequently the appellant had no right to the property and thus was not entitled 
to it. Therefore, the appellant could not successfully argue that his right to the 
property had been violated by the Supreme Court’s order requiring him to return the 
property to the plaintiff because the appellant had no right to the property as a matter 
of law.45  
In another decision46 concerning the term “property” in Article II (3)(k), the 
appellants filed a request with the Town Planning Service for the cessation of 
originally socially owned, and subsequently state-owned, construction land that had 
not been used for its intended purposes. The appellants pointed out in their request 
that they were registered as users of a one-third portion of the land. They proposed 
that the land in question should cease to be socially owned property and that they, 
the appellants, should be ex officio registered as co-owners of the land. The Town 
Planning Service dismissed the request.47 In their appeal against the decisions 
                                            
45 Para 45. 
46 Case No AP – 298/07. 
47 Para 6-7. 
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associated with the dismissal the appellants alleged a violation of the right to 
property in Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution and Article 1 ECHR.48  
The Constitutional Court held that where there is an allegation that the right to 
property has been violated, the Court must first establish whether Article II (3)(k) and 
Article 1 ECHR safeguard the property concerned. 49  In this respect the Court 
emphasised that the word “property” includes a wide range of property interests that 
represent an economic value.50 The Court concluded that the appellants had the 
right to use the construction land in question and that this right constituted an 
economic value representing “property” of the appellants within the meaning of 
Article 1 ECHR and therefore Article 1 ECHR was applicable to the matter.51 Judging 
by the approach followed by the Constitutional Court, namely that both Article II 
(3)(k) of the Constitution and Article 1 ECHR apply to property cases, it can be 
inferred that a finding that Article 1 ECHR is applicable to a particular matter means 
that Article II (3)(k) is also applicable.  
The Constitutional Court applied the principles regarding the protection of 
property formulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in deciding 
whether a particular interest is indeed “property” or a “possession” so as to qualify for 
protection under either Article II (3)(k) or Article 1 ECHR. Therefore, it seems as 
though Article 1 ECHR is applied together with Article II (3)(k) and provides 
substance and direction in adjudicating disputes regarding the meaning of property 
under the Constitution. It also appears from the case law that if a particular interest 
could be characterised as a possession for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR, it is 
                                            
48 Para 11. 
49 Para 28. 
50 Para 28.  
51 Para 28. 
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likely that the Constitutional Court will conclude that the interest would constitute 
property under Article II (3)(k) as well.  
In another case that illustrates this approach, a court ordered an insurance 
company to pay the appellant compensation for non-pecuniary damage, including 
the legally prescribed default interest accrued thereon until payment had been made 
in full.52 The appellant later instituted enforcement proceedings against the insurance 
company and the court decided to allow enforcement against the insurance 
company.53  
The Constitutional Court held that the issues in this case were the lawfulness 
and constitutionality of a final ruling in the enforcement proceedings concerning the 
collection of damage compensation awarded in the legally binding decision relating 
to an insurance case. It was held that there were two questions that had to be 
answered with reference to the proceedings, the first of which is important for the 
purposes of this chapter: in addition to the principal debt amount, the question is 
whether the legally prescribed default interest constitutes property within the 
meaning of Article II (3)(k) and Article 1 ECHR.54  
In this regard, the Constitutional Court concluded that the appellant had 
legitimate expectations (both at the time of the accident and at the adoption of the 
legally binding judgment) to receive the default interest due to the late payments and 
therefore these expectations to receive the legally prescribed default interest from 
the insurance company constituted a claim amounting to property under both Article 
                                            
52 Case No AP – 1311/06 para 6. 
53 Para 7. 
54 Para 22. 
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II (3)(k) and Article 1 ECHR.55 The Constitutional Court made use of the “legitimate 
expectation” doctrine formulated by the ECHR (for determining whether a claim 
constitutes a possession) in order to determine whether the claim for the default 
interest would constitute property for the purposes of both Article II (3)(k) and Article 
1 ECHR. The Constitutional Court applied the principles formulated by the ECHR as 
a matter of routine, which makes sense because Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.  
From the case law of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is 
clear that when the court is faced with a matter concerning the right to property 
provided for in Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court will apply 
both Article II (3)(k) and Article 1 ECHR. The latter is used to provide substance to 
the right to property provided for in the former and the Constitutional Court applies 
the principles formulated by the ECHR routinely in order to adjudicate a matter 
involving property. Accordingly, if an interest is found to constitute a possession 
under Article 1 ECHR, the Constitutional Court will most likely find that the interest is 
also property for the purposes of Article II (3)(k).  
 
b) Croatia 
Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia56 states that the right of 
ownership shall be guaranteed and that ownership implies obligations, including that 
the holders of the right of ownership and its users shall contribute to the general 
welfare. The Constitutional Court of Croatia has held that ownership within the 
                                            
55 Para 23. 
56 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 6 July 2010. 
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meaning of Article 48 “includes, in principle, all proprietary rights, including economic 
interests, which, by the nature of things, pertain to property but also the legitimate 
expectations of the parties that their property rights, founded on legal acts, will be 
respected and their exercise protected”.57  
    
c) Moldova 
Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova58 states that the right to 
possess private property shall be guaranteed (Article 46(1)) and that no one may be 
expropriated unless it is for a matter of public utility, established under law and 
against the payment of fair and previously determined compensation (Article 46(2)). 
The Constitutional Court of Moldova also applies the principles and case law of the 
ECHR regarding Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) when determining 
whether a particular interest is protectable as private property under Article 46(1). 
The Constitutional Court has stated that a property right guaranteed by Article 46 is 
“[…] in its substance, a person’s right to respect for his or her movable and 
immovable property”.59 This appears similar to the positive guarantee in the first 
sentence of Article 1 ECHR, which states that everyone is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his or her possessions.60  
Similar to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Constitutional Court of Moldova refers to ECHR’s principles and case law in deciding 
                                            
57 Decision U-III-3871/2009. 
58 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (adopted on 29 July 1994, amended and supplemented on 
5 July 2000). 
59 Judgment No 15 of 13.09.2011 para 40. 
60 See 3 2 2 above. 
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constitutional property disputes.61 In a case regarding social rights, the complainants 
argued that newly implemented legislation restricting the social rights, particularly the 
pension rights, of public sector employees caused prejudice to the right of 
ownership.62 The Constitutional Court stated that, in its assessment of the conformity 
of the legislation with the guarantee of ownership laid down in Article 46, it would 
take into account the provisions of the Convention and the case law of the ECHR.63 
The Constitutional Court referred to its own earlier case law64 in which the status of 
social rights in the case law of the ECHR was canvassed and concluded that a social 
right could be the object of constitutional protection guaranteed by Article 46 and 
Article 1 ECHR only in cases when the social right is acquired and has an economic 
value.65  Therefore, the Constitutional Court held that the right to a pension in 
payment would be protected under Article 1 ECHR as long as it is an acquired right 
with economic value.66 This case shows that the Constitutional Court makes ready 
use of the ECHR’s case law regarding what constitutes a possession for the 
purposes of Article 1 ECHR to inform and provide content to the constitutional 
definition of property for the purposes of Article 46 of the Constitution.  
Another interesting case67 concerning the meaning of property in terms of 
Article 46 of the Constitution dealt with legislation that required persons to graduate 
from the National Institute of Justice in order to run for a position as a judge or a 
prosecutor. The complainant in this case argued that the limitation of the right of 
                                            
61 See, for example, Judgment No 15 of 13.09.2011; Judgment No 27 of 20.12.2011; Judgment No 5 
of 10.04.2012. 
62 Judgment No 27 of 20.12.2011 para 22. 
63 Para 77. See further 3 2 above. 
64 Judgment No 19 of 19.10.2011. 
65 Judgment No 27 of 20.12.2011 para 79. 
66 Para 79. 
67 Judgment No 15 of 13.09.2011. 
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graduates from the National Institute of Justice to run for the position of judge or 
prosecutor to a period of three years, commencing from the date of graduation, is 
incompatible with a number of constitutional provisions including Article 46. The 
Constitutional Court first investigated whether the diploma received by the graduates 
of the National Institute of Justice constituted an “asset” for the purposes of Article 
46 and Article 1 ECHR.68 The Court noted that the ECHR has consistently held that 
a licence to conduct an activity is an asset within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR, 
including the licence of a lawyer. 69  Applying the reasoning of the ECHR, the 
Constitutional Court concluded that the expectation of obtaining a paid job as a result 
of holding a diploma from the National Institute of Justice was a property right in 
terms of Article 46 and Article 1 ECHR.70 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court held 
that graduates had a legitimate expectation to access the office of a judge or 
prosecutor because the law stated that such a right existed and that this legitimate 
expectation involved a material interest, thus making it an asset in the sense of the 
rights protected by Article 46 and Article 1 ECHR.71 
From the few available English-translated cases, it appears that the 
Constitutional Court’s approach to the case law of the ECHR is similar to that of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in that both of these constitutional 
courts consistently apply ECHR principles and case law as a means of providing 
content to the concept of constitutional property.  
 
                                            
68 Paras 44-52. 
69 Paras 46-47. 
70 Para 48-50. 
71 Para 51. 
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d) The Russian Federation 
Article 35 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation72 provides that, firstly, the 
right to property shall be protected by law (Section 1); secondly, everyone shall have 
the right to have property and to possess, use and dispose of property both 
personally and jointly with other people (Section 2); and thirdly, no one may be 
deprived of property other than by a court decision and forced confiscation of 
property for state needs may be carried out only with the condition of preliminary and 
complete compensation (Section 3).  
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (the Constitutional Court) 
refers to Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) but such references are not as 
prolific as that of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Constitutional Court makes use of its own constitutional provisions to resolve 
property disputes and while there are references to Article 1 ECHR in case law, it is 
not automatically applied by the Court in conjunction with Article 35. Rather, Article 
35 and other relevant provisions of the Russian Constitution are applied first and 
while Article 1 ECHR might sometimes be referred to in order to provide clarity on a 
particular point, its application is not given as much priority as it is by the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In a decision 73  regarding the meaning of “property” in Article 35, the 
Constitutional Court reiterated that, pursuant to the Constitution, everyone has the 
                                            
72 Constitution of the Russian Federation (with the Amendments and Additions of 30 December 2008). 
See further Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 39-41. 
 
73 Judgment of 6 June 2000 No 9-Π. See further Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund 
University 2008) 41-46. 
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right to have property and to possess, use and dispose of property either individually 
or jointly with others as encapsulated in Article 35(2).74 The Constitutional Court held 
further that within the meaning of Article 35 the term “property” comprises any 
possessions related to the exercise of the right of private or other forms of property, 
including proprietary rights, in particular the rights to possess, use and dispose of 
property, if these rights were lawfully acquired by the owner. The Constitutional 
Court further stated that the rights to possess, use and dispose of property, including 
determination of the grounds and the procedure for its creation, alteration and 
termination, as well as the scope of its protection and legitimate restrictions, shall be 
regulated by law as it follows from Articles 71(c) and 76(1) of the Constitution.75  
In another decision,76 the Constitutional Court dealt with a case concerning the 
review of the constitutionality of certain provisions of Section 4, Article 104 of the 
Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)”.77 Article 104 regulates the legal regime 
of a debtor’s possessions that shall not be included in the bankruptcy estate and 
provides, inter alia, that social housing funds, pre-school institutions and municipal 
service infrastructure, which are vitally important for the region, shall be transferred 
to the municipality with no additional conditions. The complainant argued that taking 
property out of the bankrupt estate and transferring possession thereof to the 
municipality in effect hinders complete satisfaction of the creditor’s claims, depriving 
him of his entitlements, in violation of Article 35.78 In determining whether Article 35 
was applicable in the matter, the Constitutional Court stated that the term “property” 
                                            
74 Judgment of 6 June 2000 No 9-Π at 3. 
75 Judgment of 6 June 2000 No 9-Π at 3. 
76 Judgment of 16 May 2000 No 8-Π. 
77 Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” of 8 January 1998. 
78 Judgment of 16 May 2000 No 8-Π at 2. 
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in Article 35 includes particular real rights (rights in rem) and enforceable claims, 
including those belonging to creditors. Therefore enforceable creditors’ claims and 
lawful interests in insolvency proceedings are subject to the protection of Article 35.79  
The right to property provided for in Article 35 of the Constitution is far more 
detailed than that of Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This is perhaps the reason why the Russian Constitutional Court finds it less 
necessary to rely on interpretations of, and the conclusions reached, regarding the 
right to property by the ECHR. While the Constitutional Courts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Moldova apply their own constitutional property clauses and Article 
1 ECHR together, using the latter to provide substance to the former, the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation applies Article 35 of its Constitution 
independently and makes use of Article 1 ECHR only where necessary to resolve a 
particular question but its application is not necessarily guaranteed.   
   
e) Hungary 
Section 1 of Article XIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary80 states that everyone 
shall have the right to property and succession and that property shall entail social 
responsibility. Section 2 states that property may be expropriated exceptionally, in 
the public interest and in cases and ways provided for by an Act, subject to full, 
unconditional and immediate compensation. While the Constitutional Courts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and (to a lesser extent) the Russian Federation refer to 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) and apply it, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court (the Constitutional Court) prefers to apply its own constitutional decisions 
                                            
79 At 3.  
80 Fundamental Law of Hungary (effective as of 1 April 2013). 
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regarding disputes involving property rather than relying on the principles of the 
ECHR. From the case law available in English, it appears that the Constitutional 
Court does not mention Article 1 ECHR at all when it adjudicates property disputes, 
instead choosing to rely solely on its own previous decisions that are relevant to the 
particular matter.  
As the Fundamental Law only became effective as of April 2013, the case law 
dealing with property disputes prior to this date still refers to Article 13 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. Article 13 is quite similar to that of Article 
XIII of the Fundamental Law, but Article XIII is more detailed regarding what the right 
to property entails, when expropriation is permitted and what compensation must be 
paid in the event of expropriation. Paragraph 1 of Article 13 simply states that the 
Republic of Hungary protects the right of property. In contrast, Section 1 of Article 
XIII states that everyone shall have the right to property and succession and that 
property shall entail social responsibility, thus providing more substance to the right 
to property. The Fundamental Law of 2013 repealed the Constitution of the Republic 
of Hungary because it states in Article R that the Fundamental Law shall be the 
foundation of the Hungarian legal system.81  
There are as yet no translated decisions of the Constitutional Court involving 
Article XIII of the Fundamental Law, but there are translated decisions available 
involving Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. These decisions 
are still relevant because the basic premise of these two articles is the same, and 
therefore the principles created by the case law under Article 13 may still be useful 
when adjudicating disputes under Article XIII, especially in terms of what may, or 
may not, be included in the right to property. In these decisions, where the Court 
                                            
81 Article R(1) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (effective as of 1 April 2013). 
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actually discusses the issue of an infringement of the right to property, the Court 
does not expressly state what it regards as property for the purposes of Article 13. 
This issue is often bypassed and the Court moves on to determining whether the 
infringement of the right to property was authorised and therefore constitutional. 
Therefore, the emphasis appears to be on protection against the limitation of the 
right rather than what forms of property the right applies to. The Constitutional Court 
has held that the right to property constitutes a fundamental right which is, however, 
not immune to restriction.82  
It appears that the Constitutional Court adopts a broad view of what constitutes 
property for the purposes of Article 13, although the emphasis may be on protection 
against the limitation of the right to property rather than on what constitutes property. 
In a decision83 regarding the right to property, the Constitutional Court has held that 
under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, the Republic of Hungary guarantees the right 
to property as a fundamental right and protects it accordingly. The Court reiterated 
that the right to property is given constitutional protection as a means of securing an 
economic basis for the autonomy of individuals.84 The Court stated that the extent of 
the protection of the right to property depends on three factors.85 Firstly, it depends 
on the restrictions applicable to the right to property under public and private law.  
This factor is similar to the approach in German and US law. For example, in 
German and US law, the mere fact that an intangible interest has value does not 
automatically qualify it as property for constitutional purposes.86 The meaning of 
                                            
82 Decision 1/2004 (II. 12.) AB at 7. 
83 Decision 29/2006 (VI. 21.) AB. 
84 At 16. 
85 At 16. 
86 See 2 2 above. 
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possessions in Article 1 ECHR is not subject to restrictions imposed by public or 
private law.87 The ECHR developed the autonomous meaning doctrine in order to 
prevent the interpretation of possessions being restricted to property rights existing 
under the private law of the member state in question.88 This allows for Article 1 
ECHR to be applied to interests that would ordinarily not be classified as property 
under private law.  
Secondly, protection under Article 13(1) of the Hungarian Constitution depends 
on the subject, object and function of the property. Thirdly the protection depends on 
the nature of the restriction. The Court has held that Article 13(1) of the Constitution 
applies not only to the right to property but to other valuable rights as well. For 
instance, the application of Article 13(1) has been extended to protect 
entrepreneurial activities. When examining the rules governing the licence to pursue 
construction design activities, the Court established that the protection of the right to 
property was applicable to profitable entrepreneurial activities. In this case, the Court 
held that the purpose of the operation licence in question was related to the pursuit 
of medical activities as an enterprise and therefore the constitutional protection of the 
right to property was applicable to the operation licence as the licence constituted a 
valuable right.89   
From the limited sources available, it appears that the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court focuses less on the issue of what constitutes “property” for the purpose of 
protection under the Constitution prior to its replacement by the Fundamental Law. 
The focus seems to fall on the protection against the limitation of the right to property 
                                            
87 See 3 2 above. 
88 See 3 2 above. 
89 Decision 29/2006 (VI. 21.) AB at 15. 
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as a fundamental right and whether this right has been disproportionately restricted. 
This approach is not novel. It corresponds with the practice in German and US law 
and also relates to Theunis Roux’s theory of a telescoping effect  where other issues 
that might have been addressed in the property clause inquiry are drawn into the test 
for the arbitrariness of the limitation. 90  
  
4 2 2 Conclusion 
All of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in this chapter provide 
protection for property rights in their respective constitutions. While the wording of 
these provisions differs, what matters is the deliberate effort to promote and protect 
the private ownership of property. Similar to German and US law, the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions recognise a wide concept of property for 
constitutional purposes and their constitutional property clauses do not attempt to 
exhaustively define what constitutes property for constitutional purposes.  
 
4 3 Distinction between deprivation and expropriation  
4 3 1 Terminology 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina91  states that all 
persons within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have the right to 
property. The Constitution itself does not provide any content to this right but the 
                                            
90 See Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 2-5,9-11, 23-25. 
91 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995 (as amended in 2009). 
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Constitutional Court makes use of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) and 
the accompanying principles developed by the ECHR to provide the necessary 
content to the right to property in Article II (3)(k). This was observed in the context of 
determining what constitutes property for the purposes of Article II (3)(k), but case 
law indicates that this is also the case when dealing with interferences with property 
rights. When adjudicating matters of alleged interference with property the 
Constitutional Court both refers to and applies the three rules in Article 1 ECHR 
formulated by the ECHR.92  
 
 b) Croatia 
Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia states that the right of 
ownership shall be guaranteed and that such ownership shall entail obligations. 
Article 50 states that in the interest of the Republic of Croatia, ownership may be 
restricted or rescinded by law, subject to indemnification equal to the market value of 
the pertinent property. Article 50 does not define what is meant by the terms 
“restricted” or “rescinded”. The restriction of ownership appears to entail the 
regulation of property and the rescinding of ownership the expropriation of property 
for a purpose that promotes the interests of the Republic of Croatia against 
indemnification in the sense of compensation.93 
 
                                            
92 See for example Case No AP – 298/07; Case No AP – 619/08. See 3 1 above. 
93 Decision U-I-236/1996. 
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c) Estonia 
§ 32(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia94 states that property may be 
taken from an owner without consent, but only in the public interest, in cases and 
through procedures provided for by law, and for fair and immediate compensation. § 
32(2) states that everyone has the right to freedom from interference in possessing 
or using their property or making dispositions regarding their property, though the 
law may limit this right. The Supreme Court of Estonia has held that a situation 
where a person’s right to freely use his property is restricted amounts to an 
interference with the right of ownership guaranteed by § 32.95 Interferences with the 
right of ownership are divided into two categories, namely expropriation of property 
without the consent of the owner (regulated under § 32(1)) and interferences 
regulated under the second sentence of § 32(2), dealing with the limitation of the 
right of ownership.96 
  
d) Moldova 
Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova guarantees the right to 
possess private property (Article 46(1)) and states that no one may be expropriated 
unless such expropriation is for a public utility, established under law and against the 
payment of fair and previously determined compensation (Article 46(2)). Article 46 
does not specifically mention the regulation of property. 
 
                                            
94 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 3 July 1992. 
95 Supreme Court judgment of 17 April 2012 in matter no 3-4-1-25-11 para 35.   
96 Para 35. 
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e) The Russian Federation  
Article 35(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation97 specifically refers to 
deprivation of property by stating that “[n]o one may be deprived of property other 
than by a court decision”. Deprivations of property can be divided into four 
categories, namely confiscation (of property as a sanction for the commission of a 
crime or other violation of law),98 requisition, nationalisation and expropriation.99 
Therefore, the reference to “deprivation” in Article 35(3) includes, among other 
things, expropriation. Article 35(3) embodies a different requirement for the 
deprivation of property than most other property clauses, namely that deprivation is 
effected through a court decision. Article 35(3) states that “forced confiscation of 
property for state needs may be carried out only with the condition [of] preliminary 
and complete compensation”. Article 35(3) does not refer to expropriation but rather 
to deprivation and “forced confiscations of property.” The Constitutional Court has 
held that the term “deprive” means that the right of property is terminated in a 
coercive manner and implies the existence of a property dispute, and therefore ex 
ante or ex post judicial review is necessary.100 The Court stated further that the 
second sentence of Article 35(3) stipulates that, as a general rule, property may be 
taken only after prior and equal compensation.101 Therefore, Article 35(3) uses the 
term “deprive” in the same sense as Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR, meaning to 
dispossess or take away property. The term “forced confiscation” refers to the 
                                            
97 Constitution of the Russian Federation (with the Amendments and Additions of 30 December 2008).  
98 Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 50. 
99 Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 49-50. 
100 Judgment of 24 February 2004 No 3-Π at 10. 
101 At 10. 
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termination of the property rights, which may be effected only after compensation 
has been paid. 
  
f) Hungary  
Article XIII (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary102 states that “[p]roperty may only 
be expropriated in exceptional cases and in the public interest, in such 
circumstances and manner as stipulated by an Act; expropriation shall be 
accompanied by full, unconditional and immediate compensation”. Like all the other 
property clauses Article XIII (2) requires not only a public interest to justify 
expropriation but also that compensation be paid for the expropriation.  
Article XIII is similar to the German property clause in that these two clauses 
expressly require legislation authorising expropriation before it can take place.103 In 
terms of Article 14 of the German Basic Law, in order for legislation to authorise 
expropriation it must specifically state the nature and extent of the compensation to 
be paid in the event of expropriation. Article XIII is in line with most property clauses 
because it requires both a public interest and compensation for expropriation. The 
second sentence of Article XIII (1) states that property shall entail social 
responsibility. This is also similar to the German Article 14, which states that property 
entails obligations.  
  
                                            
102 Fundamental Law of Hungary (effective as of 1 April 2013). 
103 See 2 3 above. 
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4 3 2 Characteristics 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina applies the three rules 
approach of the ECHR to determine whether an interference with property is 
constitutional. 104  As a result, the Constitutional Court makes use of the same 
requirements as the ECHR to determine whether an interference with the right to 
property in accordance with the second or third rules of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 
(Article 1 ECHR) is valid, namely that the deprivation must be provided for by law, be 
in the public interest and be proportionate.105 When any of the rules in Article 1 
ECHR is invoked in a property dispute, the Constitutional Court has developed a set 
of questions that must be answered in considering whether there has been a 
violation of the right to property in Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution. Firstly, it 
considers whether the relevant property can be included under Article 1 ECHR; 
secondly, whether there has been an interference with the property; thirdly, under 
which of the three rules the interference may be considered; fourthly, whether the 
interference pursues a legitimate aim in the public or general interest; fifthly, whether 
the interference has satisfied the requirement of proportionality, in other words 
whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest 
of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental right; and finally, whether the interference has been in accordance with 
the principle of legal certainty and lawfulness.106 The Constitutional Court appears to 
                                            
104 See 3 1 above. See further Case No AP – 298/07; Case No AP – 775/08; Case No AP – 1095/07. 
105 Case No AP – 921/06; Case No AP – 1095/07. 
106 Case No AP – 1362/06; Case No AP – 775/08. 
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follow the same approach as the ECHR, referring to and applying the ECHR’s 
principles when adjudicating alleged interferences with property rights.107  
 
b) Croatia 
Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia states that the right of 
ownership shall be guaranteed and that such ownership shall entail obligations. 
Article 50 states that in the interest of the Republic of Croatia, ownership may be 
restricted or rescinded by law, subject to indemnification equal to the market value of 
the pertinent property. Article 50 does not define what is meant by the terms 
“restricted” or “rescinded”. The restriction of ownership appears to entail the 
regulation of property and the rescinding of ownership the expropriation of property 
for a purpose that promotes the interests of the Republic of Croatia against 
indemnification in the sense of compensation.108 It also appears that compensation 
must be paid when either restricting ownership or expropriating property in the 
interest of the Republic of Croatia.109 The Constitutional Court of Croatia refers to the 
ECHR’s principles regarding the protection of possessions.110 It has also stated, in 
addition to the payment of compensation, a restriction of ownership will be 
constitutional if it is introduced to realise a legitimate purpose provided for in the 
Constitution and it must be adequate to the purpose that it seeks to bring about.111 
The Constitutional Court’s approach differs from that of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in that it applies the principles of the ECHR in a secondary 
                                            
107 See 3 3 2 above. 
108 Decision U-I-236/1996. 
109 At 4. 
110 At 3-4. See further Decision U-IIIB-4366/2005. 
111 At 4. See further Decision U-I-1037/1995; Decision U-I-1156/1999. 
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manner, preferring to first resolve complaints in terms of the Constitution and then 
refer to the ECHR’s principles to confirm the conclusion reached on the basis of the 
Constitution.112  
 
c) Estonia 
§ 32(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia113 states that property may only 
be taken from an owner without consent if it is in the public interest, in cases and 
through procedures provided for by law, and for fair and immediate compensation. 
§32(1) appears to require authorising legislation that specifically states when 
expropriation of property may take place and the procedures to be followed when 
expropriating property, similar to the German approach. 114  § 32(2) states that 
everyone has the right to freedom from interference in possessing or using their 
property or making dispositions regarding their property, though the law may limit 
this right. The Supreme Court of Estonia has held that a situation where a person’s 
right to freely use their property is restricted amounts to an interference with the right 
of ownership guaranteed by § 32.115 Interferences with the right of ownership are 
divided into two categories, namely expropriation of property without the consent of 
the owner (regulated under § 32(1)) and interferences regulated under the second 
sentence of § 32(2), dealing with the limitation of the right of ownership.116 
 
                                            
112 See, for example, Decision U-I-236/1996; Decision U-IIIB-4366/2005. 
113 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 3 July 1992. 
114 See 2 3 3 above. 
115 Supreme Court judgment of 17 April 2012 in matter no 3-4-1-25-11 para 35.   
116 Para 35. 
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d) Moldova 
Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova guarantees the right to 
possess private property (Article 46(1)) and states that no one may be expropriated 
unless such expropriation is for a public utility, established under law and against the 
payment of fair and previously determined compensation (Article 46(2)). In dealing 
with a complaint of a restriction of property rights, the Constitutional Court will 
consider the matter in light of Article 46 as well as Article 54 of the Constitution.117 
Article 54 states that no law may be adopted that might curtail or restrict the 
fundamental rights and liberties of the person and citizen (Article 54(1)). 
Furthermore, the pursuit of rights and freedoms may not be restricted unless those 
restrictions are provided for by the law, which is in compliance with the unanimously 
recognized norms of international law and which are requested in specific cases118 
(Article 54(2)). Finally, the enforced restriction must be proportionate to the situation 
that caused it and such restriction may not affect the existence of the right or liberty 
so restricted (Article 54(4)). When analysing an alleged restriction of property rights, 
the Constitutional Court applies the principles and case law of the ECHR, as it does 
when determining whether a particular interest is property for the purposes of Article 
46.119   
 
                                            
117 See Judgments No 15 of 13.09.2011; No 5 of 10.04.2012. 
118 These specific cases are the defence of national security, territorial integrity, economic welfare of 
the State, public order, with the view to prevent mass revolt and felonies, protect other persons' rights, 
liberties and dignity, impede the disclosure of confidential information or guarantee the power and 
impartiality of justice.  
119 See Judgments No 15 of 13.09.2011; No 5 of 10.04.2012. 
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e) The Russian Federation 
Article 35(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that no one may be 
deprived of property other than in accordance with a court order and that forced 
confiscation of property for state needs may be carried out only with the condition 
that preliminary and complete compensation be paid.120 The deprivation referred to 
here is expropriation and not the regulation of property. Article 35(3) does not require 
any authorising legislation to effect an expropriation. All that is required is a valid 
court order. Therefore, Article 35(3) differs significantly from the other Central 
Eastern European constitutional property clauses. When there is termination of 
property rights in the form of a deprivation of property, there must be either ex ante 
or ex post judicial review of the deprivation. The purpose of judicial review is to 
provide a guarantee of the inviolability of property.121  
The Russian Constitutional Court has held that in cases where the 
expropriation of property is necessary for public purposes and serves as a 
preventative measure, the way to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right 
to private property set out in Article 35(1) is ex post judicial review.122 While the 
public purpose justifies the expropriation, the right to ex post judicial review of this 
transfer of private property cannot be restricted.123 The Constitutional Court has also 
stated that ex post judicial review of the reasonableness and lawfulness of a 
deprivation of property will be inappropriate in, for example, cases dealing with the 
seizure of property that constitutes material evidence in criminal proceedings 
                                            
120 Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 49-50. 
121 Judgment of 24 February 2004 No 3-Π at 10. 
122 Judgment of 16 May 2000 No 8-Π at 6. 
123 At 6. 
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because this is regarded as an ineffective means of guaranteeing the right to 
property. 124  In these cases, it seems that ex ante judicial review of the 
reasonableness and lawfulness of the deprivation is more appropriate.  
Article 35(3) does not specifically mention the regulation of property; it only 
refers to deprivation of property in the sense of expropriation. The Russian 
Constitutional Court has held that regulation of property must not be arbitrary; in 
other words, any regulation of property must satisfy the proportionality principle.125 
Where there is an interference with property rights imposed by legislation it appears 
that the proportionality of the interference will be judged. If the interference is found 
to be disproportionate, the interference will be declared unconstitutional for violating 
Article 35.126 The Russian Constitutional Court appears to follow a subset approach 
to the distinction between deprivation and expropriation because the proportionality 
of all interferences is first determined. If the interference is disproportionate, it will be 
declared unconstitutional for violating one or more of the sub-articles in Article 35.  
 
f) Hungary 
Article XIII (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary states that property may only be 
expropriated exceptionally, in the public interest, in cases and ways provided for by 
an Act and subject to full, unconditional and immediate compensation. Like the 
                                            
124 Judgment of 16 July 2008 No 9-Π at 9. 
125 Judgment of 6 June 2000 No 9-Π at 3.  
126 See, for example, Judgment of 25 April 2011 No 6-Π. In this case, it was held that the confiscation 
of an item used in the commission of an administrative offence from the owner who was not 
administratively answerable and not recognised as guilty of the offence amounted to a 
disproportionate interference with the owner’s property rights which violated Articles 35(1) and 35(3).  
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German constitutional property clause,127 Article XIII requires authorising legislation 
before an expropriation may take place. Similar to German law, the authorising 
legislation must specifically state when expropriation of property may take place and 
in what manner it will be carried out. Any administrative act or act of Parliament 
ordering expropriation that does not comply with the requirements will be in violation 
of the Fundamental Law.128 The Hungarian Constitutional Court has emphasised that 
the requirements for a valid expropriation stated in Article 13 of the Hungarian 
Constitution, the predecessor of Article XIII and almost identical to it, are applicable 
to both expropriations carried out by state authorities and expropriations carried out 
on the basis of legislation.129  
The right to property was considered a fundamental right under the now 
repealed Hungarian Constitution and is still considered as such under the 
Fundamental Law, but this right is not absolute. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
has held that the burden placed on property by public law may lead either to a 
declaration of unconstitutionality of the intervention of the public authorities and 
therefore to the nullification of the legal rule on which it is based, or to 
acknowledgment of the constitutionality of the imposed burden and at most to the 
substitution of a legal remedy in the form of monetary compensation.130 The singling 
out of expropriation for constitutional regulation perhaps indicates that the Hungarian 
                                            
127 See 2 3 above. 
128 Decision 92/2007 (XI. 22.) AB at 6, discussing the requirements under Article 13 of the Hungarian 
Constitution, which has since been repealed and replaced by Article XIII of the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary. Articles 13 and XIII are almost identical; therefore cases and principles applicable to Article 
13 may be employed when interpreting Article XIII.  
129 Decision 27/1991 (V. 20.) AB (Compensation Case III) at 10. 
130 Decision 1/2004 (II. 12.) AB at 7.  
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Constitutional Court follows the approach according to which deprivation and 
expropriation are viewed as two distinct categories that do not overlap. 
  
4 3 3 Public use/public purpose 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides that everyone 
shall have the right to property, but nothing further is provided for in the article. As 
has been noted above, the Constitutional Court makes use of the case law of the 
ECHR to provide content to the Article II (3)(k) right to property regarding 
expropriations of property and has adopted the ECHR’s requirements for a valid 
expropriation.131  One of these requirements is that interferences in the form of 
expropriation of property must pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest.132 In 
dealing with the requirement of public interest, the Constitutional Court follows the 
approach of the ECHR as set out in its James v United Kingdom133 decision.134 In 
James the ECHR held that the fact that an interference with a property right was only 
in the interest of certain persons and not in the interests of the community as a whole 
does not necessarily mean that the deprivation was not in the public interest. The 
Constitutional Court has held, for example, that interference with a person’s property 
rights aimed at implementing prescribed rules of civil proceedings, which were in the 
interest of legal certainty and the rule of law would satisfy the public interest 
requirement.135  
                                            
131 See, for example, Case No AP – 775/08; Case No AP – 1362/06; Case No AP – 1095/07.  
132 Case No AP – 775/08 para 93. 
133 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. See 3 3 3 above.  
134 Case No AP – 1095/07 para 35.  
135 See Case No AP – 1095/07. 
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b) Croatia 
Article 50 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia provides that the restriction 
and rescinding of ownership is possible in the interest of the Republic of Croatia. The 
Constitutional Court has held that the phrase “in the interest of the Republic of 
Croatia” does not mean the same thing as the “general interest” and that a measure 
taken in the general interest will not satisfy the standard set out in Article 50 because 
the constitutional standard is the interest of the Republic of Croatia, and not the 
general interest.136  
 
c) The Russian Federation 
Article 35(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that deprivation (in 
the sense of expropriation) of property may only take place by way of a valid court 
order. There is no express reference to a public interest requirement. Rather, Article 
35(3) refers to “state need” and where there is a “forced confiscation” of property in 
order to fulfill a state need, such confiscation must be accompanied by preliminary 
and complete compensation. The Russian Constitutional Court has stated that where 
property is taken in order to fulfill a state need, the property guarantee in Article 
35(1) will be implemented through ex post judicial review.137 Therefore, it seems that 
there is no specific public interest requirement for expropriation in the Russian 
context. Rather, the requirement is that of state need, which is a much broader 
                                            
136 Decision U-III-437/1993. 
137 Judgment of 16 May 2000 No 8-Π at 6. See further Judgment of 24 February 2004 No 3-Π. 
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concept than public interest. 138  Where state need is invoked to justify an 
expropriation, ex post judicial review will safeguard the constitutional guarantee of 
the right to property. From the available case law, there does not seem to be any 
indication of a judicial public purpose-type requirement. The Russian Constitutional 
Court has stated that when property is taken from an owner effective judicial review 
shall be exercised as a guarantee of inviolability of property regardless of the reason 
for the taking.139  
 
d) Hungary 
Article XIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary identifies public interest as one of the 
requirements for a valid expropriation of property. Under the now repealed Article 13 
of the Hungarian Constitution (the substance of which is almost identical to Article 
XIII of the Fundamental Law) the right to property was, and arguably still is, 
considered to be a fundamental right, although this right is not inviolable.140 The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court has held that the constitutional review of state 
interventions with the right to property is an adjudication of proportionality between 
the ends and the means of the intervention, in other words, between the public 
interest offered as justification for the intervention and the restriction on the property 
right.141 Furthermore, all that the Constitution required to justify an expropriation was 
the public interest. If monetary compensation was provided for the expropriation, 
then a more compelling and justified “necessity” for the expropriation need not be 
                                            
138 Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 61-63. 
139 Judgment of 24 February 2004 No 3-Π at 9. 
140 Decision 4/1993 (II. 12.) AB; Decision 64/1993 (XII. 22.) AB; Decision 1/2004 (II. 12.) AB. 
141 Decision 64/1993 (XII. 22.) AB; Decision 1/2004 (II. 12.) AB at 8. 
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established for constitutional purposes. 142  Therefore, it appears that the public 
interest requirement is an easier standard to comply with than that of a necessity and 
need only be complied with where no compensation was paid for the expropriation. 
Due to the near identical content of Article 13 of the Constitution and Article XIII of 
the Fundamental Law, it can be argued that this ruling is still applicable to 
expropriations carried out in terms of Article XIII of the Fundamental Law. 
   
4 3 4 Compensation 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Article II (3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not specifically 
mention compensation as a requirement for expropriation. In fact, it mentions nothing 
about expropriation at all. However, the Court uses Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 
1 ECHR) and the ECHR’s jurisprudence regarding Article 1 ECHR in order to provide 
substance to the right to property provided for in Article II (3)(k). This practice 
extends to instances of compensation for expropriation. The Court applies the 
ECHR’s case law regarding compensation and therefore requires the payment of 
reasonable compensation for expropriations of property as necessary to striking a 
fair or equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of the individual 
whose property has been expropriated.143 Following the lead of the ECHR, the Court 
also recognises that there are certain limited exceptions to the requirement of 
compensation for an expropriation.144  
 
                                            
142 Decision 1/2004 (II. 12.) AB at 8. 
143 Case No AP – 921/06. See further Case No AP – 2157/08; Case No AP – 2175/09; Case No AP – 
3796/10.  
144 Para 37. 
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b) The Russian Federation 
Article 35(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation specifically states that any 
expropriation of property is conditioned on the payment of preliminary and complete 
compensation. Compensation is necessary in all cases of expropriation and should 
cover both the market value of the expropriated property and the loss incurred by the 
former owner.145 Furthermore, compensation may be in the form of a payment of an 
amount of money or equivalent property. Equivalent property as compensation is 
only possible with the consent of the former owner of the expropriated property. The 
Court has held that the legislator has to regulate the transfer of the right to property, 
particularly the forfeiture of this right, on the basis of legal equity and justice 
principles in accordance with the Constitution.146 These requirements also apply to 
the compensation to be paid for the expropriation. Furthermore, the compensation 
paid should be proportionate to ensure a fair balance between public and private 
interests.147 Again, a fair balance approach is employed in the determination of 
compensation for expropriation. This is very similar to the approach followed in 
German law148 and decisions of the ECHR.149 The Russian Constitutional Court even 
refers to ECHR decisions regarding compensation being paid in order to maintain a 
fair or equitable balance. While the Court does not draw its approach to 
compensation from the ECHR’s decisions, it nonetheless finds that proportionality 
requires the payment of compensation. This is because proportionality is a 
                                            
145 Svetlana S Protection of Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Russian National Legislation (LLM thesis Lund University 2008) 63. 
146 Judgment of 16 May 2000 No 8-Π at 4. 
147 At 4.  
148 See 2 3 5 above. 
149 See 3 3 4 above.  
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constitutional principle that applies to the limitation of any fundamental right, such as 
the rights listed in Article 35. 
 
c) Hungary  
Article XIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary states that all expropriations of 
property must be accompanied by full, unconditional and immediate compensation. 
In deciding whether a property restriction is constitutional or not, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court attempts to find a fair balance between the public interest and 
the property restriction.150 Furthermore, compensation may be necessary in order for 
the property restriction to be proportionate and therefore constitutional. The payment 
of compensation flows not only from a specific duty provided for in both the now 
repealed Constitution and the Fundamental Law, but also from the Constitutional 
Court’s finding that a fair or equitable balance between the public interest and the 
property restriction may require the payment of compensation.151 
 
4 3 5 Excessive deprivation/regulation 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina  
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina consistently applies the 
principles relating to regulation and expropriation of property laid down by the ECHR 
as a means of providing substance to the right to property provided for in Article II 
(3)(k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the Constitutional 
Court applies the same distinction between regulatory controls over the use of 
                                            
150 Decision 11/2005 (IV. 5.) AB at 18. 
151 At 18. 
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property and deprivation (in the sense of expropriation) as the ECHR.152 The Court 
has held that interferences with the right to property must not go further than is 
necessary in order to achieve a legitimate aim, while holders of the right to property 
must not be subjected to arbitrary treatment or forced to bear excessive burdens in 
pursuance to a legitimate aim.153 From the translated case law available it would 
appear that any interference with the right to property that does not satisfy the 
proportionality test would be declared unconstitutional and invalid. From the 
available case law it is inconclusive whether the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina recognises the notion of treating regulation of property that has 
unintended expropriatory effects as constructive expropriation, but it would seem that 
it does not. The available translated case law suggests that a regulation or 
expropriation of property that does not satisfy the proportionality test would be 
declared invalid.154  
 
b) The Russian Federation   
The Russian Constitutional Court has held that state interference with property rights 
shall not be arbitrary and shall not violate the balance between social interests and 
necessary conditions for the protection of fundamental rights. 155  Furthermore, 
excessive or disproportionate interferences with the right to property constitute 
arbitrary restrictions on the right to property and are therefore unconstitutional and 
invalid.156 The available translated case law consistently reiterates that interferences 
                                            
152 See 3 3 above. 
153 Case No AP – 619/08 para 35.  
154 See 4 4 a) below. 
155 Judgment of 16 July 2008 No 9-Π at 4. 
156 Judgment of 16 May 2000 No 8-Π at 4. 
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with property, both regulation and expropriation, must satisfy the proportionality 
principle. Failing to comply with this principle would render the interference 
unconstitutional. Therefore, it does not appear that the Russian Constitutional Court 
recognises the notion of constructive expropriation.  
 
c) Hungary  
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, like its counterparts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Russian Federation, applies the principle of proportionality when determining 
the constitutionality of an interference with the right to property. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has held that:  
“[T]he encumbrance of property by public law may lead either to the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the intervention of the public law authorities, and therefore to the 
nullification of the legal rule on which it was based, or to an acknowledgment of the 
constitutionality of the burden imposed, and at most to the substitution of legal remedy 
(monetary compensation)” […].157 
From this it appears that an interference with the right to property is either valid or it 
will be declared unconstitutional. A constitutional interference results in the 
availability of a legal remedy, whereas an unconstitutional interference is declared 
invalid. From the sources available in English it seems that constructive 
expropriation would not have a place in Hungarian constitutional property law 
because an interference with the right to property is either declared unconstitutional 
and invalid or it is acknowledged as a constitutional burden for which compensation 
is payable.  
 
                                            
157 Decision 1/2004 (II. 12.) AB at 7. 
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4 3 6 Conclusion 
The terminology used to refer to deprivation (regulation) and expropriation varies 
between the Central Eastern European constitutional property clauses discussed in 
this chapter. Where it is referred to, the term “deprivation” is in some clauses 
understood to mean “regulation” but in other clauses it is understood to mean 
“expropriation”. Other terms are used in some clauses to refer to the regulation of 
property. Some of the clauses specifically refer to expropriation of property, while 
others use different terms that are understood to mean expropriation. 
Regarding expropriation, all the Central Eastern European constitutional 
property clauses discussed in this chapter require that compensation be paid to the 
owner whose property has been expropriated. However, the other requirements for 
expropriation vary among the property clauses discussed. While some of the 
constitutional property clauses, like Croatia’s Article 50 and Hungary’s Article XIII, 
also require that the expropriation be for some public purpose or use, others for 
instance the Russian Federation’s Article 35, do not mention a public purpose 
requirement at all. Some of the property clauses require legislation that specifically 
authorises the expropriation, while others require a different form of authorisation, 
such as a court order. While all of the property clauses refer to expropriation of 
property in one way or another, not all of them refer to the regulation of property. 
Even those that do refer to it use different terms for it, such as “restriction” or 
“limitation”. Some of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions incorporate the 
ECHR’s principles regarding the constitutionality of controls on the use of property, 
while others apply their own principles regarding the regulation of property.  
From the sources available, it does not appear that the Central Eastern 
European jurisdictions recognise something like a notion of constructive 
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expropriation or an excessive regulation being validated through compensation. 
None of the jurisdictions make provision for equalisation payments like German law 
does, nor do they appear to recognise something like regulatory takings in US law. 
Those jurisdictions that follow the ECHR’s principles regarding deprivation 
(expropriation) and controls on the use of property do not go as far as replicating the 
uncertainty surrounding the validation of excessive regulation through payment of 
compensation. On the contrary, most of the jurisdictions specifically state that if an 
interference with property is disproportionate it will be unconstitutional. 
The Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in this chapter have 
either developed their own approaches to regulation and expropriation or have 
elected to apply the principles of the ECHR regarding these two types of 
interferences and therefore for the most part subscribe to ECHR’s constitutional 
framework. The Constitutional Courts of Estonia and Hungary, for example, do not 
refer to the ECHR’s principles in the context of regulation and expropriation of 
property, but both end up in a similar place to those jurisdictions that do. Article XIII 
of the Hungarian Fundamental Law and §32(1) of Estonian Constitution contain 
similar requirements for the expropriation of property to those required by the ECHR 
and both include the additional requirement of legislation that specifically authorises 
expropriation. The approach adopted by these two jurisdictions to the expropriation 
of property is similar to that of German law, in that German law also requires 
legislation that specifically authorises expropriation, requires a public interest and 
requires compensation to be paid in the event of expropriation.   
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4 4 Proportionality 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina follows the approach to 
proportionality of the ECHR.158 This is unsurprising in light of the fact that the Court 
uses Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) and the ECHR’s jurisprudence 
regarding Article 1 ECHR to provide substance to the right to property provided for in 
Article II (3)(k)159 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This use extends to 
the application of the proportionality principle when determining whether an 
interference with the right to property is legitimate or not.  
The Constitutional Court has held that interference pursuant to the second or 
third rules in Article 1 ECHR must be provided by law, serve a legitimate aim and 
strike a fair balance between the holder of a right and the public and the general 
interest (the principle of proportionality). 160  This means that, in order for an 
interference to be justified, the interference must be imposed by a legal provision 
that meets the requirements of the rule of law and serves a legitimate aim in the 
public interest; it must also maintain a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aims sought to be realised.161 Furthermore, 
interferences with the right to property must not go further than necessary to achieve 
the legitimate aim, while the holders of the right must not be subjected to arbitrary 
treatment or be forced to bear excessive burdens in pursuance of the legitimate aim 
or aims in question.162  
                                            
158 See 3 4 above. 
159 Article II (3)(k) Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995 (as amended in 2009). 
160 Case No – AP 619/08 para 35. See further Case No AP – 921/06. 
161 Para 35. 
162 Para 35. 
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b) Croatia 
The Constitutional Court of Croatia has held that the “ubiquitous significance” of the 
principle of proportionality cannot be denied, even though the Constitution does not 
provide for any direct norms for the regulation of the proportionality principle.163 Any 
measures seeking to restrict the fundamental freedoms and rights of citizens must 
be prescribed by law and be proportionate to the legitimate goal to be achieved 
thereby. 164  Furthermore, proportionality can only exist where the measures 
undertaken to ensure a legitimate goal are not more restrictive than necessary.165 
The Constitutional Court also uses the principles and case law of the ECHR 
regarding proportionality and has held that “Article 1 [of Protocol No 1] […] is an 
integral part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia, and it is above the 
law in terms of its legal effect […]”.166  
 
c) The Czech Republic  
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has held that Article 11(1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms167 guarantees to everyone the 
right to own property but in terms of Article 11(3) this right may be restricted by 
statute on the grounds of protecting the rights of others or protecting the public 
                                            
163 Decision U-I-1156/1999 at 4. 
164 At 4. 
165 At 4. 
166 At 5. 
167 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms of 16 December 1992 (forming part of the 
Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992). 
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interest, though rights may not be restricted beyond a proportionate degree.168 The 
Constitutional Court has held that this interpretation is in line with the principles of 
property protection under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 ECHR.169  
 
d) Estonia 
§ 32(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia170 states that everyone has the 
right to freedom from interference in possessing or using their property or making 
dispositions regarding their property, though the law may limit this right. The 
Supreme Court of Estonia has held that a situation where a person’s right to freely 
use their property is restricted amounts to an interference with the right of ownership 
guaranteed by § 32.171 Interferences with the right of ownership are divided into two 
categories, namely expropriation of property without the consent of the owner 
(regulated under § 32(1)) and interferences regulated under the second sentence of 
§ 32(2), dealing with the limitation of the right of ownership.172  
 A situation where the interference with a fundamental right provided by law 
“does not have a legitimate objective or where the restriction is disproportional with 
regard to the objective” will constitute an interference with the fundamental right.173 
The second sentence of § 32 prescribes a simple statutory reservation for the 
restriction of the right of ownership, which means that a law may restrict the right of 
                                            
168 2004/04/08 – II. ÚS 482/02: Restrictions upon Property Rights.   
169 2004/04/08 – II. ÚS 482/02: Restrictions upon Property Rights; 2004/03/09 – PI. ÚS 2/02: Basic 
Principles.  
170 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 3 July 1992. 
171 Supreme Court judgment of 17 April 2012 in matter no 3-4-1-25-11 para 35.   
172 Para 35. 
173 Para 36. 
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ownership for any purpose that is not in conflict with the Constitution.174 A restriction 
on a fundamental right will be regarded as proportionate if it is “appropriate, 
necessary and reasonable with regard to the objective to be achieved”.175 Whether a 
restriction is appropriate appears to be a factual question, while the question of 
necessity is answered by asking whether it is possible to achieve the desired goal by 
some other means, which is less burdensome on the person but is just as effective 
as the measure under review. If the answer is no, the measure under review is 
necessary.176 In deciding whether a measure is reasonable, it is necessary to weigh 
up the significance of the legitimate objective on the one side and the intensity of the 
restriction on the owner’s property on the other.177   
  
e) Moldova 
Article 54 states that no law may be adopted that might curtail or restrict the 
fundamental rights and liberties of the person and citizen (Article 54(1)). 
Furthermore, the pursuit of rights and freedoms may not be restricted unless those 
restrictions are provided for by the law, which is in compliance with the unanimously 
recognized norms of international law and which are requested in specific cases 
(Article 54(2)). Finally, the enforced restriction must be proportionate to the situation 
that caused it and such restriction may not affect the existence of the right or liberty 
so restricted (Article 54(4)). Article 54(4) specifically provides for proportionality 
review of measures aimed at restricting any fundamental right contained in the 
Constitution, including the right to private property. When dealing with an alleged 
                                            
174 Para 37. 
175 Para 39. 
176 Para 41. See further Supreme Court judgment of 26 March 2009 in matter no 3-4-1-16-08 para 29. 
177 Para 42. 
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unconstitutional infringement of the right to property in Article 46, the Constitutional 
Court will investigate the infringement to determine if the interference affects the right 
to property in Article 46 and whether the interference is constitutional in terms of 
Article 54.178 The Constitutional Court refers to the ECHR’s principles and case law 
regarding when an interference with possessions would violate Article 1 of Protocol 
No 1 (Article 1 ECHR) to evaluate if a particular interference will violate Article 46 
and Article 54 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court implements the fair 
balance test developed by the ECHR to determine if a fair balance is struck between 
the interference and the interests of the community. 179  According to the 
Constitutional Court, a measure that is incompatible with the protection of property 
under Article 1 ECHR will also violate Article 46 of the Constitution.180   
 
f) The Russian Federation 
Article 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation specifically provides for 
proportionate limitation of the rights and freedoms provided for in the Constitution. 
Article 55(3) states that: 
“The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by federal law only to the 
extent necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of the constitutional 
system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, for ensuring 
defence of the country and security of the State.”  
This broad provision appears to apply to all rights and freedoms provided for in the 
Constitution and therefore also to the right to property in Article 35 of the 
Constitution.  
                                            
178 See, for example, Judgment No 15 of 13.09.2011; Judgment No 5 of 10.04.2012. 
179 Judgment No 15 of 13.09.2011 para 77. 
180 Para 77. 
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In the context of rights in land, specifically agricultural land, the Court has held 
that: 
“[I]n order to provide legal protection of private property as required by Article 35 (Section 
1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and assuming that land is the foundation 
of life and activities of the peoples living in the respective territory, the legislator 
regulating land relations, including those in the area of transactions with land plots and 
land shares in shared property of agricultural lands is obliged to maintain a balance of 
public and private interests involved in the exercise of the right of private property of land 
on the basis of the constitutional principle of proportionality (Section 3, Article 55).”181 
This confirms that the principle of proportionality is applicable to the right to property 
in Article 35 and that any interference with this right by a legislator must maintain the 
appropriate balance between the public and private interests involved in the exercise 
of the right to property. 
The Court has also held that an interference that does not conform to Article 
55(3) will be regarded as disproportionate to the “constitutionally significant aims 
indicated in [Article 55(3)]”.182 This seems to indicate that the significant aims listed 
in Article 55(3) are the only bases upon which rights and freedoms can be limited 
constitutionally. However, even if the interference could be characterised as falling 
under one of these aims, the interference must nonetheless be proportionate in its 
limitation of the rights and freedoms in question, in other words it must adequately 
balance the private and public interests involved. In determining whether a particular 
interference is disproportionate, the inquiry does not seem to involve a consideration 
of specific factors like the German approach.183 Rather, the issue of proportionality is 
decided based on the particular facts of each case, in other words on the basis of an 
ad hoc inquiry. 
                                            
181 Judgment of 30 January 2009 No 1-Π at 5.  
182 Judgment of 27 April 2001 No 7-Π at 11.    
183 See 2 4 above. 
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g) Hungary 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court recognises and implements the principle of 
proportionality when dealing with the constitutionality of interferences with 
fundamental rights. According to the practice of the Court, there are three bases, 
referred to as legitimate objectives, on which fundamental rights may legitimately be 
restricted or interfered with. They are, firstly, the legitimate objective of protecting the 
fundamental rights of others; 184  secondly, the state’s duty to institutionally 
(objectively) guarantee fundamental rights185 and thirdly, the achievement of certain 
constitutional public objectives.186  
The Court has held that the state may only restrict fundamental rights if such 
restriction is the only way to protect the abovementioned legitimate objectives.187 
Furthermore, the constitutionality of restricting a fundamental right requires that the 
restriction comply with the principle of proportionality. In other words, the importance 
of the desired objective must be proportionate to the restriction of the fundamental 
right in question. The legislature, when enacting a limitation, is required to use the 
most moderate means suitable for reaching the objective of the limiting legislation.188 
Therefore, the Court appears to use a two-stage approach to determining the 
legitimacy of interferences with property. In the first stage, the Court must determine 
whether the interference in question is the only way of achieving one or more of the 
                                            
184 Decision 2/1990 (II. 18.) AB. 
185 Decision 64/1991 (XII. 17.) AB. 
186 Decision 56/1994 (XI. 10.) AB. 
187 Decision 43/2005 (XI. 14.) AB at 11. 
188 At 11.  
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legitimate objectives. If so, the Court moves to the second stage, which involves 
determining the proportionality of the interference.  
 
h) Conclusion 
Each of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in this chapter applies 
some form of proportionality review when determining if an interference with property 
is constitutional. The Constitutional Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic and Moldova apply the fair balance principle developed by the 
ECHR, while the Constitutional Courts of Estonia, Hungary and the Russian 
Federation could be considered outliers because they apply their own interpretations 
of proportionality. The Constitutions of Moldova and the Russian Federation 
specifically provide for proportionality review. While the Constitutional Court of 
Moldova uses the fair balance principle of the ECHR to give content to 
proportionality provided for in the Constitution, the Russian Constitutional Court does 
not use the fair balance principle at all and instead applies its own form of 
proportionality review.  
The methods of application of proportionality review differ among the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions but they all do something similar in that they test the 
interference with property to determine if is proportionate and therefore 
constitutional. The jurisdictions that apply their own interpretation of the 
proportionality principle appear to lean more towards the German law end of the 
continuum than the US law end. Those jurisdictions that apply the ECHR’s fair 
balance principle appear to be, in substance, following more of a German law 
approach than a US law approach without explicitly referring to German law. 
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4 5 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to investigate, as far as possible based on the sources 
available in English, the development of constitutional property law in Central 
Eastern Europe. The three main issues investigated were the constitutional definition 
of property, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property and the 
application of the proportionality principle as a means of legitimising interferences 
with property. The question was whether the approaches of the Central Eastern 
European jurisdictions discussed resemble either the German or US law approach to 
these three issues.  
The Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in this chapter all opted 
for constitutionally democratic approaches, with emphasis on the protection of 
fundamental rights. A number of the constitutional courts use the principles and case 
law of the ECHR, which is unsurprising given the fact that they are signatories to the 
European Convention. The principles and the case law of the ECHR have had a 
major impact on the development of the constitutional law of Central Eastern Europe, 
with these principles being used to provide content to otherwise vague rights, or as a 
secondary set of norms which can be applied to test the constitutional validity of 
interferences with property rights. However, not all of the constitutional courts 
choose to rely on the principles and case law of the ECHR.  
All of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions have adopted a broad concept 
of property for constitutional purposes that includes a number of interests, including 
monetary claims, pension rights, legitimate expectations and other rights having 
economic value. The Constitutional Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova 
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use the principles and case law regarding the definition of “possessions” developed 
by the ECHR, apparently to provide content to the often vague right to property or 
the right of ownership provided for in the jurisdictions’ property clauses. Similar to the 
approaches in German and US constitutional property law, no attempt has been 
made to exhaustively define what constitutes property for constitutional purposes.  
All of the jurisdictions discussed above make provision for the restriction of 
property rights, either explicitly in the text of the property clause or through 
interpretation. Those constitutional property clauses that do refer to the restriction of 
property rights use varying terminology. Deprivation is referred to in some of the 
property clauses (Russian Federation) but this term is most often understood to 
mean expropriation instead of regulation of property. Other property clauses 
(Croatia, Estonia and Moldova) use different terms for regulation of property such as 
“restriction” or “limitation”. Expropriation is specifically referred to in some clauses 
(Hungary, Moldova) while others refer to this type of interference in different ways, 
such as the rescission of ownership (Croatia) or the forced confiscation of property 
(Russian Federation).  
A consistent requirement for expropriation in all of the Central Eastern 
European constitutional property clauses discussed in this chapter is that 
compensation must be paid for expropriation of property. That being said, the other 
requirements for expropriation vary among the property clauses discussed. Whereas 
some property clauses require that the expropriation be for some public purpose or 
public use (for example, Croatia and Hungary), others do not mention a public 
purpose or public use requirement at all (Russian Federation). Similarly, not all of the 
property clauses require legislation that specifically authorises expropriation. Some 
require a different form of authorisation; for example, Article 35(3) of the Russian 
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Constitution requires a court order to authorise expropriation. While all of the 
property clauses discussed refer to expropriation in one way or another, not all of 
them refer to the regulation of property. Those that do refer to regulation use varying 
terminology, referring to the restriction or limitation of property. Regarding the 
regulation of property, it appears that Central Eastern European jurisdictions follow 
one of two paths. Whereas some will apply the ECHR’s principles regarding the 
regulation of property (for example Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova), 
others apply their own principles for the regulation of property (for example Estonia 
and Hungary). On the continuum between the German and US law approaches, 
those Central Eastern European jurisdictions that do not apply the ECHR’s principles 
regarding the regulation and expropriation of property, for example Estonia and 
Hungary, lean more towards the German law approach end of the continuum, 
without explicitly following German law.  
None of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in this chapter 
appears to recognise something like a notion of an excessive regulation being 
validated through compensation. Most jurisdictions specifically state that an 
interference that is disproportionate will be unconstitutional. No provision is made for 
something like the equalisation payments that are available in German law, nor does 
there appear to be recognition of something like regulatory takings like in US law. 
The Central Eastern European jurisdictions that apply the principles of the ECHR do 
not go so far as to apply these principles in manner that replicates the uncertainty 
surrounding the validation of excessive regulation through payment of compensation.   
Each of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in this chapter 
applies some form of proportionality review when determining if an interference with 
property is constitutional. The Constitutional Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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Croatia, the Czech Republic and Moldova apply the fair balance principle developed 
by the ECHR, while the Constitutional Courts of Estonia, Hungary and the Russian 
Federation apply their own interpretations of proportionality. The Constitutions of 
Moldova and the Russian Federation specifically provide for proportionality review. 
Whereas the Constitutional Court of Moldova uses the fair balance principle of the 
ECHR to give content to proportionality provided for in the Constitution, the Russian 
Constitutional Court does not use the fair balance principle at all and instead applies 
its own form of proportionality review. 
The methods of application of proportionality review differ among the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions but they all do something similar in that they test the 
interference with property to determine if it is proportionate and therefore 
constitutional. The jurisdictions that apply their own interpretation of the 
proportionality principle appear to lean more to the German law end of the continuum 
than the US law end. Those jurisdictions that apply the ECHR’s fair balance principle 
appear to be, in substance, following more of a German law approach than a US law 
approach without explicitly referring to German law. 
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Chapter 5  
South African law 
5 1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates how the concept of property for constitutional purposes, the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property and the principle of 
proportionality as a requirement for the validity of interferences with property are 
approached in South African constitutional property law. The purpose of this 
investigation is to determine whether the South African approach to these three 
aspects resembles the German and/or US law approaches.  
The constitutional property regime of South Africa is governed by section 25 of 
the Constitution.1 This section is unique in the sense that it combines two seemingly 
contradictory elements, the first dealing with the protection of property interests 
against unconstitutional interference (section 25(1)-(3)) and the second providing 
authority for action on the part of the state to promote land and other related forms of 
reform (section 25(4)-(9)).2  
The first issue to be considered when discussing the property clause is the 
question of what constitutes property for the purposes of section 25, because if the 
interest in question is not considered property, section 25 is not engaged. Section 
25(4)(b) provides some assistance in determining what constitutes property for the 
purposes of section 25 by stating that property is not limited to land. This statement 
aligns with the private law concept of property, which includes interests other than 
immovable property. The Constitutional Court has held that it would be both 
                                            
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 12. 
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“practically impossible” and “judicially unwise” to comprehensively define property for 
the purposes of section 25, instead opting for an incremental approach to the 
determination of whether a particular interest is property.3 This approach has led to a 
number of interests being recognised as property and therefore qualifying for 
protection under section 25. The question of whether a particular interest can be 
regarded as property for the purposes of section 25 does not receive much attention 
in the Constitutional Court’s case law. It is often just accepted or assumed that a 
particular interest is property and the analysis of the possible infringement of section 
25 follows from there. The Constitutional Court gives more attention to whether there 
has been a deprivation or an expropriation of property and if so, whether this 
interference is arbitrary or not.   
Since the Constitutional Court initially distinguished between deprivation and 
expropriation,4 subsequent decisions have deviated from this distinction. Examples 
from case law include the introduction of a state acquisition requirement for a valid 
expropriation;5 suggesting and then deciding that a statutory, regulatory interference 
with property that does not mention expropriation can amount to expropriation for 
which compensation is payable6 and that in order for deprivation to take place, the 
holder of the property interest must have been deprived of something legally 
                                            
3 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. See further 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 108; Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 6th ed (2013) 535; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 46-10.  
4 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
5 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
6 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC). 
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substantial, without explaining what would make a particular interest legally 
substantial or not.7  
Regarding proportionality, the Constitutional Court uses a two-stage approach 
when determining if an interference with property is valid. In the first stage, the Court 
determines whether the interference satisfies the specific internal requirements set 
out in the subsections of section 25. If it does not, then the second stage is reached. 
In this stage the Court determines whether the unconstitutional interference is 
perhaps justified in the circumstances by applying the factors listed in section 36(1) 
of the Constitution. 8  The justification enquiry under section 36(1) is a full 
proportionality review.9 
Deprivations of property may not be arbitrary. The Court has interpreted this to 
mean that the law authorising the deprivation does not provide sufficient reason for it 
and it has formulated a test to determine this.10  If the deprivation is declared 
arbitrary, it may still be justifiable in terms of section 36(1). Any attempt to 
expropriate property must comply with the requirements in sections 25(2) and 25(3). 
If it does not, it is unconstitutional but could possibly be justifiable under section 
36(1).  
                                            
7  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
8 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 
2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 36; Woolman S & Botha H “Limitations” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M 
(eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 2 (2nd ed OS 2006) ch 34 at 3-6; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 74-78. 
9 Woolman S & Botha H “Limitations” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa vol 2 (2nd ed OS 2006) ch 34 at 69-70. 
10 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. See 
further Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 22; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 245. 
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5 2 Property  
Section 25(1) states that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
Section 25 does not provide an exhaustive list of interests that qualify as property. 
The only interpretative guideline provided in section 25 is that property is not limited 
to land (section 25(4)). There is no standard international guideline or formulation 
that can be relied on to determine the meaning of property.11 By stating that no one 
may be arbitrarily deprived of “property”, the provision allows for the development of 
the notion of property beyond the traditional conceptions of property. Therefore, the 
notion of property for the purposes of section 25 is robust and not limited to 
traditional private law ideas of property. Both objects and rights can qualify for 
protection under section 25.12 Some rights, such as the right of access to housing13 
and socio-economic rights like pensions14 will not pose a problem if they are not 
included in the notion of property because they are protected by other sections in the 
Constitution. In other jurisdictions, constitutional provisions do not specifically protect 
these rights so their protection becomes an issue.15  
The Constitutional Court adopted a normative approach to the interpretation of 
property in section 25 in the decisions of First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
                                            
11 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 72. 
12 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. 
13 Section 26. 
14 Section 27. 
15 See 2 2 2, 2 2 3 and 3 2 2 above. 
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Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd v 
Minister of Finance16 and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive 
Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern 
Cape.17 In FNB, Ackermann J held that the subsections of section 25 must not be 
construed in isolation.18 Each subsection must be construed in the context of the 
other subsections and their historical context as well as in the context of the 
Constitution as a whole.19 Furthermore, the purpose of section 25 must be seen as 
both protecting existing private property rights as well as serving the public interest, 
including land reform, and also as striking a proportionate balance between these 
two functions.20 Ackermann J regarded it as practically impossible to lay down a 
comprehensive definition of property and that it is judicially unwise to attempt to do 
so.21  
In his majority judgment in Shoprite, Froneman J placed the property inquiry 
within a normative constitutional framework, stating that the fundamental values of 
dignity, equality and freedom necessitate a conception of property that allows for 
individual self-fulfilment in the holding of property and recognises that the holding of 
property also carries with it a social obligation to not harm the public good.22 Based 
on this approach, the strength of the protection afforded to a particular interest as 
                                            
16 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
17 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
18 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 49. 
19 Para 49. 
20 Para 50. 
21 Para 51. 
22 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 50.  
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property depends on the extent to which this interest promotes the fundamental 
rights of dignity, equaity and freedom.   
Rautenbach argues that a few aspects of Froneman J’s approach to the 
property issue in this case are unclear.23 Firstly, Froneman J’s establishment of a 
link between the right to property and other rights such as human dignity and the 
right to choose a vocation is inconsistent with section 8(2) of the Constitution.24 
Juristic persons, such as Shoprite in this case, cannot be the beneficiaries of certain 
rights in the Bill of Rights, including the right to human dignity. To resolve this 
inconsistency, Froneman J argued that if the grocer’s wine licence could objectively 
be regarded as constitutional property in the hands of a natural person and the 
legislation regulating that licence also applies to juristic persons, the absence of a 
link to these other rights does not preclude a grocer’s wine licence belonging to a 
juristic person from being recognised as constitutional property as well. 25  This 
solution has the effect of elevating legislative provisions to a higher status than 
constitutional provisions because, while ordinary legislation may provide for more 
entitlements than the Constitution, those entitlements are not protected by the 
Constitution.26 The problem with Froneman J’s analysis is that it starts with the link 
between property and other rights as an essential characteristic of constitutional 
                                            
23 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 826.  
See further Marais EJ “Expanding the contours of the constitutional property concept” 2016 TSAR 
576-592 at 583-588. 
24 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 826. 
25 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 61. See further 
Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 826. 
26 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 826. 
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property, a problem that does not arise when one considers property as a stand 
alone right.27  
Secondly, it is unclear whether Froneman J intended that the existence of this 
link between property and other constitutional rights and values is essential for the 
recognition of constitutional property.28 Marais argues that the crux of the problem 
with this linking of the right to property with other fundamental rights is that it 
collapses the threshold issues (whether the affected interest can be regarded as 
constitutional property) with the justification issue (whether the deprivation satisfies 
the relevant requirements of section 25(1)).29 This link is also referred to in the 
context of determining the “level of judicial scrutiny”30 and the “level of constitutional 
protection”.31 Rautenbach argues that it is “one thing to determine whether protection 
should be afforded at all by looking at the link with other rights and values, and quite 
another to take such a link into account in determining “the level of protection”.32   
Both of these normative approaches emphasise that section 25 does not exist 
in a vacuum and therefore cannot be interpreted in isolation. It must be interpreted in 
light of all of its subsections as well as in context of the Constitution as a whole. 
Froneman J’s normative approach in Shoprite goes further than Ackermann J’s in 
                                            
27 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 826. 
28 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 827. 
29 Marais EJ “Expanding the contours of the constitutional property concept” 2016 TSAR 576-592 at 
583. 
30 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 69. See further 
Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 827. 
31 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 50. See further 
Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 827. 
32 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 827. 
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FNB in that it directly links the protection of property to the promotion of other 
fundamental rights in the Constitution, such as dignity, equality and freedom. This 
approach creates a problem for the protection of the property by juristic persons 
because juristic persons cannot be the beneficiaries of certain fundamental rights, 
like dignity, equality and freedom. This appears to mean that the property of juristic 
persons will be given the weakest possible protection, assuming it is protected at all. 
Generally, the Constitutional Court develops the notion of property for the 
purposes of section 25 incrementally, which means that new interests are included 
under the concept of property over time and on a case by case basis. 33 Interests 
considered property for the purposes of section 25 include corporeal movables,34 
land,35 as well as limited real rights in land. In Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions 
CC36 the Western Cape High Court interpreted “property” in a purposive manner and 
decided that it should be read to include any right to, or in property. It held that 
restrictive conditions have the character of registered praedial servitudes37  and 
concluded that restrictive conditions, like registered praedial servitudes, are real 
rights and thus constitute property under section 25. Therefore, any removal or 
deletion of these conditions constitutes a deprivation of property that must comply 
                                            
33 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. Ackermann J did not 
attempt to set out a comprehensive definition of property, saying that this would be practically 
impossible and judicially unwise. Without a conclusive definition of property, it will have to be 
determined in each case whether the interest in question is property for the purposes of section 25. 
34 Para 51. 
35 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. Furthermore section 
25(4)(b) states that property is not limited to land, which implies that land, at the very least, is included 
in the concept of property for the purposes of section 25. 
36 Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) paras 4-6, 19. 
37 Para 4. 
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with the requirements of section 25(1).38 Based on this decision, all limited real 
rights, including both praedial and personal servitudes,39 real security rights40 and 
registered long-term leases would be recognised as property under section 25.41 In 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd,42 the majority held 
that the legislation in question creates a public servitude over the land of those 
affected by the legislation.43 Therefore, this public servitude would also be regarded 
as property under section 25. In Du Toit v Minister of Transport44 the Constitutional 
Court concluded that a right to temporarily use land to create a quarry pit to excavate 
gravel for the purposes of the construction of a public road had been expropriated.45 
Based on this decision, a right to use land is considered property for the purposes of 
section 25.  
Mineral rights are also recognised as property under section 25. Lebowa 
Mineral Trust Beneficiaries Forum v Government of the RSA46 is worth mentioning, 
although it is not a Constitutional Court decision. This case concerned mineral rights. 
The High Court held that if the drafters of the Constitution intended to protect mineral 
rights, they would have done so expressly as in other jurisdictions. Since mineral 
rights are not protected explicitly, no right in the Bill of Rights had been infringed or 
                                            
38 Para 19. 
39 National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 (2) SA 157 (SCA). 
40 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
41 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 140. 
42 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC). 
43 Paras 102-104. 
44 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
45 Para 54. 
46 Lebowa Mineral Trust Beneficiaries Forum v Government of the RSA 2002 (1) BCLR 27 (T); Van 
der Vyver JD “Nationalisation of mineral rights in South Africa” (2012) 45 De Jure 126-143 at 132. 
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threatened.47 However, Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy48 also concerned 
mineral rights, and the alleged expropriation of those rights by the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act. 49  The Constitutional Court held that 
sterilisation of minerals is not dependent on the state’s conferment of the right to 
mine. It stems from mineral ownership and it is undoubtedly property with economic 
value.50 The property interest in this case was the entitlement of a landowner or 
mineral rights holder to sterilise the minerals by not exploiting them. On the basis of 
this decision, intangible property in the form of mineral rights is therefore regarded as 
property for the purposes of section 25.  
Intellectual property is another category of intangible property that is 
recognised as property under section 25. In Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v 
Gründlingh,51 the Constitutional Court accepted that the applicant’s right (the right of 
a company, licensed to operate totalisator betting, to its own published results or 
totalisator dividends) is either goodwill or intellectual property and that this right is 
property for the purposes of section 25, though this right is not absolute.52 Laugh it 
Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International 53  concerned the alleged infringement of a registered 
trademark. The Constitutional Court appeared to simply accept that trademarks 
                                            
47 Paras 9-11. 
48 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
49 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 21 of 2002. 
50 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 44. 
51 Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Gründlingh 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC). 
52 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 154-155; Phumelela Gaming and 
Leisure Ltd v Gründlingh 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC) paras 36-42.  
53 Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark 
International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). 
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qualify as property for the purposes of section 25. These two decisions confirm that 
intellectual property is regarded as property under section 25. 
Certain rights are also regarded as property for the purposes of section 25. In 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 54  the Constitutional Court held that the 
recognition of the right to restitution of money paid, based on unjustified enrichment, 
as property under section 25(1) is both logical and realistic and would be in 
accordance with developments in other jurisdictions where personal rights have 
been recognised as constitutional property.55 The importance of intangible property 
in modern-day society means that the concept of property should not be construed 
so narrowly as to diminish the worth of the protection provided by section 25(1).56 
Therefore, an enrichment claim falls within the scope of section 25.57 In Cool Ideas 
1186 CC v Hubbard,58 the Constitutional Court confirmed that the right of restitution 
of money paid based on unjustified enrichment constitutes property for the purposes 
of section 25(1).59    
                                            
54 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). For a more in-depth discussion of this 
case see Brits R “Arbitrary deprivation of unregistered credit provider’s right to claim restitution of 
performance rendered: Opperman v Boonzaaier (24887/2010) 2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) and 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC)” (2013) 16 PELJ 422-470 at 434-441; 
Marais EJ “The constitutionality of section 89(6)(c) of the National Credit Act under the property 
clause: National Credit Regulator v Opperman & Others” (2014) 131 SALJ 215-233 at 217-222; Van 
der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” 2012 ASSAL 182-199 at 183-187; Van der Walt AJ 
“Constitutional property law” 2014 ASSAL 195-215 at 196. 
55 Para 63. 
56 Para 63. 
57 Para 64.  
58 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC). 
59 Para 38. 
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Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport60 dealt with the 
constitutionality of section 89(5)(b) of the National Credit Act (NCA).61 The applicant, 
Chevron, extended credit to the respondent, Wilson, for the purchase of petroleum 
products. In 2008, the respondent contested the accuracy of the applicant’s billing. In 
2010, the applicant brought suit against the respondent for payment of the 
outstanding balance.62 The applicant acknowledged that it was not registered as a 
credit provider as required by the NCA. Therefore, the credit agreement between the 
applicant and the respondent was an unlawful agreement in terms of section 40(4) of 
the NCA and void to the extent provided for in section 89 of the NCA.63 If a credit 
agreement is unlawful in terms of section 89, section 89(5)(a) states that a court 
must declare the agreement void from the date it was entered into. Section 89(5)(b) 
states that a court must order that the credit provider, the applicant in this case, must 
refund to the consumer any money paid by the consumer under the unlawful 
agreement, with interest.64 The Constitutional Court held that the property involved in 
this case was the actual money already paid to the applicant by the respondent and 
that money in hand constitutes a property interest protected by section 25.65   
In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for 
Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape,66 the 
Constitutional Court had to determine whether a grocer’s wine licence constituted 
property for the purposes of section 25. The majority judgment of Froneman J and 
                                            
60 Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport [2015] ZACC 15, 5 June 2015. 
61 National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
62 Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport [2015] ZACC 15, 5 June 2015 para 5. 
63 Para 6. 
64 Para 7. 
65 Para 16. 
66 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
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the minority judgment of Madlanga J found that this licence is property for the 
purposes of section 25.67 Therefore, a grocers wine licence is property in terms of 
section 25.  
As is evident from the discussion above, the Constitutional Court recognises a 
wide variety of interests as constituting property for the purposes of section 25(1). 
These include immovable property in the form of land, limited real rights in land, 
movable property such as vehicles, intellectual property, a claim for the restitution of 
money paid based on unjustified enrichment and a liquor licence. The Court makes 
use of an incremental approach to defining property for the purposes of section 25, 
meaning the concept of property for constitutional purposes is developed on a case 
by case basis. The decision to not exhaustively define the concept of property, the 
incremental approach to the recognition of new interests as constitutional property 
and the wide interpretation of property is similar to the approach followed in German 
and US law68 and the ECHR.69  
 
5 3 Distinction between deprivation and expropriation  
5 3 1 Introduction 
Section 25 refers to both deprivation and expropriation of property. Deprivation of 
property is regulated by section 25(1) and expropriation by section 25(2). By 
                                            
67 Paras 70 and 150 respectively. Madlanga J disagreed with the Froneman J’s majority judgment 
regarding the issue of property, saying that the majority judgment’s approach of linking the protection 
of property to the fulfilment of other fundamental rights waters down the potency of the right to 
property to the point where the right to property becomes secondary to other rights such as human 
dignity and freedom of trade, occupation and profession. 
68 See 2 2 2 and 2 2 3 above. 
69 See 3 2 2 above. 
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regulating deprivation and expropriation in different subsections, section 25 provides 
a strong textual basis for the distinction between deprivation and expropriation. The 
Constitutional Court initially adopted a subset approach to this distinction, describing 
these notions as two distinct categories of interference with property with the 
narrower category of expropriation being included in the wider category of 
deprivations. 70  However, subsequent decisions by the Court have created 
uncertainty regarding whether the subset approach to this distinction is still followed. 
Some decisions like Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset 
v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the 
Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng71 threatened to 
cause uncertainty regarding the Court’s approach to the distinction but ultimately had 
no such effect. Other decisions, for instance Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v 
City of Cape Town72 and City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa 
(Pty) Ltd73 have created uncertainty regarding which approach the Court follows in 
distinguishing these notions. 
   
                                            
70 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
71 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
72 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC). 
73 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 222 
5 3 2 Terminology  
In First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance,74 the Constitutional 
Court interpreted the term “deprivation” in section 25(1) widely so that “[i]n a certain 
sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property 
[…]” would be included in the meaning of deprivation.75 Therefore, “deprivation” 
encompasses all forms of interference with property with “expropriation” being a 
specific form of interference that is included in the larger category of deprivation.76 
This wide interpretation of deprivation seemed to be restricted in Mkontwana v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng.77 It was held that the existence of a deprivation 
“[…] depends on the extent of the interference with or the limitation of use, 
enjoyment or exploitation [and] at the very least, substantial interference or limitation 
that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an 
open and democratic society would amount to deprivation.” 78 This new definition of 
deprivation looked as though it would diminish the clarity brought about by FNB. 
However, this was not the case because this new definition was not applied in 
subsequent decisions.  
                                            
74 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
75 Para 57. 
76 Para 57. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property 3rd ed (2011) 203-204. 
77 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
78 Para 32. 
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Regarding expropriation, a claimant must “establish that the state has acquired 
the substance or the core content of what it was deprived of” to prove 
expropriation.79 Therefore, an interference with property that does not involve the 
state acquiring the property will be regarded as a deprivation of property, rather than 
expropriation. Once state acquisition has been established, the interference will 
constitute expropriation.80 It appears from these decisions of the Constitutional Court 
that deprivation and expropriation refer to two distinct types of interferences with 
property.  
Whereas deprivation refers to any interference with property that does not 
involve the state acquiring the property, expropriation refers to the narrow category 
of interferences with property where the state acquires the property for a public 
purpose or in the public interest against payment of compensation. The state does 
not usually pay compensation for an interference with property that amounts to a 
deprivation. Only expropriations must be compensated according to section 25(2). 
Therefore, the term “deprivation” in section 25(1) is understood to mean the 
regulation of property in terms of the police power principle. 81  The term 
“expropriation” in section 25(2) is in turn understood to mean interferences that result 
in the acquisition of property by the state for a public purpose or in the public interest 
and must always be compensated.      
  
                                            
79 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 58. 
80 Clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill of 2015 (B4D-2015) defines expropriation as the compulsory 
acquisition of property by an expropriating authority or an organ of state upon request to an 
expropriating authority.  
81  Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 33; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 213-215. 
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5 3 2 Characteristics 
The decision of Harksen v Lane NO82 dealt with the distinction between deprivation 
and expropriation in terms of section 28 of the Interim Constitution. 83 Goldstone J 
stated that expropriation involves the acquisition of rights in property by a public 
authority for a public purpose, while deprivation of rights in property falls short of 
such acquisition.84 According to Van der Walt,85 the Constitutional Court in Harksen 
assumed that the distinction between deprivation and expropriation was categorical 
in the sense that they are distinct entities with characteristics that distinguish them 
from each other clearly and exhaustively. Furthermore, this conceptual dichotomy 
means that any state interference with property has to be either deprivation or 
expropriation, with no room for grey areas in between. Moreover, a prospective 
litigant would have to choose between these two forms of interferences and argue 
either on the grounds of an unconstitutional expropriation or that there was an 
unconstitutional deprivation. By implication, the Court would not consider the other 
option of its own accord. On the basis of this categorical approach, the Court based 
the distinction on permanent acquisition of property by the state: if the property is not 
acquired by the state, or if the acquisition is not permanent, there is no 
expropriation.86 This approach to the distinction does not allow for any overlap at all 
                                            
82 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). See further Van der Walt AJ & Botha H “Coming to 
grips with the new constitutional order: Critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO” (1998) 13 SAPL 
17-41 at 19-26. 
83 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
84 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 33. 
85 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 339-340 
86 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 339-341. See further Van der Walt AJ 
“Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and 
FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 at 862. 
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because deprivation and expropriation are kept separate and distinct, each having 
validity requirements that the other does not, much like the German approach.87  
The decision of First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance88 
introduced a significant methodological shift regarding the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation and resolved much of the initial uncertainty 
surrounding section 25 of the Final Constitution.89 Regarding the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation, Ackermann J stated that: 
 “In a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in 
the property concerned. If section 25 is applied to this wide genus of interference, 
‘deprivation’ would encompass all species thereof and ‘expropriation’ would apply only to 
a narrower species of interference.”90 
The FNB methodology centres on the fact that expropriation is viewed as a subset of 
deprivation.91 Van der Walt explains that if expropriation is regarded as a subset of 
                                            
87 See 2 3 3 above. 
88 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
89 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 203. See further Roux T “Property” in 
Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 
46 at 2-5; Van der Walt AJ “Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the 
Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 
at 867-875; Marais EJ “When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An 
analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 PELJ 2983-3031 at 
2984-2985. 
90 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57.  
91 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 341. See further Van der Walt AJ 
“Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and 
FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 at 867; Van der Walt AJ “Retreating 
from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; 
Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and 
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deprivation, the section 25(1) test for deprivation also applies to expropriation, in 
addition to the more specific requirements in section 25(2) and (3). On this basis, an 
investigation into the constitutional validity of any limitation of property should always 
start with the requirements in section 25(1).92 This is a serious departure from the 
conceptual understanding of the distinction between deprivation and expropriation 
explained in Harksen. The difference between these two decisions is that the FNB 
methodology postpones the distinction between deprivation and expropriation to a 
later stage in the process; in many cases it may not even feature at all.93 
This results from the fact that the Constitutional Court in FNB followed an 
approach of a smaller category (expropriations) that is wholly incorporated into a 
larger one (deprivations). Expressed differently, all expropriations are deprivations 
but not all deprivations are expropriations.94 This interpretation does not allow for a 
                                                                                                                                        
Housing, Gauteng (CC)” (2005) 123 SALJ 75-89 at 77; Marais EJ “When does state interference with 
property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition 
requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 PELJ 2983-3031 at 2985. 
92 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 341-342. See further Roux T “Property” 
in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 
46 at 3; Brits R Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National 
Credit Act (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 302; Van der Walt AJ “Striving for a better 
interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB decisions on the 
property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 at 868; Marais EJ “When does state interference with 
property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition 
requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 PELJ 2983-3031 at 2985. 
93 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 342. See further Van der Walt AJ 
“Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and 
FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 at 867. 
94 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. See further 
Van der Walt AJ “Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s 
Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 at 867; Roux T 
“Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed 
(OS 2003) ch 46 at 18; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 204; Brits R 
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grey area of overlap between deprivations and expropriation, where deprivation 
could shade into expropriation based on its effects.95 The methodology under FNB 
regarding deprivation and expropriation is to first test whether the deprivation in 
question infringes upon section 25(1). If it does, it must be determined whether the 
infringing deprivation is justified under section 36 of the Constitution, the general 
limitation clause. If it cannot be justified under section 36, the provision authorising 
the deprivation is unconstitutional. However, if the deprivation does not infringe 
section 25 or is a justified limitation, the question arises as to whether it is an 
expropriation. If the deprivation amounts to an expropriation it must satisfy the 
requirements under section 25(2)(a) and make provision for compensation in terms 
of section 25(2)(b).96  
In Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy,97 Mogoeng CJ stated that: 
“Deprivation within the context of section 25 includes extinguishing a right previously 
enjoyed, and expropriation is a subset thereof. Whereas deprivation always takes place 
when property or rights therein are either taken away or significantly interfered with, the 
same is not necessarily true of expropriation. Deprivation relates to sacrifices that 
                                                                                                                                        
Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 303; Marais EJ “When does state interference with 
property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition 
requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 PELJ 2983-3031 at 2985. 
95 Van der Walt AJ “Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional 
Court’s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 at 867. See 
further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 204. 
96 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 58-59. See further Roux T 
“Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed 
(OS 2003) ch 46 at 2-5; Brits R Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and 
the National Credit Act (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 302-303; Van der Walt AJ 
“Constitutional property law” 2013 ASSAL 216-230 at 225-230; Marais EJ “When does state 
interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state 
acquisition requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 PELJ 2983-3031 at 2985. 
97 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC).  
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holders of private property rights may have to make without compensation, whereas 
expropriation entails state acquisition of that property in the public interest and must 
always be accompanied by compensation. There is therefore more required to establish 
expropriation although there is an overlap and no bold line of demarcation between 
sections 25(1) and 25(2). Section 25(1) deals with all property and all deprivations, 
including expropriation, although additional requirements must be met for deprivation to 
rise to the level of expropriations.”98  
In this paragraph, Mogoeng CJ initially agrees with the FNB decision regarding the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation by saying that expropriation is 
included in the larger category of deprivations, but then moves to an approach that 
treats deprivation and expropriation as two discrete categories of interference, like 
the Court in Harksen did, making state acquisition the element that distinguishes 
expropriation. Mogoeng CJ then moves again from the discrete categories approach 
to one where there is an overlap between deprivation and expropriation. Saying that 
these two categories of interference overlap allows for the possibility of recognising a 
grey area where deprivation shades into expropriation. This resembles the US 
approach to this distinction and the grey area manifests itself in US law as the 
problematic category of regulatory takings. 99  Mogoeng CJ seems to say that 
expropriation is a smaller category included in the larger category of deprivation, that 
deprivation and expropriation are two discrete categories of interference and that 
there is an overlap between these two categories, which allows for the possibility of a 
grey area between them. This is contradictory because the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation cannot simultaneously allow and not allow for a grey 
area between them. The result is that it is now uncertain which approach the Court 
follows regarding the characteristics that distinguish deprivations from 
expropriations.  
                                            
98 Para 48 (footnotes omitted). 
99 See 2 3 6 above. 
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Further problems arise when Mogoeng CJ discussed the requirements that 
have to be proven in order to establish expropriation. In order for the claimant to 
prove that expropriation has taken place, it must establish that the state has acquired 
the substance or core content of what the claimant was deprived of, but the rights 
acquired by the state do not have to be exactly the same as the rights that were lost. 
While exact correlation in this regard is not required, there must be sufficient 
congruence or substantial similarity between what was lost and what was 
acquired.100 Stating that state acquisition is a requirement for expropriation brings 
some clarity but it also creates new uncertainties. Marais argues that state 
acquisition is more a consequence of expropriations validly performed pursuant to 
authorising legislation than a requirement for expropriation.101 Finally, there can be 
no expropriation in circumstances where deprivation does not result in property 
being acquired by the state.102 What is problematic, firstly, is that the yardsticks of 
“sufficient congruence” or “substantial similarity” are not defined in the judgment. 
Marais argues that focusing on the effect-based nature of the acquisition 
requirement to determine if expropriation has taken place is unable to produce 
                                            
100 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 58. See further Marais EJ 
“When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri 
SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part II)” (2015) 18 PELJ 3033-3069 at 3061. 
101 Marais EJ “When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis 
of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part II)” (2015) 18 PELJ 3033-3069 at 3061-
3062. 
102 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59. Van der Walt AJ 
“Constitutional property law” 2014 ASSAL 195-215 at 201 explains that this statement could create 
the erroneous impression that every state acquisition of property amounts to expropriation that 
requires compensation in terms of section 25(2), including for example development contributions and 
criminal forfeiture. 
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reliable results in all cases.103 Secondly, the requirement of state acquisition to 
establish expropriation raises questions relating to property expropriated by the state 
but then transferred to third parties. Based on the decision in Agri SA, it seems that 
there will be no expropriation in this situation because the state does not acquire the 
property that is transferred to third parties.104 
The decision of Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town105 
creates further uncertainty regarding the Court’s approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation. The issue in this case was whether a local authority 
that has acquired land, by operation of legislation, from a private owner in a planning 
approval process for a residential development, is obliged to pay compensation for 
the land so acquired.106 Arun (Pty) Ltd claimed compensation from the City of Cape 
Town for the value of the land that the City acquired in this manner on the ground 
that the land in question was unrelated to the normal need for the provision of public 
streets and public places for the residential development but was required for a 
future road network planned for the region as a whole.107 The Constitutional Court 
had to decide whether the legislation in question, section 28 of the Land Use 
                                            
103 Marais EJ “When does state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis 
of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part II)” (2015) 18 PELJ 3033-3069 at 3062. 
104 For an in-depth discussion of these two issues in Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 
(4) SA 1 (CC), see Marais EJ “When does state interference with property (now) amount to 
expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 
PELJ 2983-3031; Marais EJ “When does state interference with property (now) amount to 
expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state acquisition requirement (Part II)” (2015) 18 
PELJ 3033-3069. 
105 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC). See further 
Slade BV “Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development (Pty) 
Ltd v Cape Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 5; Van Wyk J “Planning and Arun’s (not so straight and 
narrow) roads” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-29 at 2-6. 
106 Para 1. 
107 Para 1. 
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Planning Ordinance (LUPO),108 vests all public streets and public spaces shown in 
an approved subdivision in the local authority with jurisdiction and if so, whether the 
property developer is entitled to compensation for land that so vests if the public 
streets and public spaces are more than the normal needs of the development and 
whether the vesting of land in the local authority amounts to expropriation.109 
The Court stated that the text of section 28 vests ownership of all public streets 
and places in the local authority without compensation, so long as the provision of 
land is within the normal needs of the development or is allowed in terms of a policy 
determined by the Premier. Therefore, the vesting of ownership without 
compensation is permissible only to cater for the normal needs of the subdivision.110 
Ownership of all land designated as public streets on the subdivision application will 
vest in the local authority, but the vesting of excess land attracts a claim for 
compensation.111 The property that is required for public streets and places vests in 
the public authority without compensation because they are integral to the 
development.112  The vesting of ownership in the local authority of excess land 
beyond the reasonable and normal needs of the development must be regarded as a 
legislative acquisition of the developer’s land without compensation, occurring by 
operation of law after confirmation of the subdivision or a part thereof. 113  The 
compulsory taking away of excess land without compensation is not properly related 
                                            
108 Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Western Cape). 
109 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) para 29. 
110 Para 31. See further Van Wyk J “Planning and Arun’s (not so straight and narrow) roads” (2016) 
19 PELJ 1-29 at 19. 
111 Para 32, referring to the minority judgment in City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development 
(Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA). 
112 Para 40. 
113 Para 40. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 232 
to the purpose of developing a township with adequate public roads and spaces.114 
Rather than declare the provision (or the use of it to acquire excess land) 
unconstitutional, the Court gave the provision a meaning that accords with section 
25(2) by stating that “excess land, properly so established, must attract 
compensation […]”.115  
The Court next considered whether the vesting of ownership in terms of section 
28 of LUPO is an expropriation. Though the issue of the distinction between a 
deprivation and an expropriation was not fully argued in this case, the Court was 
prepared to accept that an expropriation “occurs by state coercion and without the 
consent of the affected owner”.116 The Court held that section 28 requires that 
ownership of land be given over to the local authority upon the granting of a 
subdivision; this loss of ownership is compelled by law and not by the decision of the 
local authority; a land developer would know from the start of the process for 
rezoning and subdivision that it has to give up the public streets and spaces that 
comprise the normal needs of the development, but not those that are not 
reasonably required for the normal needs of the development.117 The Court held that, 
to the extent that section 28 vests public places and streets beyond the normal need 
arising from a particular subdivision, the owner of the land may claim for 
compensation. 118  Furthermore, section 28 does not authorise any deprivation 
beyond the normal needs and it follows that any deprivation beyond the normal 
                                            
114 Para 40. 
115 Para 41. 
116 Para 58. The Court also cited with approval the definition of expropriation in the minority judgment 
of City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA) para 40, which 
defined expropriation as “the compulsory deprivation of ownership or rights usually by a public 
authority for a public purpose”.   
117 Para 59. 
118 Para 59. 
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needs would take place outside of legislative authority and would therefore be 
arbitrary.119  The Court concluded that under section 28 an ex lege transfer of 
ownership occurs and that transfer has the same effect as an expropriation.120 The 
recognition of an interference with property having the same effect as an 
expropriation is not possible under a categorical approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation. Therefore, this decision creates uncertainty as to 
whether the Court actually follows a categorical approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation apparently adopted in Agri SA.  
Further uncertainty is created by the majority decision in City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd.121 This case concerned licences 
issued under the Electronic Communications Act (ECA).122 These licences entitle the 
holder to construct an electronic communications network or facility on the land of 
another person.123 The main issue in this case was whether these licences permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property. In a decision written by Cameron J and Froneman 
J, the Court held that the granting of an electronic communications service licence in 
terms of the ECA creates a public servitude, a type of servitude granted by force of 
law and not by consent between the parties and that this type of servitude rebuts the 
challenge to the validity of the impugned provisions of the ECA.124 The question to 
be answered regarding the validity of the impugned provisions is what the common 
law position is if the owner of the servient property is confronted with a servitude 
                                            
119 Para 60. 
120 Para 73. 
121 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC). 
122 Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 (as amended by the Electronic Communications 
Amendment Act 37 of 2007 and the Electronic Communications Amendment Act 1 of 2014). 
123 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC) para 2. 
124 Paras 104-109. 
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created by law.125 The common law provides flexible and equitable principles that 
protect the servient owner and therefore section 22 does not inflict arbitrary 
deprivation of property. 126  Section 22 could be read as authorising arbitrary 
deprivation if the licence holders, in terms of section 22(1), are allowed to exercise 
their rights granted pursuant to the licence in any manner that they choose. To avoid 
this interpretation, the majority held that section 22 creates a public servitude that 
must be exercised in terms of servitude law; therefore the deprivation is not 
arbitrary.127 The Court raised the issue of a public servitude mero motu, as none of 
the parties raised this point in argument before the Court. It also remarked that 
servitudes imposed by law without the consent of the landowner are treated as a 
kind of expropriation and must be compensated.128 Herein lies the difficulty with the 
decision in terms of the distinction between deprivation and expropriation. No 
explanation was given in this decision as to what kind of expropriation this is or why 
it is possible to recognise different kinds of expropriation. This does not seem to be 
possible because state acquisition is required for expropriation and this public 
servitude does not transfer any property to the state. Treating an interference with 
property as a kind of expropriation contradicts the categorical approach to the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation. The Court again does not follow 
the apparent categorical approach adopted in Agri SA and this creates uncertainty 
regarding how the distinction between deprivation and expropriation is approached in 
South African law.     
                                            
125 Para 110. 
126 Para 110. 
127 Para 127. 
128 Para 149, referring to Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) at 677H. 
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In FNB, the Court adopted a subset approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation. Deprivation was interpreted widely as any interference 
with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property with expropriation being a 
narrower category of interference that is included in the larger category of 
deprivations. Some decisions since FNB have created uncertainty about this 
distinction, especially Arun and City of Tshwane, while others seemed to but ended 
up not having that effect like Mkontwana. Some decisions managed to bring some 
clarity to issues left open by the Court in FNB, but also created new uncertainties. 
Agri SA is an example of that. The Court appears to view the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation as two categories with state acquisition required for 
expropriation. However, the possibility of an interference with property that does not 
satisfy the state acquisition requirement being regarded as a kind of expropriation is 
also recognised. Such recognition may indicate that the approach to the distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation has shifted again to the view that these two 
forms of interference overlap but the Court did not expressly state this in either Arun 
or City of Tshwane. For now, the end result seems to be that deprivation and 
expropriation are viewed as two distinct categories of interferences with property with 
state acquisition as a requirement for expropriation. On the continuum between the 
German and US law approaches to this distinction, the South African law approach 
appears to be closer to the German law approach.129  
 
5 3 3 Public purpose/public interest 
Section 25(2) of the Constitution states that property may be expropriated for a 
public purpose or in the public interest. Section 25(4)(a) further provides that for the 
                                            
129 See 2 3 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 236 
purposes of section 25, “public interest” includes the nation’s commitment to land 
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural 
resources.130 Van der Walt argues that this requirement may end up playing a 
relatively insignificant role in constitutional property cases dealing with expropriation 
if Roux’s prediction regarding the “telescoping” effect of the FNB case comes to pass 
and all property issues are decided on the basis of the arbitrary deprivation test.131 
However, it remains necessary to examine how this requirement will most likely be 
interpreted should courts be confronted by it. 
In the pre-constitutional era, public purpose was interpreted in both a narrow 
sense and a broad sense. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in 
Administrator, Transvaal v J van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd132 distinguished 
between expropriation in the public interest and expropriation for a public purpose.133 
Van der Walt explains that expropriation in the public interest could accommodate a 
lenient interpretation that would allow for expropriation for purposes other than actual 
state or public use and that expropriations for a public purpose would not allow 
                                            
130 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 458 argues that the possibility that the 
public purpose requirement will be interpreted so narrowly as to frustrate expropriations for land 
reform purposes can probably be discounted. See further Eisenberg A “’Public purpose’ and 
expropriation: Some comparative insights and the South African bill of rights”  (1995) 11 SAJHR 207-
221 at 208-209; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 33. 
131 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 458-459 explains that, if this is the 
case, “issues about the public purpose of an expropriation might perhaps never come to the court’s 
attention in terms of section 25(2), as they would be decided at an earlier stage as arbitrary 
deprivation issues in terms of section 25(1)”. See further Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 2-5. 
132 Administrator, Transvaal v J van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
133 At 660I-661I. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 461; Slade BV 
The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 2012) 33-35. 
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expropriations for purposes other than actual state or public use.134 In any given 
case during this time, the approach the courts would follow was dictated by the 
wording of the statutory provision that authorised the expropriation. Therefore, 
depending on the wording of the authorising statute and the context, the courts were 
willing to follow either a more lenient approach that corresponds with the wider 
notion of public interest or a narrow approach that corresponds with the notion of 
public purpose.135 
In the constitutional era, the public purpose requirement can be said to serve a 
dual function, firstly to control the justification and authority for expropriations, and 
secondly to ensure that the ordinary functioning of the property clause in protecting 
property does not frustrate or impede expropriations that constitute a part of land or 
similar reforms to which the Constitution has committed itself. 136  This dual 
interpretation of the public purpose requirement is incorporated within a lenient 
                                            
134 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 461. See further Eisenberg A “’Public 
purpose’ and expropriation: Some comparative insights and the South African bill of rights” (1995) 11 
SAJHR 207-221 at 201; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg 2nd ed (2001) 95; Nginase XH The Meaning of 
“Public Purpose” and “Public Interest” in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (LLM thesis Stellenbosch 
University 2009) 27; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 35; Slade BV “’Public purpose or public interest’ and third 
party transfers” (2014) 17 PELJ 167-206 at 183. 
135 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 461. See further Nginase XH The 
Meaning of “Public Purpose” and “Public Interest” in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 2009) 27; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic 
Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2012) 36.  
136 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 
3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 2-5. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 459; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 48; Slade BV “The less invasive means argument in expropriation law” 
2013 TSAR 199-216 at 199; Slade BV “Less invasive means: The relationship between sections 25 
and 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Hoops B, Marais EJ, Mostert H, 
Sluysmans JAMA & Verstappen LCA (eds) Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in 
Expropriation (2015) 331-347 at 331. 
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approach; an approach that does not involve complete deference to legislative or 
executive decisions regarding the public purpose of expropriation nor frustrates land 
reform. 137  
A problematic area with regard to the public purpose requirement in South 
African law is that of the transfer of expropriated property to others, specifically those 
involving transfers of property to other private parties. The Appellate Division in Van 
Streepen held that the expropriation of property for the benefit of a third party cannot 
be considered a public purpose, but since the third party’s business in that case was 
important to the public, it was accepted under the ambit of public interest and 
declared valid.138 Similarly, in Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the 
Maluti-a-Phofung Municipality139 the High Court accepted that the expropriation of 
property for the benefit of a third party could not be for a public purpose. However, 
the court stated further that it could qualify as a valid act of expropriation if it could be 
“brought within the realm of an act performed in the public interest”.140 Slade argues 
that, on the basis of these decisions, the public purpose cannot justify an 
expropriation that is undertaken for the sole benefit of a third party. Furthermore, 
expropriations undertaken for the sole benefit of third parties must be distinguished 
                                            
137 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 460. See further Slade BV The 
Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
2012) 49.  
138  Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 51. See further Slade BV “’Public purpose or public interest’ and third 
party transfers” (2014) 17 PELJ 167-206 at 187. 
139  Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-a-Phofung Municipality [2010] 
ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010.   
140 Para 5 2. See further Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 282-
287; Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 51; Slade BV “’Public purpose or public interest’ and third party 
transfers” (2014) 17 PELJ 167-206 at 187. 
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from situations where the expropriated property is transferred to a third party in order 
to enable the third party to realise or achieve a public purpose.141 In Offit Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd142  the Supreme Court of 
Appeal stated that  
“[t]he expropriation of land in order to enable a private developer to construct low-cost 
housing is as much an expropriation for public purposes as it would be if the municipality 
or province had undertaken the task itself, using the same contractors. I do not think it 
can be said in our modern conditions and having regard to the Constitution that an 
expropriation can never be for a public purpose merely because the ultimate owner of 
the land after expropriation will be a private individual or company.”143  
Slade states that, when property is expropriated and subsequently transferred to a 
third party to realise a public purpose, the expropriation and subsequent transfer will 
be for a public purpose and the mere fact that the property is transferred to a third 
party will not automatically invalidate the expropriation.144 Van der Walt explains that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Offit indicates that South Africa would 
follow the international trends on the public purpose requirement in the context of 
third party transfers of expropriated property.145  
The South African approach to the public purpose requirement seems to be 
based less on deference, thus more strict than the US approach, but is not as strict 
                                            
141  Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 51. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 490; Slade BV “’Public purpose or public interest’ and third party transfers” (2014) 17 PELJ 
167-206 at 187. 
142 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
143 Para 15. 
144  Slade BV The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 2012) 51-52. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 490-492; Slade BV “’Public purpose or public interest’ and third party transfers” (2014) 17 
PELJ 167-206 at 187.  
145 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 464-465. 
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in its application as the German approach, because of the reform commitments of 
section 25. The South African approach seems to sit in the middle of the US total 
deference approach and the strict German approach.146 
 
5 3 4 Compensation 
Section 25(2) of the South African Constitution requires that just and equitable 
compensation be paid for the expropriation of property; those affected by the 
expropriation must agree on the amount, time and manner of payment of the 
compensation or these factors must be decided or approved by a court. Section 
25(3) states that the amount, time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all the relevant circumstances including, 
but not limited to, the factors listed in section 25(3)(a)-(e). The factors are the current 
use of the property; the history of the acquisition and use of the property; the market 
value of the property; the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and the purpose of 
the expropriation.  
The time and manner of payment of compensation should be just an equitable, 
taking into account all relevant circumstances. Prompt payment of compensation 
would usually follow an expropriation, but sections 25(2) and 25(3) do allow for 
delayed payment of compensation in circumstances where this would be just and 
                                            
146 See 2 3 4 above.  
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equitable.147 In Haffejee NO v eThekwini Municipality148 the Constitutional Court held 
that section 25 does not require that the amount of compensation always be 
determined prior to expropriation taking place. While prior compensation may be 
required in certain circumstances, such circumstances were not present in this case 
and thus the subsequent determination of compensation was deemed to be just and 
equitable. A determination of the amount of compensation under section 25 requires 
a “contextualised judgment with due regard for individual property interests and for 
the history of land rights in the pre-constitutional era, the new constitutional 
framework and the legitimate land reform efforts of the state”.149 Van der Walt 
explains that “[w]hat is adjudged just and equitable has to reflect the sensitivity of 
that context and cannot simply be based on [an] abstract value attached to the 
property in question”.150  The South African just and equitable approach to the 
determination of compensation required in section 25(3) is very similar to Article 14.3 
of the German Basic Law, which requires that an equitable balance be reflected 
between the interests of those affected and the public interest.151 
The payment of just and equitable compensation is a factor that can be used to 
distinguish between deprivations and expropriations of property because it is a 
requirement for expropriations but not deprivations. Therefore, deprivations are 
                                            
147 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 
3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 35. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed 
(2011) 509. 
148 Haffejee NO v eThekwini Municipality 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC). 
149 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 509. 
150 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 509-510. See further Budlender G “The 
constitutional protection of property rights” in Budlender G, Latsky J & Roux T (eds) Juta’s New Land 
Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 48-55, 57; Du Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the 
Constitution (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2009) 99-100. 
151 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 510. See further 2 3 5 above; Eisenberg 
A “Different constitutional formulations for compensation clauses” (1993) 9 SAJHR 412-421 at 421. 
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usually not compensated but expropriations are.152  However, it is possible that 
expropriation without compensation may be justifiable under section 36 of the 
Constitution.153  
 
5 3 5 Excessive deprivation 
The South African Constitutional Court adopted what has been described as an 
“oversimplified categorical distinction”154 between deprivation and expropriation in its 
Harksen 155  decision. However, in its FNB 156  decision, the Court replaced this 
approach with a methodology that subverts the categorical distinction.157 Van der 
Walt points out that both the categorical distinction formulated in Harksen and the 
subset-approach proposed in FNB seem to exclude the possibility of recognising a 
grey area between deprivation and expropriation.158 However, there is still no clarity 
as to whether South African constitutional property law recognises the notion of 
constructive expropriation. An example of an area where the notion of constructive 
expropriation should never arise is taxation.159 Van der Walt argues that, while 
                                            
152 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 196. 
153 Nhlabati v Fick 2003 (7) BCLR 806 (LCC), where it was held that even if the provision resulted in 
expropriation without compensation, this outcome would be justified in terms of section 36(1). 
However, the Court did not decide that expropriation took place. See further Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 274, 297-299. 
154 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 347. 
155 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
156 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
157 Para 57. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 347. 
158 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 347. See further Roux T “Property” in 
Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 
46 at 33; Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action 
(LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 105. 
159 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 347-349. 
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taxation appears to be both a deprivation and an expropriation of property, it would 
be senseless to think of taxation as a limitation that could be rectified by the payment 
of compensation. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a law imposing or enforcing 
an unfair or excessive tax will successfully found a claim for compensation under the 
expropriation clause: such a law will most likely be declared unconstitutional 
because it amounts to an arbitrary deprivation and therefore is invalid.160 According 
to Agri SA, state acquisition of the property in question must be established in order 
to prove expropriation. This state acquisition requirement implies a categorical 
approach to the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, meaning that 
each form of interference is a distinct category and they do not overlap. A categorical 
approach does not allow for the recognition of a notion like constructive expropriation 
because the interference must be either a deprivation or an expropriation. If the 
interference does not fit into one of these categories, it is unconstitutional. On the 
basis of the FNB and Agri SA decisions, constructive expropriation seems to be 
inappropriate in South African law.161  However, certain statutes do provide for 
compensation for excessive regulation of property.162 These instances of excessive 
regulation are not expropriations and the compensation awarded is not expropriatory 
                                            
160 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 347-348. 
161 Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 211. See further Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T 
& Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 33; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 347. 
162 For examples see Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory 
State Action (LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 210-231; Minister of Agriculture v 
Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd 2008 (5) SA 522 (SCA).  
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in nature. These statutes provide for equalisation-type measures, often monetary in 
nature, similar to the approach in German law.163    
However, the Arun and City of Tshwane decisions complicate the question of 
accepting the notion of constructive expropriation in the context of excessive 
deprivations. In these decisions, as well in the Agri SA decision, the Court was 
willing to treat a statutory interference with private property as expropriation and 
therefore bypassing the section 25(1) analysis and heading directly into the 
expropriation analysis based on section 25(2)-(3),164 in circumstances where the 
legislation involved did not clearly state the intention or the authority to expropriate 
and where it must have been questionable whether expropriation was indeed 
possible and legitimate.165 It is not clear that judicially bypassing the deprivation 
inquiry and moving straight into the expropriation inquiry is jurisprudentially wise or 
even doctrinally possible in these instances.166  
The Arun decision raises the question of what kind of expropriation, if 
expropriation was even applicable at all, was being compensated for.167 One option 
is that the Court wanted to award compensation for statutory expropriation. Statutory 
expropriation involves the promulgation of a law that brings about expropriation of 
                                            
163 See 2 3 5 above. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 276; 
Bezuidenhout K Compensation for Excessive but Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 2015) 212. 
164 Van der Walt AJ “Section 25 vortices (Part 2)” 2016 TSAR (forthcoming November 2016) at 46. 
165 Van der Walt AJ “Section 25 vortices (Part 2)” 2016 TSAR (forthcoming November 2016) at 46. 
166 Van der Walt AJ “Section 25 vortices (Part 2)” 2016 TSAR (forthcoming November 2016) at 46. 
167 Slade BV “Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development 
(Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 18. 
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certain property automatically, without any administrative or judicial intervention.168 
However, the question remains whether statutory expropriation can or should be 
recognised in South African law.169 Section 25(2) weighs against the recognition of 
statutory expropriation because it states that property may only be expropriated in 
terms of law of general application and not by law of general application.170 Slade 
argues that the alleged expropriation in Arun does not meet the requirements for 
statutory expropriation because the legislation in this case made no provision for the 
expropriation of specified properties to be effected upon its promulgation. 171 
Furthermore, the acquisition of the property in this case was caused by an 
administrative decision to approve a subdivision plan, not to expropriate. 172 
Therefore, statutory expropriation is not applicable in Arun because the property was 
not automatically transferred to the state by the promulgation of the law in question. 
Another option is that the kind of expropriation being compensated here is 
constructive expropriation. According to this notion, a deprivation that has an 
excessive or unfair effect on an individual owner is saved from invalidity due to the 
importance of the regulation by treating it as an expropriation that requires 
                                            
168  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 433. See further Slade BV 
“Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 4. 
169 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 433-436. 
170  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 434. See further Slade BV 
“Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 19. 
171 Slade BV “Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development 
(Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 19. 
172 Slade BV “Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development 
(Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 19. 
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compensation.173 The Constitutional Court never regarded the vesting of the excess 
land in the local authority as a regulatory measure, which counts against the 
recognition of constructive expropriation in this case.174 Van Wyk argues that the 
vesting of ownership of a public road in a municipality upon subdivision or township 
establishment cannot amount to an expropriation.175 Instead, this vesting amounts to 
a deprivation of property.176 This conclusion is reached after considering a number of 
factors,177 including the distinction made in conveyancing practice between vesting 
transfers, private sales and expropriation transfers and section 26(3) of the 
Expropriation Act, which states that the compensation for land declared to be a road 
by an ordinance or acquired for a road without such land being expropriated payable 
to the owner shall be calculated in terms of section 12 of the act, as if the land had 
been expropriated.     
In City of Tshwane it was held that the imposition of a public servitude is a kind 
of expropriation that must be compensated.178  The Constitutional Court did not 
elaborate on what it meant by “kind of expropriation” or what kind of expropriation 
this could be. This does not appear to be expropriation because state acquisition of 
the property is required for expropriation and there was no state acquisition in this 
case. It does not appear to be statutory expropriation either because the land was 
not transferred to the state by promulgation of the legislation in question. One 
                                            
173  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 350. See further Slade BV 
“Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 20.  
174 Slade BV “Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development 
(Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-25 at 21. 
175 Van Wyk J “Planning and Arun’s (not so straight and narrow) roads” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-29 at 19. 
176 Van Wyk J “Planning and Arun’s (not so straight and narrow) roads” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-29 at 20. 
177 Van Wyk J “Planning and Arun’s (not so straight and narrow) roads” (2016) 19 PELJ 1-29 at 19-21. 
178 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC) para 149. 
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possibility, although it was not specifically mentioned in the case is that the kind of 
expropriation in this case could be something like constructive expropriation because 
there was no legislative authority or intention to expropriate but the effect of the 
regulatory action is in fact expropriatory. 
 The Agri SA decision appears to indicate that the Court follows a categorical 
approach to the distinction between deprivation and expropriation with the 
requirement of state acquisition distinguishing expropriation from deprivation. 
Therefore, in theory, the notion of constructive should not be recognised in South 
African law. However, the Arun and City of Tshwane decisions cast doubt on 
whether this is actually the case. Both of these decisions make statements regarding 
different kinds of expropriation but under the categorical approach state acquisition is 
required to prove expropriation. Without establishing state acquisition, there is no 
expropriation. This approach does not allow for something like the notion of 
constructive expropriation. The notion of constructive expropriation is not expressly 
recognised in South African law but there is still uncertainty regarding whether it will 
perhaps be recognised in the future. 
 
5 3 6 Conclusion 
In Harksen, the Court assumed that the distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation of property was a categorical one, meaning that these two forms of 
interference with property are distinct entities with characteristics that distinguish 
them from each other clearly and exhaustively. It was held that expropriation 
involves the acquisition of rights in property by a public authority for a public 
purpose, while deprivation of rights in property falls short of such acquisition. 
Therefore, property acquired by the state for a public purpose is expropriation, while 
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any interference that does not result in acquisition of the property by the state is a 
deprivation of property. This categorical approach does not allow for any overlap 
between expropriation and deprivation, negating the possibility of recognising 
constructive expropriation.  
In FNB, the Court moved away from this categorical approach in Harksen 
towards a subset approach. According to this approach, expropriations are a smaller 
category of interferences with property that fall into the larger category of 
deprivations of property. The Court also set out a methodology for determining the 
constitutional validity of interferences with property. Since expropriations are a 
subset of deprivations, the investigation into the constitutionality of an interference 
must necessarily begin with section 25(1), which sets out the requirements for 
constitutional deprivations of property. If the interference passes scrutiny under 
section 25(1) or it is justified under section 36, then the question arises whether the 
interference is an expropriation. If the interference amounts to expropriation, it must 
pass scrutiny under section 25(2)(a) and provide for compensation under section 
25(2)(b).  
This methodology makes a notion like constructive expropriation impossible 
because a deprivation that goes too far will be declared unconstitutional under 
section 25(1) and will never reach the expropriation stage. However, subsequent 
decisions have not followed this methodology. The Court has in some cases jumped 
immediately to the expropriation inquiry in a matter without first considering whether 
the interference in question is a deprivation in terms of section 25(1). This is not very 
problematic in cases where the interference is clearly an expropriation. Agri SA 
makes it clear that the interference is an expropriation if there is state acquisition of 
the property. If state acquisition is not established, the interference is a deprivation. 
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Agri SA seemed to confirm the subset approach of FNB, but then moved back 
towards a categorical distinction and then mentioned that deprivation and 
expropriation overlap. There was no clear finding regarding this overlap. The Court 
focused its attention on the state acquisition requirement, which seems to indicate 
that it adopted a categorical distinction between deprivation and expropriation. The 
introduction of state acquisition as a requirement for expropriation has the effect of 
creating some certainty regarding the distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation and is reminiscent of the Harksen decision, in that there will be no 
expropriation where deprivation of property does not result in property being 
acquired by the state.  
In Arun, it was held that the legislation in question brought about an ex lege 
transfer of ownership that had the same effect as an expropriation and that 
compensation was therefore payable. The Court did not say that this was an 
expropriation of property but rather an interference that had the same effect as an 
expropriation. This decision creates confusion because this should not have been an 
expropriation case. The Court characterised the interference as an expropriation of 
sorts and then held that it attracted a claim for compensation. In City of Tshwane, the 
majority flirted with the notion of an interference with property that is something like 
expropriation by saying that the imposition of a public servitude is a kind of 
expropriation. Statements that interferences with property can have the same effect 
as an expropriation or are a kind of expropriation contradict the categorical 
distinction established in Agri SA. These decisions create uncertainty regarding 
which approach to the distinction between deprivation and expropriation the Court 
uses. In light of the state acquisition requirement for expropriation laid down in Agri 
SA, the approach to the distinction between deprivation and expropriation appears to 
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be, in theory, a categorical one. On the continuum between the German and US law 
approaches to this distinction, the South African law categorical approach appears to 
be closer to the German law approach.179 
  
5 4 Proportionality  
Proportionality comes into play when adjudicating the constitutional validity of 
limitations on the rights of an individual. The South African Constitution180 contains 
an express limitation clause in section 36. Section 36(1) provides that any right in the 
Bill of Rights, including the right to property, may be limited as long as such limitation 
is authorised by law of general application, and to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including: the 
nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and 
extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.181 The Constitutional Court has indicated 
that it follows a two-stage approach when inquiring into the constitutional validity of a 
statute that limits a fundamental right.182 The Court first establishes whether there 
                                            
179 See 2 3 above. 
180 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
181 Section 36(1)(a)-(e). For an in-depth discussion of these factors see Woolman S & Botha H 
“Limitations” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 2 (2nd ed 
OS 2006) ch 34 at 70-93. 
182 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). See further Woolman S & Botha H “Limitations” in 
Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 2 (2nd ed OS 2006) ch 34 
at 2-6; Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
93-97; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 74-75; Slade BV “Less invasive 
means: The relationship between sections 25 and 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
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has been an infringement of a right protected in the Bill of Rights. The matter 
proceeds to the second stage only if an affirmative answer is achieved in the first 
enquiry. Secondly, the Court establishes whether the infringement can be justified 
under section 36 of the Constitution. In the cases of an interference of the right to 
property, the interference will first be judged under the requirements of section 25. If 
the Court finds that the right has been infringed, then the proportionality test will be 
used to establish whether the infringement is justified.183  
The decision of S v Makwanyane184 dealt with the interpretation and application 
of the predecessor to section 36, namely section 33 of the Interim Constitution.185 
There are important differences between these two provisions. Section 33 required 
that limitations of certain rights had to be necessary to be valid and that such 
limitations should not negate the essential content of the right in question.186 Section 
36 no longer contains these requirements and thus they are no longer relevant. 
However, the limitation-of-rights analysis of Chaskalson P is still relevant to 
understanding section 36 of the final Constitution. In Makwanyane, Chaskalson P 
held that the “limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and 
                                                                                                                                        
Africa, 1996” in Hoops B, Marais EJ, Mostert H, Sluysmans JAMA & Verstappen LCA (eds) 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation (2015) 331-346 at 335-336. 
183 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 
3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 26; Woolman S & Botha H “Limitations” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop 
M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 2 (2nd ed OS 2006) ch 34 at 5-6; Liebenberg S Socio-
Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 94; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 74-75; Slade BV “Less invasive means: The relationship 
between sections 25 and 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Hoops B, 
Marais EJ, Mostert H, Sluysmans JAMA & Verstappen LCA (eds) Rethinking Expropriation Law I: 
Public Interest in Expropriation (2015) 331-347 at 335. 
184 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
185 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
186  Section 33(1)(a)-(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
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necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality.”187 There is no absolute standard 
that could be laid down and applied in every case. While guiding principles can be 
established, the application of those principles will depend on the circumstances of 
each case. Furthermore, Chaskalson P set out the relevant considerations to be 
taken into account when determining whether a particular limitation is reasonable 
and necessary. These considerations are now written into section 36. Finally, 
Chaskalson P emphasised that it is not the role of the courts to “second-guess the 
wisdom of policy choices made by legislators” in establishing the balance of interests 
inherent in proportionality analysis. This means, according to Van der Walt, that the 
application of the proportionality test concerns the “constitutional stability of a 
limitation and not the application of a subjective substantive due process standard in 
the sense of testing the political wisdom of a law”.188  
In FNB, the Court interpreted what the term “arbitrary” means in the context of 
section 25. After considering comparative law regarding deprivation of property, 
Ackermann J concluded that a deprivation of property would be arbitrary for the 
purposes of section 25 when the law referred to in section 25(1) “does not provide 
sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair”.189 
Ackermann J then set out a comprehensive test to establish whether there is 
sufficient reason for the deprivation:  
“(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means employed, 
namely the deprivation in question, and ends sought to be achieved, namely the 
                                            
187 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104.  
188 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 358 (emphasis 
removed). 
189 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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purpose of the law in question. 
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered. 
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the relationship 
between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is 
affected. 
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent of the deprivation 
in respect of such property. 
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a 
corporeal moveable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established in 
order for the depriving law to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation, than 
in the case when the property is something different, and the property right 
something less extensive.  This judgment is not concerned at all with incorporeal 
property. 
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of 
ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling than 
when the deprivation embraces only some incidents of ownership and those 
incidents only partially. 
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of the 
property in question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be circumstances 
when sufficient reason is established by, in effect, no more than a mere rational 
relationship between means and ends; in others this might only be established by 
a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by section 36(1) of the 
Constitution. 
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to be 
decided on all the relevant facts of each particular case, always bearing in mind 
that the enquiry is concerned with ‘arbitrary’ in relation to the deprivation of 
property under section 25.”190 
The methodology set out in FNB is geared towards determining substantive and not 
procedural arbitrariness. Having created the dichotomy between substantive and 
procedural arbitrariness, only substantive arbitrariness was considered. 191  Roux 
                                            
190 Para 100. 
191 The Court did not provide any further content to the concept of procedural arbitrariness, though it 
appears to constitute an independent ground for finding that a deprivation is arbitrary. See further Van 
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observed that this methodology leaves much room for judicial discretion, which 
means that the factors that will be taken into account and the level of scrutiny will 
vary according to the circumstances.192 Therefore, the level of scrutiny “will vacillate 
between two fixed poles: rationality review at the lower end of the scale, and 
something just short of a review for proportionality at the other”.193 Regarding the 
application of the section 36(1) justification analysis, it was assumed that 
infringements of section 25(1) are also subject to the provisions of section 36.194 It 
was unnecessary to embark on a detailed section 36(1) justification analysis in this 
case because a brief application of the factors listed under section 36(1) yielded the 
same conclusion as that reached after applying the arbitrariness test.195   
Proportionality review features in both the first and second stage of a 
constitutional challenge based on section 25. In the section 25(1) stage, it takes the 
form of an arbitrariness review. In the section 36(1) stage, it takes the form of a full 
proportionality review. The kind of review required in section 25(1) is more than mere 
rationality, yet not quite the full proportionality review required by section 36(1). The 
standard of review in section 25(1) can be located on a continuum between thin 
rationality review and something just short of full proportionality review required in 
                                                                                                                                        
der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 264-265; Van der Walt AJ “Procedurally 
arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stell LR 88-94 at 88. 
192 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 
3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 24. 
193 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 
3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 24. 
194 First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 110. 
195 Paras 111-113. 
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section 36(1).196 The difference between the arbitrariness standard in section 25(1) 
and the proportionality test in section 36(1) is that the arbitrariness standard in 
section 25(1) will fluctuate between standards of rationality and something just short 
of proportionality due to the high level of discretion the FNB methodology allows 
judges, while the proportionality test in section 36(1) is a strict proportionality test 
and its standard does not fluctuate at all, regardless of circumstances. Applying both 
the section 25(1) arbitrariness test and the section 36(1) proportionality test confirms 
that the Court follows a two stage approach when inquiring into the constitutional 
validity of a deprivation of property. This two-stage approach is also applied when 
determining the validity of expropriation property. In the first stage, the expropriation 
must comply with the requirements in section 25(2)-(3). The second stage is reached 
if the expropriation does not comply with the requirements and the inquiry becomes 
whether the expropriation is nonetheless justifiable in terms of section 36(1). It is 
improbable that a deprivation or expropriation that is conflict with section 25 could be 
justified under section 36 and therefore any limitation of property that does not 
comply with the specific requirements in section 25 will most likely always be 
unconstitutional.197 
                                            
196 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 243. See further Roux T “Property” in 
Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 
46 at 22; Van der Walt AJ “Striving for a better interpretation – A critical reflection on the 
Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2005) 123 SALJ 854-878 
at 871-872. 
197 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 79. There have been instances that 
suggest that this will not always be the case. An example is the decision of Nhlabati v Fick 2003 (7) 
BCLR 806 (LCC), where it was said, without actually deciding that expropriation was involved, that 
there can be circumstances where the absence of a right to compensation for expropriation would be 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36(1).  
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In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo 
City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng,198 the Court used the wide 
judicial discretion reserved for itself in FNB “to locate the level of scrutiny on the 
rationality side of the continuum rather than the proportionality side”.199 It thus proved 
Roux correct in his observation that the Court had created for itself a wide discretion 
to vacillate between the proportionality-like test used in FNB and something closer to 
mere rationality in terms of section 25(1).200 Proportionality review under section 
36(1) was not resorted to in this case because the deprivation in question was 
regarded as constitutionally valid based on the lower level of scrutiny opted for 
during the section 25(1) arbitrariness review. In Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for 
Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government,201 the Court 
decided that a proportionality-type analysis was appropriate and considered the 
purpose of the law in question, the nature of the property involved, the extent of the 
deprivation and whether there were any less restrictive means available to achieve 
                                            
198  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
199 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 256. See further Roux T “Property” in 
Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 
46 at 24; Van der Walt AJ “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action 
Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 123 SALJ 75-89 at 87-88. 
200 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 
3 2nd ed (OS 2003) ch 46 at 24. See further Van der Walt AJ “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness 
test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” 
(2005) 123 SALJ 75-89 at 82; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 3rd ed (2011) 250. 
201  Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
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the purpose in question. 202  The Court did not engage in a section 36(1) 
proportionality review because the deprivation in this case was deemed to be 
constitutionality valid under the section 25(1) proportionality-type analysis.   
In National Credit Regulator v Opperman,203 it was held that the deprivation 
was not of a partial nature. Rather, it removed an unregistered credit provider’s right 
to restitution and that there had to be convincing reasons for this removal. 204 
Furthermore, given the fact that the deprivation in this case was far reaching, the 
purpose for it should be stated clearly and the means chosen to accomplish it must 
be narrowly framed. The means chosen were disproportionate to the purpose to be 
achieved and therefore section 89(5)(c) resulted in arbitrary deprivation of property in 
breach of section 25(1) of the Constitution.205  
 Having determined that the deprivation in this case was indeed arbitrary, the 
Court, in accordance with the test set out in FNB, analysed whether the arbitrary 
deprivation could be justified in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution. To begin 
with, the Court once again referred to FNB where it was assumed that it must be 
determined whether or not the deprivation is justified under section 36 when it is 
found to be arbitrary.206  Furthermore, many of the factors employed under the 
                                            
202 Para 49. 
203  National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). See further Van der Walt AJ 
“Constitutional property law” 2012 ASSAL 182-199 at 183-187; Brits R “Arbitrary deprivation of 
unregistered credit provider’s right to claim restitution of performance rendered: Opperman v 
Boonzaaier (24887/2010) 2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) and National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC)” (2013) 16 PELJ 422-470 at 434-441; Marais EJ “The constitutionality of 
section 89(6)(c) of the National Credit Act under the property clause: National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman & Others” (2014) 131 SALJ 215-233 at 217-232. 
204 Para 70. 
205 Paras 71-72. 
206 Para 74 referring to First National Bank of Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 110. 
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arbitrariness test to determine sufficiency of reasons yield the same conclusion when 
considering whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable under section 36.207 
Laws impacting on constitutional rights may not use disproportionate means to 
achieve their purpose.208 The failure to allow a court the discretion to distinguish 
between credit providers who intentionally exploit consumers and those who fail to 
register due to ignorance and lend money to a friend on an ad hoc basis is an 
example of a disproportionate means of achieving the section’s purpose.209 The 
Court concluded that all the factors under section 36(1) had already been taken into 
account when determining whether the deprivation in this case was arbitrary. 
Therefore, the Court was not persuaded that section 89(5)(c) could be saved as a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation on the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property.210  
In Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport,211 only the second 
stage proportionality test was employed because in the first stage the Court held that 
the deprivation was procedurally arbitrary under section 25(1).212 The Court had to 
determine whether the deprivation could be considered reasonable and justifiable 
under section 36(1).213 The Court considered if there were any less restrictive means 
available to achieve the purpose. The most obvious is to grant a court the discretion 
to make a just and equitable order, thus allowing for individualised justice. 
Furthermore: 
                                            
207 Para 75. 
208 Para 76. 
209 Para 76. 
210 Para 80. 
211 Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport [2015] ZACC 15, 5 June 2015. 
212 Para 24. 
213 Paras 31-34. 
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“It is excessive, unfair, inequitable and arbitrary to compel, in all circumstances, an 
unregistered credit provider to refund monies paid by the consumer for goods or services 
it actually received or enjoyed, simply because that credit provider is not registered. The 
operative words are ‘in all circumstances’. This is not to suggest that in some 
circumstances this may not be acceptable. The problem is that section 89(5)(b) does not 
admit of exceptions to make it possible for courts to exercise a discretion.”214 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the arbitrary deprivation constituted an 
unjustifiable limitation on the property right in section 25(1) and is constitutionally 
invalid.215  
In the Shoprite decision,216 Froneman J acknowledged that the standard of 
arbitrariness could range from rationality to proportionality.217 The lighter standard 
may be applicable if the nature of the right to property is not strong and the 
deprivation is not too heavy.218 The strongest protection of property will be invoked 
where the protection of the property best enhances or protects other fundamental 
values or rights under the Constitution or where the right to property is extinguished 
completely. 219  If the deprivation is of property that is closely connected to 
fundamental rights and constitutional values, sufficient reason for the deprivation 
should approximate proportionality and if not, rationality might suffice.220 Since the 
                                            
214 Para 33. 
215 Para 34. 
216 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
217 Para 77. See further Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 
822-833 at 830.  
218 Para 77, citing with approval Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v 
Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 34-35. See further 
Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 830. 
219 Para 79, 83. See further Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 
TSAR 822-833 at 830.  
220 Para 80. 
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deprivation did not extinguish any fundamental rights, rationality would suffice to 
avoid a finding of arbitrariness and on this standard the deprivation was held to not 
be arbitrary.221 The Court did not apply the second stage proportionality test because 
the deprivation was regarded as non-arbitrary, stating that “[o]nce an interest is 
identified and the FNB approach to arbitrariness is applied, there can be no further 
independent infringement that would require further justification under section 36”.222  
Rautenbach argues that Froneman J’s cut-off point that proportionality will be 
required if other rights are affected and if not, rationality might suffice is unrealistic 
and too rigid.223 This is so because there may be instances in which the other rights 
are so slightly affected or the purposes of the limitation so overwhelmingly 
compelling that mere rationality will be sufficient, and there could, on the other hand, 
also be instances in which other rights are not affected at all, but the extent of the 
limitation of the right to property is so serious that more than rationality is required.224 
Froneman J concluded in this case that rationality would be a sufficient reason to 
avoid a finding of arbitrariness because the regulatory regime introduced by the 
relevant legislation did not extinguish any fundamental rights of the holders of 
grocer’s wine licences or fundamental constitutional values.225   
In City of Tshwane226 the majority and minority differed on both the level of 
scrutiny and the outcome of the first stage arbitrariness test. The minority, focusing 
on the fact that the deprivation in this case was extensive and that it affected 
                                            
221 Para 83, 86. 
222 Para 87. 
223 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 830. 
224 Rautenbach IM “Dealing with the social dimensions of property” 2015 TSAR 822-833 at 830. 
225 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 83.  
226 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 440 (CC). 
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ownership of land, concluded that a rational connection between the intrusions 
authorised by the legislation and the goal sought to be achieved is insufficient to 
avoid a finding of non-arbitrariness and that compelling reasons for the scale of 
deprivation authorised are required in this case.227 The minority also emphasised the 
lack of information placed before the court to justify such an extensive limitation of 
property rights.228 The above two considerations led the minority to conclude that the 
deprivation is substantively arbitrary.229 The majority adopted a completely different 
approach to the arbitrariness issue, arguing that the deprivation is not substantively 
or procedurally arbitrary because the impugned provision has to be interpreted in a 
way that least changes the common law and that is the least invasive of fundamental 
rights.230 The majority held that it is reasonable to interpret the impugned provision 
as giving effect to the common law, which means that any actions taken under the 
impugned provision has to comply with the common law and therefore the provision 
is neither substantively nor procedurally arbitrary.231  
Regarding the second stage, the minority did not embark on a detailed section 
36(1) justification inquiry. It held that it is unlikely that an arbitrary deprivation may 
still be justified under section 36 because both the arbitrariness and justification 
enquiries involve the same analysis and consideration of similar factors.232 The 
majority did not apply the proportionality test in section 36(1) because it held that the 
deprivation was not arbitrary and therefore a justification inquiry is unnecessary. 
                                            
227 Para 61.  
228 Para 62.   
229 Para 63. 
230 Para 153.  
231 Para 153-154.  
232 Para 77. 
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From the discussion above, it is evident that the Constitutional Court follows a 
two-stage approach when inquiring into whether an interference with property is 
valid. In the context of deprivations of property, the Court first inquires into whether 
the deprivation is arbitrary using the arbitrariness test formulated in FNB. Due to the 
wide scope for judicial discretion that the FNB arbitrariness test allows for, the 
standard of the arbitrariness test can vary and can be placed somewhere on a 
continuum between rationality on the one end and just short of full proportionality 
review on the other. If the deprivation is not found to be arbitrary the inquiry ends 
there but if the deprivation is arbitrary, the inquiry moves to the second stage where 
it must be determined whether the arbitrary deprivation is justifiable under section 
36(1). The standard for the justification inquiry is full proportionality review and does 
not vary. 
A two-stage approach is also employed when determining the validity of 
expropriations. The Court first determines if the requirements for a valid 
expropriation in terms of section 25(2) are satisfied. If not, the Court moves to the 
second stage and applies the same full proportionality review as it does in the 
second stage of the deprivation enquiry. Only one proportionality test is applied 
when determining the validity of an expropriation of property.233  
                                            
233 In the context of expropriation, the Court appears to first determine whether the expropriation 
complies with the requirements for a valid expropriation. If it does, then the inquiry ends there. If it 
does not, the Court inquires in the second stage whether the expropriation is justifiable in terms of 
section 36(1). There have been very few cases in which the Court has inquired into the justifiability of 
an expropriation that does not meet the requirements of section 25(2). In Nhlabati v Fick 2003 (7) 
BCLR 806 (LCC), the Land Claims Court decided that even if the effect of the provision in question is 
seen as expropriation without compensation, that outcome would be justifiable under section 36(1). 
However, the Land Claims Court did not decide that expropriation took place.  
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On the continuum between German and US law, the South African law 
approach to determining the legitimacy of interferences with property appears to be 
closer to the German law approach in this regard.234 German and South African law 
use a contextual approach when determining whether a specific interference is 
unconstitutional. Both the FNB arbitrariness test and the section 36(1) justification 
inquiry consider factors similar to those considered under the German law 
proportionality analysis.    
However, even if the deprivation is found to be arbitrary after applying the 
arbitrariness test, the Court does not always engage in a detailed section 36(1) 
justification inquiry because both the arbitrariness and justification enquiries involve 
the same analysis and consideration of similar factors and therefore the outcome is 
unlikely to be different under the section 36(1) justification inquiry. If the deprivation 
is found to not be arbitrary, then there is no need for a justification enquiry. If an 
expropriation does not satisfy one or more of the requirements it is unconstitutional 
and will probably not be justifiable. Therefore it seems that the justification enquiry in 
terms of section 36(1) is not really significant for the purposes of section 25 because 
limitation of property that does not satisfy the specific requirements in section 25 will 
most likely always be unconstitutional.  
The circumstances of the case are important in determining whether the 
section 36(1) justification inquiry will be valuable or not. The section 36(1) 
justification inquiry could be more valuable when the discretion afforded by the 
arbitrariness test is exercised in favour of mere rationality review. The justification 
inquiry could add another layer of more intense scrutiny to ensure that the 
interference is justified. Only arbitrariness review that is situated towards the 
                                            
234 See 2 4 2 above. 
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proportionality end of the spectrum between rationality and proportionality could be 
said to take the form of a full proportionality review and could make the section 36(1) 
justification inquiry unnecessary because similar factors are considered during the 
arbitrariness review and the outcome would arguably not be different under a 
subsequent section 36(1) inquiry.  
 
5 5 Conclusion  
Section 25 of the Constitution does not contain a definition of property, nor has the 
Constitutional Court attempted to exhaustively define what property is for the 
purposes of section 25. The Court interprets property very widely and has 
recognised a number of interests as constituting property for the purposes of section 
25, including limited real rights in land, movable property such as vehicles, 
intellectual property, a claim for the restitution of money paid based on unjustified 
enrichment and a liquor licence on a case by case basis, thereby defining the 
concept of property over time and on an incremental basis. This means that the 
concept of property is flexible can be expanded as the need for such expansion 
becomes necessary. The Court’s approach of interpreting property widely and 
incrementally adding interests to the concept of property is similar to the German, 
ECHR and US law approach to the interpretation of the concept of property. On a 
doctrinal level, the construction the South African Constitutional Court uses is 
probably the most similar to German law even if not explicitly followed.235 In other 
                                            
235 With the above being said, it is worth mentioning that Froneman J in his majority judgment in 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) did rely on German 
constitutional property jurisprudence (paras 52-55) in his argument for how the South African 
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words, the private law, narrow notion is used as the starting point and incrementally 
a wider constitutional notion is developed by the courts.      
Regarding the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, the Court 
initially adopted a subset approach to this distinction, viewing expropriation as a 
smaller category of interference wholly included in the larger category of deprivation. 
However, the Court appears to have now adopted a categorical approach and 
requiring state acquisition of the property in order to establish expropriation. 
Subsequent decisions have called this into question by referring to interferences with 
property that have the same effect as an expropriation or are treated as a kind of 
expropriation. Interferences like this exist when the categories of deprivation and 
expropriation overlap but a categorical approach does not allow for such an overlap. 
Based on the state acquisition requirement, the approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation appears to be a categorical one for now. On the 
continuum between the German and US law approaches to this distinction, the 
South African law categorical approach is closer to the German law approach.236 The 
South African law approach to the public purpose requirement seems to sit in the 
middle of the strict German law approach and the deferential US law approach. 
Compensation is required only for expropriations and not for deprivations of property, 
though it is possible that expropriation without compensation could be justifiable 
under section 36 of the Constitution. The recognition of a notion like constructive 
expropriation seems inappropriate, given the apparent categorical approach to the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation adopted by the Constitutional 
Court in Agri SA. This approach does not allow for something like constructive 
                                                                                                                                        
constitutional concept should be construed, which indicates that German law was followed to an 
extent.  
236 See 2 3 above. 
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expropriation. However, the Arun and City of Tshwane decisions raise questions 
about whether the Constitutional Court actually follows a categorical approach. While 
the notion of constructive expropriation is not expressly recognised in South African 
law, there is uncertainty regarding whether it will be recognised in the future. 
The Constitutional Court follows a two-stage approach when inquiring into 
whether an interference with property is valid. In the first stage, the Court determines 
whether the interference satisfies the internal requirements of the subsection of 
section 25 that regulates it. The second stage is reached if the interference does not 
satisfy the relevant requirements of section 25. In this stage, the Court applies a 
proportionality test set out in section 36(1) to determine if the interference is 
justifiable, despite failing to meet the necessary validity requirements. Deprivations 
of property are first subjected to arbitrariness review, the standard of which can vary 
between rationality and just short of proportionality due to the wide judicial discretion 
that this test allows for. A finding of arbitrariness moves the inquiry to the second 
stage, which involves the application of full proportionality review in order to 
determine if the arbitrary deprivation is justifiable in the circumstances. The standard 
of review in this second stage does not vary. Therefore, two tests are employed 
when determining the validity of a deprivation of property. A two-stage approach is 
also employed when determining the validity of expropriations. The Court first 
determines if the requirements for a valid expropriation are satisfied. If not, the Court 
moves to the second stage and applies the same full proportionality review as it does 
in the second stage of determining whether a deprivation is justifiable. Only one 
proportionality test is applied when determining the validity of an expropriation of 
property. The South African law approach to determining the legitimacy of 
interferences with property appears to be closer to the German law approach in this 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 267 
regard than the US law approach.237 German and South African law use a contextual 
approach when determining whether a specific interference is unconstitutional. Both 
the FNB arbitrariness test and the justification inquiry consider factors similar to 
those considered under the German law proportionality analysis. 
Case law has indicated that the Court does not always engage in a detailed 
justification inquiry when the interference does not satisfy the specific internal 
requirements because, in the case of deprivations, both the arbitrariness and 
justification enquiries involve the same analysis and consideration of similar factors 
and therefore the outcome is unlikely to be different under the justification inquiry. If 
the deprivation is found to not be arbitrary, there is no need for a justification enquiry 
because the deprivation is valid. If an expropriation does not satisfy one or more of 
the requirements it is unconstitutional and will probably not be justifiable. Therefore it 
seems that the section 36(1) justification enquiry is not really significant for the 
purposes of section 25 because limitation of property that does not satisfy the 
specific requirements in section 25 will most likely always be unconstitutional. 
                                            
237 See 2 4 2 and 2 4 3 above. It should be mentioned that there have been instances where the 
Constitutional Court has exercised its judicial discretion to place the standard of review of deprivations 
of property more towards the rationality end of the spectrum, instead of the proportionality end. See 
for example Froneman J’s judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive 
Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 
125 (CC) and Yacoob J’s judgment in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset 
v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6 1 Introduction  
The primary aim of this dissertation was to investigate the state of constitutional 
property law in certain jurisdictions in Central Eastern Europe. Constitutional 
property law in South Africa was also investigated because South Africa can also be 
characterised as a relatively young constitutional democracy, similar to the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions discussed. The investigation focused on three main 
themes: the concept of property for constitutional purposes; the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation and the application of the proportionality principle as a 
means of determining the legitimacy of interferences with property. The selected 
jurisdictions of Central Eastern Europe and South Africa were chosen because they 
represent relatively new democracies that are still in the process of refining their 
approaches to constitutional property law. German and US constitutional property 
law were briefly described in order to determine if the approaches of either of these 
more established constitutional democracies could be seen in the approaches 
adopted by the Central Eastern European jurisdictions and South Africa. In this 
regard, it was not the purpose to determine whether German or US law were 
specifically cited or deliberately followed by the Central Eastern European 
jurisdictions or South Africa, but rather to assess whether the approaches adopted in 
these “new democracies” resembled German or US law. The European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECHR) principles regarding the protection of property were also 
discussed because they represent another framework that might influence the 
development of specifically the Central Eastern European jurisdictions’ constitutional 
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property law, especially since all the Central Eastern European jurisdictions 
discussed in chapter 4 are members of the Council of Europe and signatories to the 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
 Another aim of this investigation was to determine what sources are available 
in English that could assist in investigating constitutional property law in Central 
Eastern Europe. This was the main difficulty that I encountered during this 
investigation. Certain regions had considerable case law translated into English, 
whereas others had only a handful of useful cases translated or simplified media 
summaries translated into English. While these were still useful to my investigation, 
they would often state principles without explaining what those principles mean or 
how they are applied. This has inevitably led to certain discussions being more brief 
than others due to a lack of sources. In this regard, it was challenging to further 
elaborate on particular aspects because of a lack of sources. Be that as it may, a 
number of quite specific conclusions can nonetheless be drawn in relation to the 
three themes in the respective jurisdictions.   
   
6 2 Conclusions 
6 2 1 Established doctrine in German and US law 
The chapter on German and US law sought to set out the approach of the respective 
jurisdictions in relation to how property is defined for constitutional purposes, how to 
distinguish between deprivation and expropriation of property and the application of 
the proportionality principle as a means to test the legitimacy of an interference with 
constitutionally protected rights. The chapter is set up with the purpose of 
representing these two jurisdictions as two markers, or points on a continuum, 
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specifically in relation to these three questions. The chapter reveals that German and 
US constitutional property law represent two different approaches to the three main 
themes. However, in some instances the outcomes of the two jurisdictions are 
similar but they clearly use different methodologies and for different reasons. The 
German constitutional property law system is regulated by the Basic Law and 
legislation, with clear requirements that must be followed in order for the protection 
provided by Article 14 to be applicable. These requirements are enforced strictly and 
failure to comply with them will result in invalidity. US constitutional property law 
relies less on legislation and more on the wording of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and doctrine developed by the courts over time.  
Despite the difference in the general point of departure in these jurisdictions, 
both German and US law have a wide constitutional notion of property that begins 
with the private law concept but then, in the case of German law, goes beyond it. In 
German law a wider notion of property is consciously developed for constitutional 
law in terms of Article 14. The constitutional notion of property in these two 
jurisdictions ends up including most well-known and recognised rights and interests 
in property. Both German and US law exclude from protection non-property interests 
such as the general wealth of an individual and mere expectations. German and US 
law also treat certain categories of property rights differently, such as public 
participation rights. Under German law, these rights are protected as property for all 
intents and purposes, whereas in US law these rights are only regarded as property 
for the purposes of due process and therefore cannot be the object of a taking 
requiring compensation. A difference between German and US law is that property in 
German law is not a pre-constitutional right because Article 14 explicitly empowers 
the legislature to determine its content and limits. In US law, it can be implied that at 
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least some property rights are pre-constitutional because the source of property is 
state law.  
In terms of the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, German and 
US constitutional property law diverge quite significantly. German law views these 
two forms of interference with property as being distinct from each other, as 
evidenced by the different validity requirements for each of them. This strict 
enforcement of these requirements is why the concept of constructive expropriation 
or regulatory takings has no place in German constitutional property law. A 
constructive expropriation of property does not comply with the requirements of a 
regulation or an expropriation and is therefore constitutionally invalid.  This approach 
means that there is no grey area between a deprivation and an expropriation of 
property; an interference with property is either a deprivation (regulation) or an 
expropriation. It is not possible for a regulation of property to be transformed into an 
expropriation by judicial interpretation; any attempted regulation of property that does 
not satisfy the requirements is constitutionally invalid. Thus, constructive 
expropriation is not recognised in German law.  
US law approaches the deprivation (regulation) and expropriation (taking) of 
property in a manner opposite to the German law approach. US law treats these two 
forms of interference as points on a continuum, with a grey area existing in between. 
It is in this grey area that the regulatory takings doctrine finds its application. This 
approach has led to much confusion surrounding US takings law and discrepancies 
in the judgments of the courts adjudicating constitutional property matters. This 
approach also allowed for the creation of the regulatory takings doctrine, which in 
itself is confusing with unpredictable results at times. 
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There are however similarities between the German and US law approach to 
deprivation and expropriation, particularly with regard to excessive regulation of 
property. Both German and US law place a strong emphasis on the formal source or 
power to perform either regulation or expropriation of property. The consequences of 
attempting to interfere with property using the incorrect power are quite similar in 
German and US law. Where the state’s regulation of property using the police power 
is excessive, German law will regard the regulation as constitutionally invalid if it 
does not meet the requirements of a valid regulation of property; compensation in 
the form of equalisation may nonetheless be payable if it has been specifically 
provided for in the legislation. In US law, excessive regulation may be struck down 
as constitutionally invalid for being an improper use of the police power or it may give 
rise to a claim for expropriatory compensation because it amounts to a regulatory 
taking. In this regard, equalisation payment is not the same as expropriatory 
compensation. Furthermore, in both systems, the provision of some form of 
equalisation or compensation does not legitimise the unconstitutional interference. 
The interference remains unconstitutional with the equalisation or compensation 
serving to alleviate the excessive burden placed on the property holder or holders in 
question.  
Both German and US law require that expropriation of property be either in the 
public interest or for a public use, however this requirement is approached differently 
in these two jurisdictions. Whereas German law interprets this requirement strictly, 
the US Supreme Court has adopted a highly deferential approach to this 
requirement. The payment of compensation for expropriation is required in both 
German and US law, although the reasoning behind and the intricacies related to 
compensation, differs in some respects. German law requires that the legislation 
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authorising the expropriation must provide for compensation, specify the type and 
extent of compensation and such compensation must reflect a fair balance between 
the public interest and the interests of those affected. On the other hand, US law 
requires that just compensation is required in the event of expropriation. This does 
not necessarily mean that full compensation will be paid. Rather, compensation is 
determined according to the fair market value standard. As mentioned above, 
whereas US law provides for expropriatory compensation to be paid in the event of a 
regulatory taking, German law does not. German law allows for equalisation to be 
paid to an owner whose property rights have been unintentionally infringed by 
legislation, but this is not compensation for expropriation. 
Regarding proportionality, the approach of German and US law diverges. 
Proportionality is a well-established principle of German constitutional law and is the 
primary method of testing the legitimacy of state interference with property. 
Proportionality takes two forms in German law. The first is a general application test, 
asking whether law of general application has infringed the right in question, whether 
the infringement is necessary, whether the infringement is properly authorised and 
asks whether the ends of the regulation justify of the means, generally speaking. The 
second form focuses on the effect of the regulation on the individual property owner. 
Proportionality is not unheard of in US law, but is only applied in certain cases, most 
notably in cases of regulatory takings and exactions. The primary method of 
determining the constitutionality of takings of property is judicial balancing. Judicial 
balancing involves weighing up a number of factors in an abstract manner within a 
single calculation with the focus on the effect on the individual property owner or 
owners in question. In this regard, it is not really concerned with a general 
application test.  
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6 2 2 The influence of the ECHR 
Another framework that might influence the development of constitutional property 
law in the Central Eastern European jurisdictions is the doctrine regarding the 
protection of possessions developed by the ECHR. The special role of the ECHR on 
the new democracies in Central Eastern Europe was discussed in chapter 3. The 
chapter showed that the ECHR influences the member states of the European 
Union, especially the Central Eastern European members. The existing law of 
Central Eastern European countries that seek to become members of the European 
Union in the aftermath of the fall of Communism may be influenced by the principles 
and case law of the ECHR. In order to deal with potentially conflicting existing law of 
the member states of the European Union, particularly in the case of property 
disputes, the ECHR has developed the autonomous meaning doctrine regarding the 
definition of “possessions” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (Article 1). 
This doctrine was initially developed with a focus on Article 6 but was later also used 
in property disputes. This doctrine allows the ECHR to determine for itself whether a 
particular interest constitutes a possession for the purposes of Article 1. This 
prevents the member states from legislating that a particular interest is not property 
so as to frustrate or prevent potential applicants’ claims from being brought before 
the ECHR. Therefore, the ECHR’s interpretation is not dependent on any domestic 
law definitions of property. It will consider domestic law to determine if the interest in 
question is property in the domestic law of the state in question and if so, it will 
regard the interest as a possession for the purpose of Article 1. However, if the 
interest is not recognised as property in the domestic law of the state in question, the 
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autonomous meaning doctrine allows the ECHR to determine if the interest in 
question is a possession for the purposes of Article 1 or not.   
The ECHR has also developed something of a distinction between the 
deprivation (regulation) and expropriation of property. In this regard, the ECHR has 
interpreted the term “deprived” in Article 1 to mean expropriation of property. This 
expropriation must be in line with some public interest and subject to any conditions 
on expropriation in the domestic law of the member state as well as the principles of 
international law. In the third paragraph of Article 1, provision is made for the 
individual member states to control the use of property within their own jurisdictions. 
This provision allows the member states to control the use of property through any 
regulations that they deem necessary. A wide degree of deference is provided to the 
member states regarding the measures that they may implement for this purpose. 
However, this degree of deference is not unlimited. The ECHR will intervene when a 
measure implemented by a member state to control the use of property is manifestly 
unreasonable in the circumstances. The three-rule structure of Article 1 appears to 
indicate that the ECHR treats deprivation (expropriation) and regulation of property 
as two discrete categories that do not overlap. While both must comply with the 
principle of lawfulness, be in the public or general interest and comply with the 
principle of proportionality, each constitutes a unique interference with the right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions. In the context of deprivation (expropriation), the 
first rule of Article 1 does not explicitly state that compensation is required for 
deprivations to be valid, though the ECHR has stated that compensation is required 
for deprivations in order to maintain a fair balance. 
It is uncertain whether the ECHR recognises something like a notion of 
constructive expropriation. A small number of decisions appear to have created the 
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space for something like constructive expropriation but the authority for doing so is 
not clear. The ECHR’s inconsistency in classifying interferences under the three 
rules in Article 1 has led to decisions that appear to constitute a third category of 
interference with possessions. The interferences in this category are judged under 
the first rule of Article 1. If the ECHR awards compensation for interferences judged 
under the first rule, for example a monetary amount as just satisfaction under Article 
50, then that compensation will not be compensation for expropriation. Rather, this 
compensation would resemble either a general award of constitutional damages or 
compensation in terms of the equalisation awards that are allowed in German law.    
When there is an interference with a right in the Convention, the ECHR must 
determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights. Proportionality analysis has been incorporated into 
the fair balance inquiry and is described as playing a central role in the jurisprudence 
of the ECHR. An important aspect of the fair balance inquiry is the margin of 
appreciation afforded to member states. The ECHR will defer to the member states 
regarding the implementation of legislation and policy within their jurisdictions. The 
rationale for this level of deference is that the legislatures of the member states are 
in the best position to legislate on matters in the jurisdiction than the international 
judge. This margin of appreciation further enforces the ECHR’s supervisory role in 
that the ECHR cannot dictate to the legislatures of the member states how to protect 
property rights or other rights in their respective jurisdictions. 
The ECHR is a supervisory body aimed at enforcing the protection of the rights 
in the Convention and to ensure that member states provide for this protection. While 
it cannot directly dictate to the member states what principles they should adopt and 
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how they should do so, the ECHR can influence the existing law of the member 
states to bring it in line with the principles developed by the ECHR. This influence is 
most notable in member states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose use of 
ECHR principles and case law is incredibly prolific and used to provide content to 
their right to property. Other Central Eastern European member states, such as the 
Russian Federation, make use of ECHR principles and case law to a more limited 
extent, while others, such as Hungary, do not use them at all. Nonetheless, the 
ECHR’s doctrine could potentially influence the developmental direction that an 
emerging democracy’s laws and policies take if it wishes to be a member of the 
European Union and to have access to the ECHR. 
 
6 2 3 The Central Eastern European jurisdictions   
The Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in chapter 4 all opted for 
constitutionally democratic approaches, with emphasis on the protection of 
fundamental rights. A number of the constitutional courts use the principles and case 
law of the ECHR, which is unsurprising given the fact that they are signatories to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. The principles and the case law of the ECHR have clearly had a major 
impact on the development of the constitutional law of Central Eastern Europe, with 
these principles being used to provide content to otherwise vague rights, or as a 
secondary set of norms which can be applied to test the constitutional validity of 
interferences with property rights, as is the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Moldova, the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. However, not all 
of the constitutional courts choose to rely on the principles and case law of the 
ECHR, for example Estonia and Hungary. Although it remains difficult to make an 
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overall assessment in relation to the three broad themes investigated, there are 
nonetheless a number of conclusions that can be drawn in relation to the concept of 
property for constitutional purposes, the distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation and the application of the proportionality principle.   
All of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions have adopted a broad concept 
of property for constitutional purposes that include a number of interests, including 
monetary claims, pension rights, legitimate expectations and other rights having 
economic value. The Constitutional Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova 
use the principles and case law regarding the definition of “possessions” developed 
by the ECHR, apparently to provide content to the often vague right to property or 
the right of ownership provided for in the jurisdictions’ property clauses. Similar to the 
approaches in German and US constitutional property law, no attempt has been 
made to exhaustively define what constitutes property for constitutional purposes. 
The Central Eastern European jurisdictions appear to approach the concept of 
property from a constitutional perspective, recognising each new interest as property 
individually, and not from a private law notion that is incrementally expanded on a 
case by case basis as Germany, the US and South Africa do.   
All of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions also make provision for the 
restriction of property rights, either explicitly in the text of the property clause or 
through interpretation. Those constitutional property clauses that do refer to the 
restriction of property rights explicitly use varying terminology. Deprivation is referred 
to in some of the property clauses but this term is most often understood to mean 
expropriation instead of regulation of property, similar to the approach of the ECHR. 
Other property clauses use different terms for regulation of property such as 
“restriction” or “limitation”. Expropriation is specifically referred to in some clauses 
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while others refer to this type of interference in different ways, such as the rescission 
of ownership or the forced confiscation of property.  
A consistent requirement for expropriation in all of the Central Eastern 
European constitutional property clauses discussed is that there must be 
compensation for expropriation of property. That being said, the other requirements 
for expropriation vary among the property clauses discussed. Whereas some 
property clauses require that the expropriation be for some public purpose or public 
use, others do not mention a public purpose or public use requirement at all. 
Similarly, not all of the property clauses require legislation that specifically authorises 
expropriation. Some require a different form of authorisation; for example, a court 
order to authorise expropriation. While all of the property clauses discussed refer to 
expropriation in one way or another, not all of them refer to the regulation of 
property. As already mentioned, those that do refer to regulation use varying 
terminology, referring to the restriction or limitation of property. Regarding the 
regulation of property, it appears that Central Eastern European jurisdictions follow 
one of two paths. Whereas some will apply the ECHR’s principles regarding the 
regulation of property, others apply their own principles for the regulation of property. 
On the continuum between the German and US law approaches, those Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions that do not apply the ECHR’s principles regarding the 
regulation and expropriation of property, for example Estonia and Hungary, lean 
more towards the German law approach end of the continuum, without explicitly 
following German law.  
None of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed appear to 
recognise something like a notion of an excessive regulation being validated through 
compensation. In this regard, most jurisdictions specifically state that an interference 
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that is disproportionate will be unconstitutional. No provision is made for something 
similar to equalisation payments like in German law, nor does there appear to be 
recognition of something like regulatory takings as in US law. 
Each of the Central Eastern European jurisdictions discussed in chapter 4 
applies some form of proportionality review. The methods of application of the 
proportionality review differ among the Central Eastern European jurisdictions but 
they all do something similar in that they test the interference with property to 
determine if is proportionate and therefore constitutional. The jurisdictions that apply 
their own interpretation of the proportionality principle appear to employ a contextual 
approach. Certain factors are considered to determine if the interference is 
proportionate in the circumstances of the particular case. Therefore, the application 
of the proportionality principle by these jurisdictions appears to lean more to the 
German law end of the continuum than the US law end. Those jurisdictions that 
apply the ECHR’s fair balance principle appear to be, in substance, following more of 
a German law approach than a US law approach, again, without explicitly referring to 
German law. 
In light of the conclusions reached above, the best way forward for the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions discussed would perhaps be to continue with their 
current approaches to constitutional property law. Those jurisdictions that rely on the 
principles of the ECHR should arguably continue to do so because doing so provides 
certain advantages to such young constitutional democracies. These advantages 
include access to fully developed constitutional property law principles specifically 
tailored to the European legal environment and access to an objective tribunal 
beyond the highest court of any individual member state. These advantages make 
the application of ECHR principles very attractive for Central Eastern European 
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constitutional democracies and this approach is more viable than applying US 
constitutional property law, for example. The Central Eastern European jurisdictions 
that apply their own constitutional property law principles reach a result that is similar 
to German law, though they do not explicitly cite German law. Given the option of 
following either German or US law, these Central Eastern European jurisdictions 
appear to be more inclined towards following an approach that is similar to German 
law rather than US law. Therefore, albeit not expressly, German constitutional 
property law appears to have greater influence in the development of the 
constitutional property law of these Central Eastern European jurisdictions than US 
law.  
 
6 2 4 South African law 
In chapter 5, the South African law regarding the concept of property for 
constitutional purposes, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation and 
the application of the proportionality principle is discussed. Section 25 of the South 
African Constitution does not contain a definition of property, nor has the 
Constitutional Court attempted to exhaustively define what property is for the 
purposes of section 25. The term “property” is interpreted very widely and a number 
of interests are recognised as property for the purposes of section 25, including 
limited real rights in land, movable property such as vehicles, intellectual property, a 
claim for the restitution of money paid based on unjustified enrichment and a liquor 
licence on a case by case basis. New interests are added over time and on an 
incremental basis. This means that the concept of property is flexible and can be 
expanded as the need for such expansion arises. The Court’s approach of 
interpreting property widely and incrementally, adding interests to the concept of 
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property on a case by case basis, is similar to the German, ECHR and US law 
approach to the interpretation of the concept of property. Doctrinally the construction 
that the South African Constitutional Court uses is probably the most similar to 
German law even if German law is not explicitly followed. In other words, the private 
law, narrow notion is used as the starting point and incrementally a wider 
constitutional notion is developed by courts. Although the examples from the Central 
Eastern European jurisdictions, or even other comparative jurisdictions’ examples 
would not change how the constitutional concept of property is being developed in 
South African law, some specific examples might be interesting to consider in case 
by case development in the future, such as the land and housing cases decided by 
the ECHR and identified in chapter 2. In South Africa, informal land rights will be 
interesting to consider when thinking about how the constitutional concept of 
property will be interpreted in the future. The South African law approach to the 
constitutional concept of property is fairly unproblematic. The incremental expansion 
so far has resulted in a broad concept of property for constitutional purposes and has 
yielded results that are in line with other constitutional democracies in this regard.    
Regarding the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, the Court 
initially adopted a subset approach to this distinction, viewing expropriation as a 
smaller category of interference wholly included in the larger category of deprivation. 
However, the Court appears to have now adopted a categorical approach between 
the notions of deprivation and expropriation, requiring state acquisition of the 
property in order to establish expropriation, similar to the pre-constitutional 
understanding of the notions. Subsequent decisions have called this approach into 
question by referring to interferences with property that have the same effect as an 
expropriation as a kind of expropriation. Interferences of this nature usually exist 
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where there is an overlapping of the notions of deprivation and expropriation but a 
categorical approach does not allow for such an overlap. Based on the state 
acquisition requirement, the approach to the distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation appears to be a categorical one for now, although statements by the 
Constitutional Court that an interference can be a kind of expropriation makes an 
overall conclusion about the distinction between deprivation and expropriation really 
difficult to draw. On the continuum between the German and US law approaches to 
this distinction, the apparently categorical South African law approach is closer to the 
German law end of the continuum. The uncertainty in US law regarding this 
distinction makes something like the categorical approach in German law very 
attractive to South African law. What is necessary is clarity from the Constitutional 
Court regarding whether South African law actually follows a categorical approach to 
the distinction between deprivation and expropriation or not.  
The South African law approach to the public purpose requirement seems to sit 
in the middle of the strict German law approach and the deferential US law 
approach. Compensation is required only for expropriations and not for deprivations 
of property, though it appears that it is possible that expropriation without 
compensation could be justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution. The 
recognition of a notion like constructive expropriation seems inappropriate in South 
African law, given the apparent categorical approach to the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation adopted by the Constitutional Court in Agri SA. This 
approach does not allow for something like constructive expropriation. However, the 
Arun and City of Tshwane decisions, at the very least, raise questions about whether 
the Constitutional Court actually follows a categorical approach. While the notion of 
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constructive expropriation is not expressly recognised in South African law, there is 
uncertainty regarding whether it will be recognised in the future. 
Regarding the South African law approach to proportionality, the Constitutional 
Court follows a two-stage approach when inquiring into whether an interference with 
property is valid. In the first stage, the Court determines whether the interference 
satisfies the internal requirements of section 25. The second stage is reached if the 
interference does not satisfy the relevant requirements. In this stage, the Court 
applies a proportionality test provided in section 36(1) to determine if the interference 
is justifiable, despite failing to meet the necessary validity requirements of section 
25. Deprivations of property are first subjected to the arbitrariness review, the 
standard of which can vary between rationality and just short of proportionality due to 
the wide judicial discretion that this test allows. A finding of arbitrariness moves the 
inquiry to the second stage, which involves the application of full proportionality 
review in order to determine if the arbitrary deprivation is justifiable in the 
circumstances. The standard of review in this second stage does not vary. 
Therefore, two tests are employed when determining the validity of a deprivation of 
property.  
A two-stage approach is also employed when determining the validity of 
expropriations. The Court first determines if the requirements for a valid 
expropriation in terms of section 25(2) are satisfied. If not, the Court moves to the 
second stage and applies the same full proportionality review as it does in the 
second stage of the deprivation enquiry. Only one proportionality test is applied 
when determining the validity of an expropriation of property. The South African law 
approach to determining the legitimacy of interferences with property appears to 
resemble the German law approach.  
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Case law has indicated that the Court does not always engage in a detailed 
justification inquiry when the interference does not satisfy the specific internal 
requirements of section 25 because, in the case of deprivations, both the 
arbitrariness and justification enquiries involve the same analysis and consideration 
of similar factors and therefore the outcome is unlikely to be different under the 
justification inquiry. If the deprivation is not arbitrary, there is no need for a 
justification enquiry because the deprivation is valid. If an expropriation does not 
satisfy one or more of the requirements it is unconstitutional and will probably not be 
justifiable either. Therefore it seems that the section 36(1) justification enquiry is not 
really significant for the purposes of section 25 because limitation of property that 
does not satisfy the specific requirements in section 25 will most likely always be 
unconstitutional. While the two-stage approach is adequate and effective in theory, 
more clarity is required regarding its application by the Constitutional Court, 
specifically in those cases where the proportionality inquiry proceeds to the second 
stage proportionality test under section 36(1).    
Given the conclusions reached regarding South African constitutional property 
law, the way forward is less clear. Whereas the South African approach to the 
interpretation of property and the application of the proportionality principle is 
relatively straightforward and for the most part consistent, the approach to the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation is much less clear. It appears that 
a categorical approach has been adopted again, with state acquisition of property 
now a requirement for expropriation of property. This position is further bolstered by 
the inclusion of a definition for expropriation in the 2015 Expropriation Bill, which is 
girdled in state acquisition. It is uncertain whether this approach will be consistently 
followed because interferences have been regarded as being a kind of expropriation 
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or having the same effect as an expropriation (so called de facto expropriations). 
This characterisation conflicts with the apparent categorical approach because under 
this approach an interference is an expropriation or it is not. It remains to be seen 
whether this apparent categorical approach will be applied in subsequent decisions.  
South African law appears to follow an approach to the constitutional concept 
of property and the application of the proportionality principle that resembles German 
law. The South African law approach to the distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation is less straightforward. Where the approach to distinguishing these two 
notions is categorical with state acquisition being a requirement for expropriation but 
not deprivations, the approach bears a striking resemblance to the German law 
approach to the distinction. However, the Constitutional Court’s references to 
interferences that have the same effect as expropriation as a kind of expropriation 
indicates an approach that is similar to US law, which recognises an overlap 
between deprivations and expropriations. This overlap allows for the recognition of 
interferences that have the same effect as an expropriation, which may in some 
instances require compensation. At this point it is difficult to draw a general 
conclusion regarding what kind of approach to the distinction between deprivation 
and expropriation South African law uses and therefore it is difficult to determine 
whether the South African law approach, at least as far as the distinction between 
deprivation and expropriation is concerned, resembles either German or US law. 
That being said, the apparent adoption of a categorical approach to the distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation, which seems to exclude the notion of 
something like constructive expropriation, seems to indicate that the South African 
approach tends more towards the approach in German law than US law.   
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